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A N D J A C Q U E S D E L O R S . 
M A S T E R O F A R T S . 
1997. 
A B S T R A C T . 
The antipathy between Thatcher and Delors is examined, in particular 
their socio-economic divide and its influence upon their conflicting 
visions of the future of the EC. Thatcher was a neo-liberal realist with 
an inherent distrust and suspicion of the EC; she equated it with her 
domestic attack upon the post-1945 Keynesian consensus. She was 
divided from Delors over many issues, including national concepts and 
the US relationship; however, underlining this division was her vision of 
a total Europe-wide free market, with little regulation to hinder market 
forces. She saw the SEA as a vital step in the creation of her vision of 
the EC - a stateless market. 
Delors, the personalist and pragmatic socialist, had a contrasting 
vision of Europe. His philosophy was critical of liberalism in that it put 
community before individuality; he supported protection, wanted 
regulation in the market, and believed everybody should be helped, 
especially the agricultural community for which he had a near spiritual 
affection. He saw the SEA as a stage in the development of EC 
integration; the Delors' package, E^MU, the social dimension and 
political union were all part of his vision of the creation of state-like 
structures to avoid the stateless market. That was when the division 
with Thatcher could be clearly seen and became more personal. 
Thatcher and Delors were the extremes of the debate; the more realistic 
way forward for the EC appeared the middle way with 
inter-governmental bargaining slowing integration, making Europe more 
than the pure free market visualized by Thatcher but less than the more 
integrated state which was the dream of Delors. 
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I . I N T R O D U C T I O N . 
Delorism and Thatcherism will define as they do today the extremes of the 
European debate. (1) 
This study will assess the antipathy between Margaret Thatcher and 
Jacques Delors. Their division of opinion and conflicting visions had 
many contributory factors. Thatcher inherited the British historical 
preoccupation with sovereignty and national independence and British 
suspicions of Europe and the importance of the relationship with the 
US. She was also influenced by issues of national interest and 
nationalism, the pressures of party politics and the influence of 
economic and elite interest groups. 
However with Thatcher and her extreme neo-liberalism these 
differences were exaggerated. This study will show that the conflict 
between Thatcher and Delors was intensified and there was a 
socio-economic ideological chasm over the role of the market and the 
state and ultimately over the future of Europe. 
Thatcher was an ideologically motivated Prime Minister whose belief 
in 19th. Century economic liberalism (neo-liberalism) and free market 
concepts dictated her relationship with Delors and the European 
Community (EC). She saw in Delors a strand of thought in Europe 
which she equated with the post-war British Keynesian consensus, its 
compromises and ultimate failure. 
Her relationship with the EC changed over the period discussed. She 
was unbending in pursuit of a "fair deal" on the budget issue and 
attacked the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and EC finances from 
the Strasbourg Council in 1979 to Fountainbleau in 1984; she promoted 
the concept of the single market and signed the SEA; finally she was 
the nationalist who opposed the EC she had helped to create and 
feared a potential superstate - a "Leviathan" which would pervert and 
regulate the market. 
Her view of Delors also changed. In 1984 she knew he was a 
financially prudent finance minister whose socialism was pragmatic; in 
1986 she believed he was a federalist with his own agenda and 
humiliated him at the press conference following the London Council; 
but it was not until 1988 that her dislike became intense, personal 
animosity developed and he became the epitome of everything she 
disliked about the EC. 
Delors' character also played a role in this divide and he was not an 
innocent party hand-bagged by a wild woman. Delors was a personaiist, 
socialist and dirigiste who was critical of liberalism, believed in state 
intervention, had a vision and was as determined as Thatcher to turn it 
into reality. The conflict became intense over the future of Europe 
following the SEA when Delors' plans for European state building 
became major issues in the EC. 
The divide can be illustrated by applying a theor}' of European 
integration and by examining different views on regulation. Paul 
Kapteyn uses the Single European Act (SEA) and its repercussions to 
examine three possible scenarios for EC development. The first 
8 
scenario is Thatchers vision of the stateless market, where there is no 
regulation and the gap between the negative integration of the market 
and the positive integration- of state-like structures is very wide. (2) To 
Kapteyn: "Certainly in the period of Margaret Thatcher's premiership a 
form of economic liberalism was allied with a conservative nationalism, 
thus supporting a market without a state." (3) In the past the state was 
built before the market, but with the SEA a market was built without 
state-like structures - a market without a state. The momentum towards 
state building which followed the SEA was an attempt to redress this 
balance, to narrow the gap between the negative integration of the 
market and the positive integration of the state. "The downward spiral" 
is what he calls the "grimmest" scenario, where there are no controls 
amidst rampant competition, which ultimately will result in a return to 
national protection. (4) This scenario is near to the vision of Thatcher. 
She promoted the single market project after the settlement at 
Fountainbleau and believed she could restrict integration to a negative 
form and produce a giant free trade area - Thatcherism on a European 
scale. 
The SEA disappointed Thatcher, as negative integration became 
positive with the paquet Delors, economic and monetan>' union (EMU), 
the social dimension and talk of political union. Kapteyn's second 
scenario is of a transfer of national government powers to a central 
supra-national European government which would narrow the gap 
between negative and positive integration. This form of state building, 
to avoid the "stateless market", is near to the vision of Delors. There 
would not be a stateless market and the downward spiral of 
uncontrolled competition would be resisted. (5) The proposals, 
promoted by Delors, that followed the SEA were attempts to move in 
that direction. 
However, the resistance to EMU, the social dimension and political 
union made the more obvious scenario for EC integration the third 
option, interstate cooperation, with a greater role for intergovernmental 
bargaining and due to the fear of loss of national sovereignty there 
would be a restriction on the amount of supra-nationalism. That 
scenario stops the downward spiral of the stateless market but stops 
short of state building. (6) It is a form of middle way between the t\\'o 
extremes, represented by Thatcher and Delors. This was the 
compromise and to Kapteyn the most likely way forward. (7) 
Kapteyn helps illustrate the divide between Thatcher and Delors as 
does the issue of regulation. Both Steven Woolcock and Kenneth 
Dyson compare British and German attitudes to regulation. The 
German system provides a good comparison because "....the German 
approach to market regulation has developed in parallel with the 
evolution of the Community." (8) According to Woolcock, the SEA had 
a link with domestic policy which had seen much deregulation in the 
industrial sector since 1979. The regulation that was introduced was to 
ensure liberalization of the market. (9) To the British, regulation rests 
with an interpretation of public interest by the government of the day. 
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(10) 
The German approach emphasizes the establishment of a framework 
via the general consensus of policy objectives, the detail being 
implemented at a lower level. German regulation is "anchored in 
statute" and allows the free flow of the market within set parameters. 
(11) 
To Dyson, the British view of regulation is less government-led, and 
has a market approach where regulation comes from market failures. 
There is a resistance to an institutionalization of regulation. The 
German variant has regulation as part of the legal framework, as an 
embodiment of public requirements and as part of the "domestic 
political consensus about the proper relationship, between the state and 
the economy." (12) 
Delors' opinion on harmonization, on a more consensual and 
corporatist approach and the necessity to regulate to make the market 
work in the public (as well as the private) interest reflects a great deal 
of the German regulatory culture. (13) 
The British view of regulation provides a continuity in policy towards 
the EC. However, as with many other issues, with Thatcher it became 
more intense and the divide with Europe more pronounced. 
By 1990, there was the contrast between a pragmatist who, despite 
the slowing down of his vision through public scepticism and recession, 
retired gracefully and with dignity at the end of his term; and Thatcher, 
who seemed the intransigent ideologue who could only say "no no no" 
11 
to such an extent that she alienated the "true believers", lost the support 
of her party, and was destroyed by "treachery with a smile on its face." 
(14) 
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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N . 
1 Grant, C, Inside The House That Jacques Built (London, 1994), p. 
283. 
2 Kapteyn, P, The Stateless MarJ(et (London, 1996), pp. 69-70. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., pp. 73-91. This scenario creates its own problems, including, 
fraud, unfair competition, border controls and contradictory national 
laws. One problem is the Schengen Treaty of open borders and the 
different national laws, for example the Dutch drug laws are less 
strict than the German. See also. Ibid., p. 69. This scenario of 
uncontrolled competition could drive states back towards national 
barriers. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Woolcock, S, et. al., Britain, Germany and 1992 (London, 1991), p. 
102. See also, Ibid, "....both Germany and the EC have drawn on 
similar philosophies in order to deal with the issue of how to 
structure regulatory policy in a liberal economy that comprises a 
number of different states." 
9 Ibid., p. 96. 
10 Ibid., p. 97. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Dyson, K, "Regulatoiy Culture and Regulatory Change: Some 
Conclusions", pp. 257-271 in K. Dyson (ed). The Politics of German 
Regulation (Aldershot, 1992), pp. 259-260. See also, Lehmbruch, 
G, "The Institutional Framework of German Regulation", pp. 29-52 
in K. Dyson (ed). The Politics of German Regulation, p. 36. The 
British wish to regulate only where necessary; there is an influence 
of outside bodies, for e.xample, the Adam Smith Institute; and a 
reluctance of the state to take the lead and usually only when 
invited. Webber, D, "The Politics of Regulatory Change in the 
German Health Sector", pp. 209-234 in K. Dyson (ed). The Politics 
of German Regulation, p. 225. This culture was exaggerated by the 
Thatcher government with the exclusion from regulatory discussions 
of interest groups and lobbies, as well as trade unions. 
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13 Ibid., pp. 259-60. 
14 Thatcher, M , interviewed in, Tibbernam, P, The Downing Street 
Years (BBC TV 1993). 
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2. V I E W S ON T H E T H A T C H E R D E L O R S A N T I P A T H Y . 
There are various interpretations of the antipathy between Thatcher and 
Delors and they can be categorized as follows: 
1. The personality clash. 
2. The importance of the domestic audience. 
3. The free trade and cooperation argument versus the protection and 
integration view. 
4. The intergovernmentalism versus supra-nationalism and federalism 
debate. 
5. The role of the market. 
1. The personaHty clash. Charies Grant in a biography of Delors 
said that Thatcher had a dislike for both Frenchmen and 
Commissioners. He quoted an unnamed diplomat who said that 
personalities rather than ideology caused the problem between them. (1) 
There was a personality clash but her treatment of Delors seemed no 
better or worse than that of her own cabinet members, especially Sir 
Geoffrey Howe. (2) 
2. The importance of the domestic audience. To Hugo Young in his 
biography of Thatcher, Delors was a breed of politician with whom she 
was not used to dealing; a man of the left who had to be taken 
seriously. Young states that Delors filled a need for Thatcher; like 
Scargill and Galtieri he entered the "lexicon" of a leader who always had 
to have conspicuous enemies, upon whom she could focus her fury. He 
quoted Howe, who believed she was not just anti-Delors; but was and 
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always had been anti-European and that the antagonism had perhaps 
more to do with domestic nationalist politics than anything else. (3) 
Domestic politics naturally influenced Thatcher in that she was 
elected on a set programme and saw the EC as an obstacle. Her views 
did appeal to a nationalist audience but she was far more sophisticated 
than a simple nationalist. She knew the limitations of the nation state 
in the global world of today and had a world outlook. But it was an 
outlook which was neo-liberal and monetarist as illustrated by her 
friendship with Reagan and the debates over the SEA, EMU and social 
dimension. 
3. Free trade versus protection. Derek Urwin takes the view that the 
difference was between Delors' view of maximizing integration and 
Thatcher's of an economic single market and cooperation. The 
battle-ground was E M U , the budget and the Social Charter. The 
differences were over the future of Europe; political union or a free 
trade area. The choice was between Delors, the Europeanist, who used 
the SEA to enhance his view and Thatcher who resisted non-elected 
central control. (4) 
Stephen George made the following points: Thatcher was an 
internationalist who pursued the desire for a global market and 
world-wide free trade. She was not just the nationalist of the Bruges 
speech but was also the foe of European protectionism. To George, the 
gulf was between internationalism and regionalism. The same divide 
that had always existed in Britain's relations with Europe. (5) To him it 
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was Thatcher and her economic liberal philosophy against regionalism 
and the closure of EC commerce to the rest of the world. (6) 
4. The intergovernmentalism versus supra-nationalism and federalism 
debate. Martin Holland said that the division was over the future of 
Europe. He called Thatcher the intergovernmentalist and Delors the 
federalist. The dispute went beyond personalities into what he called 
"the serious tension in the Community." (7) 
Thatcher did want intergovernmentalism but she wanted more -
Thatcherism on a European scale. She could accommodate 
supra-nationalism when it was passive, for example when Gaston Thorn 
was President of the Commission, (8) but she resisted when it became 
active and took the EC in a ideological direction away from her own. 
Albert Bressard made the point that the argument was over the future 
of Europe. He put a slightly different emphasis on the divide when he 
said that Delors and Thatcher represent two extremes, neither of which 
seems to have been born out by observable trends: Delors the 
federalist, and Thatcher with her "roll back the state model." (9) 
5. The role of the market. Vernon Bogdanor stated that the British 
view has always been that the Community should provide a more free 
and effective market and Thatcher viewed the internal market as an end 
in itself. He contrasted this to the Christian-social democratic view of 
the market as just one means to union. He believed there was a deep 
ideological gap between Britain and the continent regarding the future 
of the market. (10) 
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However, tliis deep ideological gap which has always existed, was 
more intense and profound during Thatcher's period of office. For 
example, several of the "true believers" had ideological arguments with 
the EC, but it was Thatcher who stayed ideologically pure in her 
resistance, especially during the protracted EMU debate. There was 
also more to the Bruges speech in that it was triggered by Deiors' TUC 
appearance where he touched upon the social dimension, an area of 
intense ideological division between himself and Thatcher. 
John Young concluded that the ideological difference between 
Thatcher's laisscz-faire doctrine and the continental belief in the social 
market is the key. (J 1) David Alien agrees and he believes Thatcher 
felt she was playing a zero sum game; more power to Brussels would 
mean less power for Britain. To quote Allen: "However, the argument 
between Mrs Thatcher and Jacques Delors went beyond the theological 
dispute about the nature of sovereignty and integration and into the 
much more interesting realm of political ideology." (12) 
This view does seem to be the reason for Thatcher's intensity of 
resistance to the EC in certain fields. However, it was not just her free 
market conservatism which caused the rift over EMU; it was her strict 
adherence to monetarist doctrine in the face of other free market 
consen'atives who wished to negotiate and compromise over the issue. 
She saw the Community as threatening while others saw it as a means 
of bringing increased gain for all. 
All the views stress that the argument was over the future of Europe 
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and need to be acknowledged. However, these market models are 
general and do not investigate aspects of monetarism and the social 
dimension. Thatcher wanted the stateless market because it fitted her 
neo-liberal beliefs of competition and non-intervention; she resisted any 
centralization of economic policy because it would infringe upon the 
doctrines of monetarism. In addition, she saw it as fitting Britain's role 
in the world, especially the US relationship and her belief in the 
sovereignty of the nation state. She deluded herself in promoting the 
SEA and believed she had not compromised sovereignty in signing it. 
She believed that it was only the ambition of Delors which destroyed 
her vision. 
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2. VIEWS O N T H A T C H E R - DELORS A N T I P A T H Y . 
1 Grant, C, Inside The House That Jacques Built (London, 1994), pp. 
89-90. 
See also, Calvocoressi, P, Resilient Europe (London, 1991), p. 207. 
He disregards the ideological differences and stresses Thatcher's 
personality, lack of compromise and patience with those who 
disagreed and her lack of intellectual ability. 
2 Sir Geoffrey Howe: Chancellor of the Exchequer 1979-83, Foreign 
Secretary 1983-89, Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the House 
of Commons 1989-90. 
3 Young, H, One of Us (London, 1993), pp. 549-.550. 
4 Urwin, D, The Community of Europe (London, 1991), pp. 238-240. 
5 George, S, Britain and European Integration Since 1945 (London, 
1991), p. 62. "So although the press treated the Bruges speech as a 
sustained assertion of nationalism it was also compatible with global 
internationalism and resistance to European regionalism that had 
long been constant policy of the British state towards the EC under 
successive governments since 1945." 
6 Ibid., p. 61. 
7 Holland, M , European Community Integration (New York, 1993), p. 
87. See also, Taylor, P, "The New Dynamics of EC Integration in 
the 1980s", pp. 3-25 in J. Lodge (ed). The European Community 
and the Challenge of the Future (London, 1989), p. 22. 
Taylor states that there was a change after 1988, from the budget 
problems towards a fundamental and ideological dispute. To him 
the ideological divide was not socio-economic but between 
supra-nationalism and national sovereignty. 
8 Gaston Thorn: President of the European Commission 1981-85. 
9 Bressard, A, "Futures of Economic Integration: Beyond 
Interdependence: 1992 As a Global Challenge", pp. 231-244 in 
International Affairs Vol 66 No 1, January 1990, p. 60. 
10 Bogdanor, V, "Constitutional Implications", pp. 60-65 in H. Howie 
(ed), Towards Fiscal Federalism (London, 1992), p. 61. Bogdanor 
sees the Bruges speech as part of the national 
sovereignty-federalism debate; a debate about two abstract concepts 
and not where best to locate particular institutions. 
11 Young, J, Britain and European Unity 1945-92, (London, 1993), p. 
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157. 
12 Allen, D, "The European Community and the New Europe" pp. 
230-250 in D. Swann (ed), The Single European Market and 
Beyond (London, 1992), p. 240. 
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3. M A R G A R E T T H A T C H E R . 
A thinking person's Reagan. (1) 
3.1. N E Q - L I B E R A L I S M . 
....the combination of a traditional liberal defence of the free economy 
with the traditional conservative defence of state authority. (2) 
Neo-liberalism is a strand of right wing conservative belief which owes 
more to 19th. Century liberalism than to traditional one-nation Disraeli 
toryism. It rejects the concepts of slow organic change, the acceptance 
of state burdens and the ever-increasing collectivism, corporatism and 
welfarism. It has its intellectual backing in liberal concepts and the 
work of the philosopher Federick von Hayek and the economist Milton 
Friedman. According to Hayek: "Though we neither can wish, nor 
possess the power, to go back to the reality of the nineteenth century, 
we have the opportunity to realise its ideals..." (3) 
Thatcher and her supporters were greatly influenced by Hayek, who 
classed any kind of state involvement, including the welfare state, as a 
kind of slavery and destroyer of freedom. (4) He saw the primacy of 
the individual being threatened by the drift towards socialism. He 
favoured pure individualism without any fetters of the state which only 
erode a person's natural ability and drive; hence his support for the 
limited classical liberal laissez-faire state, with no income tax and the 
rule of law to protect freedom and free markets. This belief in pure 
free markets became relevant during the EMU debate in the late 1980s. 
To Dyson, the British competing currencies alternative to the Delors 
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method for EMU is indebted to Hayek (5), and Thatcher endorses that 
view in her biography. (6) This belief in Hayek and pure free markets 
drove her to resist any notions of fixed exchange rates as the precursor 
for the EMU. 
Hayek was also influenced by conservatism in that he supported 
tradition and inherent wisdom. Despite his criticism of conservatives as 
unprincipled in their desire for power, his ideas of allowing a rebirth of 
individualisir.' and of reducing the role of the state took hold in the Tory 
party. Many agreed with him that, without the free market, there was 
no liberty and they accepted the fact that the market produced both 
winners and losers. 
American economist Friedman was a great influence upon Thatcher. 
He advocated state withdrawal from the economic sector of society in 
order to allow market forces to prevail. He was reasserting the 
principles of Adam Smith in that, by man pursuing his own selfish goals, 
the free market ensures that a contribution will be made for the good 
of all. The market is the arbitrator, it establishes the correct price, 
keeps production at the correct level and ensures all can participate. So 
long as it is efficient and unconstrained, the market allows business to 
prosper, thus creating employment and the consumer benefits in the 
form of low competitive prices. To Friedman, the state must not 
introduce price controls or any sort of central planning because this will 
distort the market and bring misery. He restricts the role of the state to 
preserving the value of money by limiting the money supply and thus 
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controlling inflation. This is an adaption of the "quantity money theory." 
(7) 
To a monetarist the money supply is the main weapon to control 
inflation and the early budgets of Howe and Nigel Lawson placed great 
emphasis upon the money supply in the form of sterling M3 and MO. 
(8) However, when the growth in money continued, despite 
deflationary budgets, it was dropped and control via interest and 
exchange rates was used. This move played a significant role in the 
tension between the "true monetarist", Thatcher and Lawson, during the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and E M U debates in 1989-90. (9) 
Friedman's influence became crucial to Thatcher when Lawson moved 
away from the true monetarist creed. 
A third influence upon Thatcher was Keith Joseph and the "new 
right." A radical approach to the role of the state was articulated by 
Joseph and the "new right" in the 1970s and was to produce the base 
upon which Thatcher and her followers built their attempts to 
rejuvenate Britain. Joseph made several influential speeches in 1974, 
the most important being at Preston on the 5th September. According 
to Thatcher it "fundamentally affected a political generation and their 
way of thinking." (10) In it he articulated the tenets of Thatcherism; 
inflation "is threatening to destroy our society" and it would result in 
"excessive growth in the money supply." He continued, "incomes policy 
as a way to abate inflation caused by excessive money supply is like 
trying to stop water coming out of a leaky hose without turning off the 
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tap." (11) These radical ideas were dubbed "Thatcherism." (12) 
Thatcher and her supporters were convinced that Britain's problems 
could be solved and that the decline since 1945 could be reversed. In 
addition, Thatcher and Joseph had been members of a government in 
1974 which had lost its ideological nerve in the face of recession and 
unrest, had sunk into corporatism and, discredited, had fallen. The 
near-repeat with the 1976-79 Callaghan government convinced her that 
radical change was needed. 
Thatcher seemed to dominate the political arena as no other PM 
since 1945. Although she was not an original thinker she did have a set 
programme, an ideological belief, and the will and determination to 
carry it through. She had the energy to force change, to attack the 
vested interests and the inertia, and just enough supporters in Cabinet 
and in the party to achieve her objectives. Despite this reforming zeal, 
she also had many traditional conservative qualities; her reforms would 
never bring reform to the House of Lx)rds, change the voting system or 
attack the monarchy. She was a defender of the sovereignty of 
Parliament although many of her actions would erode its power. 
Thatcherisni was a mixture of this tradition and ideology, with ideology 
playing a major part in producing the change she required. 
Fundamental to Thatcherism was its criticism of the pre-1979 political 
settlement - the post 1945 consensus. 
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authority and competence to act." He called Thatcherism, 
"authoritarian popularism." 
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3.2. C R I T I C I S M O F CONSENSUS. 
For me, consensus seems to be the process of abandoning 
all beliefs, principles, values and policies. (1) 
The radical right programmes of both Thatcher and Reagan 
were responses to the breakdown of authority and stability in 
the world system and in national politics and economic management. (2) 
The neo-liberal criticism of the consensus, interventionist and 
spendthrift nanny state was that it sapped the moral fibre of the people, 
created a dependency culture and threatened individual rights. The 
problem was perceived as a crisis in the social-democratic state, where 
the state with its involvement in all aspects of society was spending too 
much and was destroying the capitalist system. The state did not allow 
the market, and thus capitalism, to operate freely and create enough 
wealth to meet the provisions of the welfare state and the support of 
industry. Britain suffered from a lack of competativeness, "Luddite" 
industrial relations and it had sunk into corporatism. According to 
Keith Joseph, "the public sector had drained away the wealth created by 
the private sector." (3) He added that Britain was "over governed, over 
taxed, over borrowed, and over manned, as well as under policed, under 
defended, and under educated." (4) 
Thatcher's criticism of consensus was clear: " I noted that many of our 
present difficulties stemmed from the pursuit of Keynesian policies with 
their emphasis on deficit financing of public expenditure and I stressed 
the need to control the money supply in order to defeat inflation." (5) 
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She later said that the state was "primarily under the influence of 
Keynes but also of socialism" and that the emphasis was always on 
"government to improve the economic conditions by direct and constant 
intervention." (6) The Keynesian collectivist consensus state had 
produced a dependency culture, decline, huge state deficit spending, 
high taxation and, in 1976, the ultimate ignominy - the International 
Monetary Fund had to be called in to inspect the books before Britain 
could receive a loan. Thatcher saw this humiliation as the culmination 
of thirty years of Keynesian spending and economics which had 
distorted the role of the market. She called this era "outdated nostrums 
of Keynesian demand management." (7) To her there was a crisis which 
required a revolution throughout the British state. 
In 1979, Britain headed down the free market path with a network of 
policies designed to exert the rights of the individual and reverse the 
trend towards collectivism - a neo-liberal state and a "new right" 
philosophy. (8) The relationship between the individual (not society) 
and the state was to be changed and the post -1945 orthodoxy replaced. 
Thatcher famously quoted Bentham and Hayek when she talked of 
there being "no such thing as society, just a collection of individuals." (9) 
Her programme was to attack the mountain of public spending and 
inflation was to be squeezed out of the system, no matter what the 
human cost. 
This ideological obsession with state spending perhaps provides a 
motive for the prolonged British Budget Question (BBQ), rather than 
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fear of integration. From 1979 to 1985 her main areas of discussion 
with the EC were all related to spending rather than any overt attack 
upon integration; they were the BBQ, the CAP and raising the VAT 
revenues to contribute to EC spending. (10) 
Her other policies followed the same ideological path. Supply side 
reforms and, the lowering of taxation were to pave the way for the 
enterprise culture; industries were privatized and financial services 
liberalized to create a great property share-owning democracy; 
institutions were reformed and opened up to competition; socialism was 
to be consigned to the dustbin, and in its place individualism, 
opportunity for all and responsibility were to be revived. The intent was 
to replace a manufacturing-base with a consumer-service society. 
Thatcher wanted to reduce the welfare state to manageable proportions 
and thus reduce the role of the state. Market forces, the arbiter of 
everything, must prevail. The market was put before people and this 
did produce a more polarized society. (11) To Thatcher, this rebirth 
would not only restore Britain's wealth but also its position in the world. 
(12) 
When in 1989 the economy overheated, creating a credit boom and 
inflation, Thatcher never lost faith in her ideology; it was the others who 
had fallen by the wayside, most especially Lawson with his exchange rate 
policy and neglect of monetary targets. (L3) 
Within Thatcherism there is a great contradiction. The crisis of 
accumulation produced an essentially anti-statist attitude but only in 
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economic matters. In other areas, for example local democracy, the 
opposite had taken place - the centralization of power Ironically, this is 
one of Thatcher's sharpest criticisms of the EC. (14) 
Any resistance to Thatcherite change was ruthlessly attacked and the 
dragon slain. A similar attitude was in evidence in Europe when at 
times it was difficult to decide if the other members of the Council were 
supposed to be Britain's allies. Thatcher's personality was crucial to 
producing change in Britain but her determination, lack of selfdoubt 
and total belief in her philosophy were traits that would bring conflict 
abroad. Her very inflexibility, which was seen as an asset during the 
Falklands war or in fighting terrorism, seemed to be a liability in 
Europe. 
Thatcher's neo-liberal wing of the Tory party is the "Euro-sceptic" 
wing and seems to have less in common than traditional conservatives 
with the Christian and social democratic consensus in Europe. Thatcher 
acknowledged the ideological tension between liberalism with its free 
trade and markets and socialism in the "guises as various as social 
Catholicism and corporatism", which produce regulation and 
intervention. (15) She calls this the "European disease of controls, high 
taxes and corporatism which has aborted jobs that otherwise would have 
occurred." (16) To her, minimum wage regulations would "condemn us 
to Euro-sclerosis when what we need is American style flexibility." (17) 
She believed those trends would lead to her nightmare - a European 
"Leviathan" producing federalism. 
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According to Stephen George, she also had to consider her 
supporters whose natural sympathies lay closer to Reagan than the 
Christian-social democrat views in Europe. (18) To many tories, 
Christian democracy was equated culturally and ideologically with 
federalism and a vision of Europe. Tories by nature are sceptical of 
visions, especially slightly alien European models. Thatcher's criticism 
of Christian democracy perhaps illustrated her distrust of Europe in 
general. To her, Christian democracy "covered a wide spectrum from 
full-blooded free enterprise to corporatism and has not thrown light on 
the relationship between nation state and supra-nationalism. 
Conservatives have little to learn from them." (19) 
Thus the clash with the Christian-social democratic "consensus" in 
Europe. Delors wrote that although they are two separate political 
beliefs, there is normally a broad consensus on the problems of society 
or the social dimension of Europe's construction. (20) And consensus 
was the word hated by Thatcher. 
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3.3. H O S T I L I T Y TO EUROPE 
We have buried our differences as a dog buries bones, always knowing where 
to find them again should the need arise. (1) 
Britain was suspicious of Europe before Thatcher came to power. She 
may have wanted a domestic revolution, but she was a traditionalist in 
that she had all the British scepticism of Europe and integration and of 
foreigners in general. According to Kirsty Milne, "the British....have not 
seen Europe as an opportunity. They regard it as somewhere between 
an obligation and a mistake." (2) Britain's scepticism and non 
involvement in Europe dates from the 19th Century and the advent of 
empire. From the inception of the idea of integration Britain, due to its 
world importance, was one of the leading opponents of the 
supra-national concept with its implied loss of sovereignty. 
In addition, Britain was undefeated in 1945, was never occupied and 
in 1940 had "stood alone", thus creating a folk law of self-sufficiency and 
a suspicion of Europe. Those feelings cut across party boundaries. It 
was the 1945-51 Labour government which rejected on the 25th June 
1950, the Schuman plan for a European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) because it was attempting a socialist transition and 
nationalization. The elites of both main parties still valued the so-called 
special relationship with the US and the Commonwealth. According to 
Peter Hennesy, Anthony Eden sent a minor Board of Trade official to 
the Messina conference, because he wanted to stand back and wait for 
the European concept to collapse. (3) This decision has been regretted 
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ever since and still haunts and influences British policy. 
Even Thatcher was aware of the dangers of being on the outside 
when the EC was moving forward, and resisted the spectre of a "two 
tier" Europe or "Europe a la carte'' as it was called in the Tindemans 
Report. (4) Britain seems to want to be included in iniatives but at the 
same time fears them, as in, for example, the recent debates over EMU. 
Even such a supreme optimist and visionary as Jean Monnet saw the 
problem; " I know the British people well enough to be confident that 
they will never oppose a progressive measure for the benefit of all 
Europe, even though their special problems may for the moment 
prevent their joining fully in its achievement." (5) A less charitable view 
is that the British could have ruined the whole idea and were thus given 
a relatively short time to decide. (6) According to F.S. Northedge, the 
British public view Europe as "a place for holidaying not for politics." 
(7) 
According to Hennesy, the 1956 Suez crisis saw the end of Britain's 
world power capabilities and problems with the special UK-US 
relationship. Many thought Europe would assist in preserving great 
power status. In addition, the realities of nationalism was spreading 
through the Commonwealth and the economic forecast for 1960 to 1970 
put Britain behind both the US and Europe. (8) According to John 
Young, it was reaction to this economic failure that pushed Harold 
Macmillan towards entry. (9) Northedge called British policy towards 
the EC "schizophrenia", an inability to decide once and for all where the 
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future lay. (10) Many people thought the old relationships with the US 
and Commonwealth could be continued and Britain was slow to accept 
change; from global to regional power and from absolute to shared 
sovereignty. This meant that the EC agenda was ignored, a problem 
inherited by Thatcher and illustrated in her battles over the CAP. 
Britain always did and still does favour intergovernmental 
organizations rather than the concept of supra-nationalism and feels, 
like Charles de Gaulle, more at home in a Europe des Patries. This 
was one of the main reasons why Britain rejected the EC at its 
inception. Thatcher was no different from her predecessors in being 
very positive in promoting intergovernmentalism as it does not impinge 
overtly upon the notion of national sovereignty or the sovereignty of 
Parliament. This notion contributed to the fact that at each stage of the 
EC's development, Britain was reluctant or slow to follow. However, 
this is not just a British concern, and The Economist wrote that Britain 
"is the most vocal but not the only country concerned about 
sovereignty." (11) 
The only period of relative harmony was during Edward Heath's 
premiership when his pro-Europeanism pushed Britain closer to the 
European vision. (12) Most of the debate about entry concerned the 
economic advantages and there was little discussion of a European 
vision, the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, or even the political 
consequences of entry. It was the anti-marketeers who stressed the loss 
of sovereignty involved. It seems paradoxical that de Gaulle paved the 
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way for British entry because the 1965 "Luxembourg compromise" was a 
great selling point for politicians sceptical about entry. The drift to the 
political centre by the Tory party caused it to favour entry, although it 
was not an overwhelming decision because both main parties were split; 
Heath's majority in 1972 relied on the Labour pro-marketeers led by 
Roy Jenkins. (13) 
Many of the points made by the arch critic of the time, Enoch 
Powell, have been repeated by Thatcher, especially the sovereignty issue. 
(14) There does seem to be a risk of antagonizing the public if 
governments take a soft line in EC negotiations. (15) For example, the 
1974-79 Labour government was as vigorous as Thatcher in defending 
national sovereignty. (16) Since then, the sovereignty issue has become 
part of a wider battle between Thatcher and Delors, even though at a 
time of so much shared sovereignty in the fields of economics, defence 
and culture, it seems a false argument. 
Despite being elected with a manifesto which stated that "withdrawal 
would be a catastrophe for the country", (17) Thatcher had a natural 
hostility to the EC. When opposition leader in 1975, she linked the EC 
to the cold war, the preservation of democracy and talked of "an 
economic bond of strategic significance." (18) Her first visit abroad as 
opposition leader included discussions in Paris regarding "Western 
Europe's role in East-West relations." (19) She then visited West 
Germany, "the frontier of freedom", was critical of Ostpolitik, which she 
called "reunification on Eastern terms" and then had discussions with 
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the opposition Christian Democrat (CDU) leader Helmut Kohl, who 
"was sound on the important issues" including the "East-West issues 
which dominated European politics." (20) John Young has written that 
her speeches in this period talked of the EC as only a bulwark against 
communism. (21) Hugo Young also makes the point that Howe 
believed that, had she not been a member of the government, she 
would have voted against Heath's terms for entry. (22) She said herself 
that "Europe was very much Ted's issue." (23) 
Thatcher disliked the EC's subtle and complex compromises, its 
inevitable intergovernmental bargains and its historical concepts of 
compromise consensus and supra-nationalism. EC decision-making is 
more of a compromise than the British system, where power is 
concentrated in the executive and a powerful Prime Minister like 
Thatcher can dominate the process. (24) 
In 1979 Thatcher said that "it became increasingly clear to me that 
there were real differences of vision about Europe's future." (25) She 
repeated that point whilst commenting upon the Tokyo G7: "Both 
Giscard and Andreotti endorsed Keynes and said the free market was 
deflationary. It was a revealing expression of the fundamental 
philosophical differences which divide the community." (26) 
Thatcher resisted this perceived threat not through quiet diplomacy 
but through confrontation in the European Council, commencing with 
the Strasboug Council in June 1979, just one month after her election. 
(27) Her xenophobia and nationalism were there for all to see and 
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Lord Carrington called this megaphone diplomacy. (28) According to 
Bernard Ingham, Thatcher's view on Bismark's dictum that politics was 
the art of the possible, was that "Bismark was a wet." (29) Michael 
Butler said that "very few Community negotiations are zero sum games 
in which there always must be an equivalent loss to offset a gain. 
Usually almost everyone can gain something." (30) Thatcher felt her 
aggressive approach helped regenerate British pride and made Britain 
once more a force in international politics. She was pleased when she 
heard people say "Britain is back." (31) 
She was never slow to play the nationalist card, especially regarding 
her hostility to the EC, but her belief in creative confrontation did seem 
inappropriate. (32) It may have worked with her own cabinet and party 
and was popular with the tabloid press who echoed her views. (33) 
However, not only her European partners but also her senior 
colleagues, especially Howe and Lawson, were dismayed when careful 
diplomacy was undermined by, in some cases, xenophobic and 
nationalist attacks by the Prime Minister. Lawson made the point that 
on many occasions he agreed with her but her tactics would on many 
issues put her in a minoritj'. She did Britain a disservice in Europe and 
helped to give the impression that the Council could not reach decisions 
- just temporary measures. (34) 
Thatcher had never studied history or travelled in Europe, and 
seemed to have little appreciation of coalition government, which she 
associated with consensus, weakness, and compromise. However, the 
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one thing she did know and would not allow her allies to forget, was 
Britain's role in 1945. To Thatcher the moral reason for the foundation 
of the EC was "just history and a history of defeat of our enemies." (35) 
There seems to be no vision of Europe and Thatcher, like all of her 
predecessors with the exception of Heath, made no attempt to inform 
or sell the idea of Europe to the public. Only the referendum debate 
produced a sustained discussion. There is a need, mostly economic and 
thus Britain is assertive on the economic benefits but slow to pay the 
political price, which has produced a minimilist approach since 1961. 
(36) This was continued with Thatcher, who saw the economic benefits 
but was reluctant to admit them. 
This approach has become more exaggerated, vigorous and pushed 
to the forefront of the agenda with confrontational rhetoric, underlined 
by the ideological divide. However, the rhetoric can be deceiving 
because, according to Geoffrey: Smith, "the harshness of Thatcher's 
rhetoric made it appear she differed from her predecessors more than 
she really did." (37) For example, both Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan took a nationalist line during negotiations. (38) Callaghan 
had a dispute regarding the budget and would have needed to 
renegotiate if he had won the 1979 election, but Thatcher said both he 
and Wilson "fudged the issue" even during the referendum debate. (39) 
With Thatcher's hectoring style the issue hit the headlines and became a 
major patriotic nationalist issue but, in addition, it went to the heart of 
her ideological anathema with the EC and that is where the differences 
40 
existed. She equated the EC with Keynesianism and the compromise of 
Christian democracy, and the budget issue and CAP became part of this 
ideological divide. 
Thatcher may have been a pragmatist in foreign affairs but in 
economics she was a zealot, so it was inevitable that in Europe there 
would be confrontation. This fundamental divide would be the driving 
force in her relations with the EC and this hostility would cast a shadow 
over her career, and it seemed by 1989 that little else mattered. It had 
become her raison d' etre. 
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3.4. A REALIST I N EUROPE. 
She saw herself in the image....of Lawrence Olivier playing Henry the 
Fifth at the battle of Agin court. (1) 
The champion of Britain and Britain's rights against the world and 
not least the E C . (2) 
Thatcher was a political realist who believed that the nation state was 
the predominant force in international relations and that its role in the 
struggle for power was to protect national interests and security. 
However, she was not a simple nationalist believer in RealpoHtik - a 
John Bull with a handbag. She did not have an inflated opinion of 
Britain's role in the world and the Falklands war, although remembered, 
was an exception. Thatcher generally picked her fights well and knew 
when to compromise. 
Despite her reputation, rhetoric and methods of negotiation she could 
achieve positive results on the international stage. (3): Her desire for an 
answer produced a more pragmatic approach and brought her results: 
She is a unionist yet signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement; she accepted 
Carrington's advice and settled the Rhodesian problem; and she 
accepted the inevitable and produced a deal with China over Hong 
Kong. 
In 1984 she even took the European side in the argument over SDI 
with Reagan. Thatcher's fear of the US removing the nuclear umbrella 
sent her to Camp David to represent the views of the EC. However, 
she did qualify her position but, according to Howe, his speech 
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criticizing SDI was praised throughout Europe but Thatcher's personal 
advisor Charles Powell said that it had not "been made with her 
authority." (4) She returned to Washington on behalf of the WEU after 
the near nuclear disarmament following the 1986 Rejkavick Summit. 
Her belief in Reagan seemed to be overridden by the prime concern of 
the realist - security and balance of power. A l l these instances have 
something in common: there were few economic aspects to them and 
they did not affect the role of the market. 
When economics did become involved, with for example sanctions 
against South Africa, she resisted and took up her usual position as a 
minority of one. Markets and perceived British interests were always 
put first. They were put before her realist concepts when the US 
banned equipment for the Siberian pipeline. That policy would have 
affected domestic industry; she therefore sided with Europe against her 
fellow cold war warrior Reagan. The push for greater involvement with 
the USSR did seem a turnaround for the "iron lady", who used the 
rhetoric of the new cold war to criticize the social democratic 
governments of the west for putting freedom at risk with detente. (5) 
On this one issue, a realist was adopting the pluralist concept of 
interdependence and involvement with the USSR which was prevalent 
in Europe. (6) 
Thatcher saw international security and defence in the black-white 
world of a cold war realist. This belief in a simplified version of George 
Kennan's thesis helped her relationship with Reagan. She even wanted 
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to up-date nuclear weapons in 1989, undeterred by the end of the cold 
war. Despite her later thaw with Mikhail Gorbachev, she still viewed 
- the international situation through the concept of containment, security, 
balance of power, the main actors being states. She therefore 
downgraded other actors in the international arena, for example the UN 
and European Commission. 
She accepted, to a certain extent, the erosion of a state's sovereign 
power, as she acknowledged US leadership in NATO and realized 
Britain could act alone only in exceptional circumstances. Despite her 
rhetoric and the insistence (along with France) that Britain continued to 
hold a separate seat on the U N security council, Thatcher accepted that 
Britain was no longer a world power and needed allies, preferably the 
US rather than Europe. (7) 
Thatcher could achieve results and looked her best at the major high 
political summits. She looked less comfortable in Europe, where a 
more pluralist, interdependent, integrationist view predominated. Lord 
Cockfield has written that "to Mrs Thatcher the English Channel was 
never just a physical barrier: it was a psychological barrier as well." (8) 
Thatcher's relations with Europe illustrate a mistrust, lack of 
understanding and ever widening fundamental divide, which can be 
illustrated by briefly looking at the CAP and BBQ which preoccupied 
the EC prior to the Fountainbleau Council of June 1984. Her 
motivation in Europe always seemed to be at one level - money. (9) 
She seemed to have little appreciation of the emotive nature of the 
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CAP to the founder members. It was as fundamental as bringing coal 
and steel under a supra-national authority. 
- Thatcher's consumer market philosophy downgraded the affects on 
small rural areas of reform and, in the 1979 Election Manifesto, she 
made a commitment to reduce the burden the CAP placed upon the 
British taxpayer. (10) It was criticized as representing a sectional 
interest, which in many cases was inefficient, at the expense of the 
consumer. This view is synonymous with the main domestic thrust of 
Thatcherism. Nicholas Ridley summarized the division and echoed her 
criticism and lack of understanding when he said that the "CAP is their 
pride and joy - it is about as far from free trade as it is possible to get." 
(11) Thatcher's concern seemed to be free trade or protection rather 
than specifically attacking an area where integration was well developed. 
To her, Europe should be only a giant free trade area, with market 
forces prevailing. Cockfield called this Thatchers "misunderstanding" of 
the EC and said that she "was convinced throughout that the 
"Community was simply a free trade area." (12) He added that "she 
never understood the community, neither its philosophy, its motivation, 
nor indeed its actual policies and legal provisions." (13) 
There seems to have been a general view that her arguments were 
valid, especially concerning the British and German contributions and, 
faced with near bankruptcy, even Delors endorsed this view. He told 
the European Parliament (EP) that "we have no option" but to reform 
the CAP "on a drastic scale." (14) Kapteyn makes the additional point 
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that because the subsidies are so high it is open to fraud or bending of 
the rules - thus increasing the expenditure even further. (15) However, 
the farming lobby, the prospect of regional unemployment and the 
attitudes of coalition governments mitigated against reform. Thatcher 
prolonged the attack on the CAP and ended up isolated. In her 
defence, Butler says that she never tried to destroy the CAP - just to 
reform it. (16) 
Linked to Thatcher's attack upon the CAP was her assault upon the 
British Budget contribution. This problem, which had existed since 
Britain joined the EC in 1973, was the subject of re-negotiations in 1975 
and would concern Thatcher from 1979-84. (17) Basically Britain, along 
with Germany, was a net contributor because of trading patterns and 
their small agricultural sectors. (18) According to Paul Taylor, it was 
one of the consequences of Britain's industrial weakness and domestic 
failure. Had industry succeeded in exploiting the new market, as was 
expected at the time of accession, the rebate claims may not have been 
made. (19) Although only representing a small amount of money and 
not being a major transfer of power to Brussels, the BBQ went to the 
heart of Thatcher's critique of the EC. She saw the "market being 
distorted" and "our own money" being wasted on the CAP and, as she 
said at the Dublin Council in 1979, " I want my money back." (20) She 
believed Britain's contributions were too high and should be reduced 
and, in her usual style, kept on and on with the battle until the other 
members needed an agreement to raise the V A T revenue to avoid 
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bankruptcy and thus keep the EC functioning. 
To Jenkins, she failed to understand the other side of the argument 
and bored her audience by repeating the same points over and-over 
again. (21) He also says that "Mrs Thatcher had right broadly on her 
side, but showed little sense of proportion and this was alienating the 
British government from the EC." (22) To Thatcher there was a 
principle involved and high budget contributions to fund protection 
from market forces was ideological anathema. (23) 
Despite all the rhetoric, Thatcher had-to accept a compromise - a 
temporary two-thirds budget rebate. However, that did not stop her 
attacking Carrington for accepting it and both he and his deputy, Ian 
Gilmour were given a "frosty reception at Chequers." (24) Jenkins 
believed Carrington showed himself more skilful and sensible in 
knowing when to settle. (25) 
After her re-election in June 1983, with a manifesto which "bracketed 
the EC with Galtieri and Scargill as the dragons she had slain", (26) 
Thatcher returned to the budget issue, this time resolved to allow the 
EC to become bankrupt unless a settlement was achieved. This was 
cynical Realpolitik. She used the threat of US hostility to protection as 
a weapon, although self-interest kept the other members from settling. 
At this time. Thorn and the Commission were unable to solve the 
budget problems, were seen as ineffective and had their roles 
downgraded, allowing decisions to revolve around the Council and the 
heads of government. Butler said that during the BBQ negotiation "Mrs 
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Thatcher was both inflexible in her determination to obtain a fair deal 
and flexible on the lesser points of substance when needed." (27) 
At the Brussels Council of March 1984, Kohl gave her the choice of 
"take it or leave it" because the budget gap was only £86 million. She 
left it at the cost of pushing France and Germany closer together. (28) 
This brought the Franco-German axis into play, dominating the Council, 
making the EC run smoothly and preparing for a settlement. Thatcher 
acknowledged Mitterrand's desire to tie Germany closer to the EC and 
Kohl's agreement in order to gain international acceptance. She 
accepted history in the case of Germany but not with the CAP, perhaps 
because only the latter affected her first love - the market. 
The BBQ was settled at the Fountainbleau Council of June 1984, 
thanks to the work of the French Finance Minister Delors and the 
Franco-German axis. Whether the deal was better than the one on 
offer at the previous Brussels Council is a matter for debate, although 
Taylor believed it was only marginally improved. (29) 
There seem to be several motives behind the settlement which was 
engineered by the French Presidency of the EC, but the main one was 
perhaps money. Both Delors and Mitterrand were aware that, due to 
the Southern enlargement, France would soon become a net contributor 
to the budget as well as Britain, a point endorsed by Howe. (30) 
Thatcher did become more accommodating, and Butler says that she 
herself said, "its time to settle." (31) Her main motivation would seem 
to be that after such a long battle she did not want to endanger the 
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budget rebate, a view supported by Taylor: "Mrs Thatcher gave 
concessions on the CAP and resources (VAT contributions were raised) 
because she did not want to loose the rebate." (32) 
In addition she circulated a paper which was the blue print for the 
SEA and her desire for momentum in that direction could have 
persuaded her to reach some kind of accord. (33) George made the 
point that there was a momentum on all sides to settle, due to the 
threat posed by Japan and the US. (34) Cockfield summed up the 
success of the Fountainbleau Council: "The Fountainbleau summit 
solved - so it was thought - all the outstanding problems of the 
community - restraining the cost of the CAP, the introduction of budget 
discipline, a progressive increase in own resources and agreement for a 
formulae for the British budget rebate." (35) 
The President of the Commission and the President of the Council 
reported the results of Fountainbleau to the EP. Thorn said, the 
agreement opened the Community to fresh stimulus and marked the 
"end of the long tedious dispute" within the EC or at least " I hope it 
does." He also thanked Mitterrand for his "personal commitment" in 
achieving a settlement. For Thatcher the bad news was that he thought 
the most promising feature was the setting up of the Dooge Committee 
to examine institutional affairs. (36) Garret Fitzgerald said that, in the 
face of mass unemployment and the chance to create a common market, 
"we are intensely serious about disputing amongst ourselves who will pay 
what share of the ....miserable 1% of Community output that we 
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allocate to the financing of this Community of Europe." (37) He also 
advocated the view that the BBQ was over, congratulated Mitterrand on 
the settlement and, like Thorn, looked forward to the Dooge 
Committee in the "push towards European Union." (38) 
From these statements it is clear that Thatcher was still in a minority 
and a momentum was building which she would not like. However, it 
was a turning point because the EC started to talk of enlargement, the 
SEA and greater budget discipline. The so-called period of 
"Euro-sclerosis" had come to an end. 
In addition to Thatcher's prejudice, there was also the domesfic 
audience to consider. She was constrained by domestic political 
opinion, not only from the "right" Euro-sceptic wing of the Tory party 
who had made her the leader, but also the party as a whole. Wridng in 
their later memoirs, Lawson believed tacdcs like the "Luxembourg 
compromise" would have split the party; (39) Thatcher concurred, 
saying that in her disputes she could not invoke the "Luxembourg 
compromise" or withhold payments because "unfortunately there was a 
hard core of Euro-enthusiasts on the Tory backbenches who instinctively 
supported the Community in any dispute with Britain." (40) To Stephen 
George, there were three competing strands of opinion in the party, 
"the paternalist opponents of membership, the modernizers in the Ted 
Heath mould who favoured the Community and the neo-liberals like 
Mrs Thatcher who wanted just free market principles." (41) 
Despite the settlement, Thatcher's prejudice, and perhaps domestic 
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influences, still showed through. For example, she only wanted one 
commissioner per member state because, she said "the devil makes 
work for idle hands" and she insisted upon calling them "our 
Commissioners." (42) This opinion was given, even though she 
personally liked Thorn, perhaps because he was seen as weak and 
ineffective due, according to Jenkins, to the BBQ. (43) Despite 
fundamental differences Thatcher said that she often saw "eye to eye" 
with Thorn, if only because "he did notiiave the grandiose ambitions 
and bureaucratic leaning of his successor." (44) 
She was responsible for slowing the momentum of the EC but with 
the Fountainbleau settlement she allowed it to gain momentum and 
dynamism. She wanted to convert the others to her way of thinking 
because she recognized the ideological divide, (but not the reasons for 
it), between her liberalism and their "consensus" which supported 
regional funds, community resources and protection. Butler summed up 
her view as that of wanting the community to run smoothly but not at 
the cost of ceding more sovereignty and spending more taxpayer's 
money. (45) This latter point was her main concern, because she has 
written that she sought to "limit the damage and distortions caused by 
the CAP and to bring financial realities to bear on Community 
spending." (46) 
Thatcher's realist approach to the Community and her 
uncompromising attitude did achieve a victory with the budget issue. 
However, it does seem a pyrrhic victory because the price was that the 
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Franco-German axis was closer and it set the pace for developments in 
the EC. She also seemed to lack understanding of the EC and when 
she did concede, it was reluctantly. She allowed Britain to become 
isolated, so that when her wish for the SEM project began to come to 
reality, she found herself alone in preaching a total free market 
orientated liberal doctrine. The other members saw more than just a 
"stateless market", they saw more posifive integration but Thatcher, from 
her isolated position, appeared a lone negative voice without influence 
in the succeeding years. The direction the EC was to take would be 
ideological anathema for a neo-liberal realist. 
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4. J A C Q U E S D E L O R S . 
Jacques Delors is inhabited by deep spiritual motivations; 
he has a grande mission, in other words. (1) 
41 . P E R S O N A L I S M . 
Deiors treats political issues as moral questions. (2) 
Delors is a personalist. Personalism, an anfi-individualist left wing 
progressive Catholic doctrine, was founded by Emmanuel Mounier. It 
came out of the post-1918 intellectual trauma of the 1930s and rejected 
both fascism and Marxism. It charted a central path between the 
collectivism of Marxism which denies the individual and liberalism 
which, in favouring the individual, denies the community. (3) To 
Mounier, society grew "from a delicate interdependence in which 
different social groups owed one another active solidarity." (4) Neither 
the individualist or collectivist answer provides this solidarity. Although 
it is a middle way, its rejection of collectivism means it is not social 
democratic. 
Grant quoted Delors: "....society is more present than it is in the 
United States. The Europeans have always had a kind of balance 
between the individual and society. That goes back to the base of their 
civilizadon, to Chrisfianity, to Roman law, to the Greek civitas, and in 
the recent period to the influence of social democracy." (5) The 
individual personified in capitalism must be a real citizen and show his 
obligations to society. To quote Delors: "Democracies are based on the 
operation of certain common values and not merely on the recognition 
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of individual rights." (6) "....the duty of every citizen, as also of citizens 
as a body, to see to it that others can develop as individuals." (7) He 
later wrote: "Democracy, the balance between state and society, between 
collective and individual, is Europe's mode." (8) 
To a personalist, it is liberalism's need for the existence of the nation 
state which submerges the individual and, according to John Loughlin, 
"the abomination for the personalist was the Jacobin attempt to identify 
the state with the nation." To quote Loughlin: "(Personalism is a) 
rejection of the capitalist, liberal-democratic nation state as well as of 
communist regimes." (9) 
Personalism is critical of centralization and advocates decentralized 
federalism. Personalists blame the nation state for many of the disasters 
of the past and believe results like the Treaty of Versailles will produce 
more disasters. According to Loughlin, personalists believe that "only 
when the nation states ceased to claim absolute sovereignty for 
themselves could the basis for a peaceful international order be laid." 
(10) 
Personalism is critical of liberalism, especially the classical liberalism 
favoured by Thatcher. In the view of personalists, liberalism achieved 
the removal of the monarchies and became the ideology of the last 
century, but in this century its emphasis on the individual is destroying 
community spirit. A personalist believes that man needs to be 
paramount and to have an internal spiritual transformation no less than 
a new social order. To David Hanley "Personalism sees society as 
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composed not of individuals (as in the liberal paradigm) but persons." 
(11) The individual needs to express himself in order to fulf i l himself 
but he should not forget his obligation to the community. According to 
Irving, it is a Christianized version of individualism, in which the 
individual can only reach fulfilment within the natural social structures 
of society, such as the family, community and work-place. "These 
natural social structures can only operate under the tutelage of the 
state." The amount of state intervenfion advocated by personalists is 
"unacceptable to laissez-faire liberals." (12) Personalism rejects 
liberalism in its economic, soulless 19th Century survival-of-the-fittest 
mode, because there is a role for the state (13) or, in the view of 
Delors, a state-like structure with the EC. 
Delors' criticism of liberalism, and thus by inference the kind of early 
Victorian society that Thatcher was trying to re-create, was that 
liberalism disregards the common good and destiny, and denies people 
the qualities of humanity. He was also crifical of liberalism's reliance 
upon the market to provide everything in society. It can provide 
resources and wealth but it cannot "guarantee equity, a moralized social 
order or full economic success." (14) Only a dialogue between all social 
groups would achieve that end. (15) He believed the liberalism of 
Thatcher treated the individual as an abstract being - not as a person, 
or true spiritual being, rooted in rich experience. To a personalist, 
when freedom is unlimited, as in classical liberalism, "the advantage 
goes to the strongest." (16) Only through the community can the 
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individual be truly free and live a full life. Thus social structures are 
needed for "spiritual individuality to flourish." (17) Delors wanted to 
"liberate liberty from liberals." (18) 
Delors' personalist views laid the foundations of many of his actions 
in Europe: " I believe the individual is a person and not only an 
individual, a person who cannot be reduced to other people and that 
this person cannot live without participating in the communities which 
bind him to people." (19) To Helen Drake, he was a man with a 
mission who saw the EC as a "social moral mission" and "had a clear 
understanding of the means required to create the modele de societe." 
(20) Delors criticized the market where he believed consumerism had 
run rampant to the detriment of society as a whole, which was "trapped 
in a gilded prison of marketing." (21) He called this "putting means 
before ends, materialism before happiness, having before being." (22) 
He was concerned with the community as a whole and the freedom of 
the individual within that whole. Vital to this belief was subsidiarity, a 
principle founded in Catholic social teaching in which decisions are 
made at the most appropriate level of society. (23) 
Personalism is part of the foundations of Christian democracy and 
Delors joined but resigned in 1946 due to the right wing leadership. (24) 
He later joined the socialists because the Christian democrats in France 
during the Fourth Republic became more conservative and in 1958 
supported de Gaulle. (25) George Ross says Christian democracy was 
"mangled by the turbulent coalition politics of the Fourth Republic" and 
64 
thus lost its "appeal for Left Catholics." (26) The Christian democrats 
allied themselves to the right because being associated with the left 
meant involvement with the communists. This caused the ideological 
centre ground to become crowded. Thus Christian democracy was a 
"catch all" doctrine because it contained many of the socialist beliefs of 
Delors, including Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity, personalism and 
solidarism. 
These tenets provided a link between Delors and his important ally in 
post-1985 Europe - Kohl. Apart from their Catholicism, many of their 
political and moral beliefs had the same source. Michael Fogarty 
believed, "the Christian democrat ideal of a good society is personalist." 
(27) This is still true despite the drift away from personalism towards 
liberalism in Christian democracy due, according to Hanley, to there 
being fewer practising Christians. (28) 
Not having read history, perhaps Thatcher did not appreciate the 
concepts of federalism, subsidiarity and personalism or that the ideal for 
social personalism was "friendship between people who were once 
enemies." (29) She may also not have known that her Victorian 
liberalism was alien to both Delors and Kohl and that they, as a matter 
of moral belief, would want more than the liberal concept of the single 
market. 
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4.2. T H E SOCIALIST A N D D I R I G I S T E . 
(Delors)...a typical French socialist. 
He was pragmatic in the extreme, believing more in the importance 
of power than socialism, and he was intensely ambitious. (1) 
Delors was essentially a pragmatist and a practical socialist who rejected 
extremes, favouring evolutionary change to advance his aims. Being 
both a socialist and personalist he rejected the collectivism of Marx, 
which puts the rights of the collective above those of the individual. 
Personalism has a strong influence in the Parti Socialiste (PS) and 
Delors' socialism seemed to owe more to religion and morality than to 
the economic determinism of Marx, and favoured equality of 
opportunity rather than of result. Delors has written: "I've never been 
fascinated by communism or Marxism - I'm undoubtedly the only man 
on the French left who never has been. I believed one could improve 
society, but not change the society." (2) 
He thus was able to look outside the dogma of the Parti Socialiste 
and, in 1981 during his tenure as French Finance Minister, he became 
central to the radical reversal of the "socialism in one country" policy. 
His pragmatism and courage in making tough economic decisions 
brought suspicion from some other socialists but helped to repair the 
French economy and perhaps saved them and Mitterrand. This period 
in office also illustrated his pedantic and austere teaching style, in which 
most decisions were based on technological facts rather than either 
doctrine or instinct. Mitterrand also commented in 1986 upon his 
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vanit>', following a complaint from Kohl: "Delors is not easy. I had him 
as Minister of Finance and I know....But Helmut, one must not make 
too much of it. Politics is made by men who are often very vain." (3) 
Delors' performance impressed both Kohl and Thatcher who, in 
particular, appreciated his intelligence. Both thought he had acted as a 
restraining influence on the socialist government and had helped the 
economic repair of France. He gained a reputation as a man not 
restricted by dogma, who could look outside the parameters of socialism 
and make deals and produce results. According to Ross, "Delors had 
little use for pre-cooked global programmes, like that of the French 
socialists in the 1970s...." (4) 
There was a tension within the EC between the dirigiste socialism 
represented by Delors and the more liberal market viewpoint 
epitomized in its extreme by Thatcher. It was a traditional tension 
dating from the interventionist methods of Jean Colbert - Louis XIV's 
finance minister. There is a tradition of state involvement in French 
economics, protection and interference in the market, which comes into 
conflict with the Anglo-Saxon liberalism symbolized by Thatcher. (5) 
An article in The Economist in 1994 said that European industry was a 
struggle between the beliefs of Colbert and those of Adam Smith, and 
that with the SEM "the Scotsman appeared to have the upper (invisible) 
hand." (6) Delors used his position to promote the dirigiste Colbertian 
viewpoint, called by Grant "Euro-Colbertism" with, for example, his 
defence of protection during the GATT Uruguay round. 
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His defence of the CAP was more emotional and went to the heart of 
his beliefs. He called for "community preference", a single market and 
financial solidarity. (7) He told the EP in 1987 that "any attempt to 
question these principles would be tantamount to tearing up the 
contract which binds the member states." (8) On another occasion he 
called the CAP the "marriage contract" between France and Germany, 
which meant that Germany would "shoulder the cost of supporting 
French agriculture in return for German industry being given free 
access to the French market." (9) Delors did feel solidarity with the 
farmers and usually favoured producers rather than consumers. He was 
concerned about rural poverty and felt that although it needed reform, 
the CAP preserved the traditional rural lifestj'le. He waxed lyrical 
about the "desire of Europeans to be rooted in the land", the need for 
"a feeling of belonging to a settlement that is close to its own history" 
and that "the rural world is the mainstay of our civilization." (10) In a 
speech to French farmers he talked of "the renaissance of the rural 
world" being an issue of "civilization," that "Europe's cultural and 
environmental backbones were rural" and with great hyperbole he said 
that "farmers were producers of goods, creators of civilization and 
gardeners of nature." (11) He summarized the whole divide with 
Thatcher when he talked about rural development: "The market cannot 
take care of all of the economic and social needs of society and it 
cannot take charge of ....public goods, invisible goods that we can only 
get collectively." (12) To Ross, Delors thought that the "future of the 
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CAP was inseparable from the collective good of the rural world." (13) 
This fundamental division also lay at the heart of much of the 
acrimony during the debate over EMU, with the ideological obsessions 
of Thatcher and Anglo-Saxon philosophy straining against the dirigiste 
state centric beliefs of Delors. Dyson quoted the French newspaper Le 
Monde, which put the clash between speculators and the central banks 
during the E R M crisis in the context of this ideological division. They 
called it "a shock between two cultures...one inspired by Anglo-Saxon 
ideologies, the other by a more continental dirigiste, ideal." (14) Dyson 
goes on to say that the analogy, that the Anglo-Saxon's currencies were 
just a commodity, compared to the French who saw currency as a 
"measure of value within the nation (can be) overdrawn." (15) Although 
those views are a simplification of complex realistic political viewpoints, 
they illustrate a divide which exists, as shown by the E M U debate. 
Delors seemed able to bridge this ideological gap in Europe and his 
background seemed acceptable to both Christian and social democrats, 
as his term of office shows. Although he seemed more at home on the 
left he could deal successfully with, for example, the right-of-centre 
politicians in Germany and the conservative bankers who control the 
Bundesbank. To Ross, Delors "stood at the exact centre of Europe's 
and the Community's, political core of social democrats and Christian 
democrats." Ross makes the point that there is a difference between 
continental Christian democrats who were open to the "Delorist" view of 
common goods with an "organized European space" and an 
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"Anglo-Saxon liberal ideologue." (16) Delors could, despite different 
political beliefs, achieve a "common vocabulary" with most of the 
mainstream political views in Europe, but with more ideological liberals 
he lacked a great deal of common ground. This not only produced the 
rift with Thatcher but also affected his working relationship with 
another neo-liberal. Sir Leon Brittan. (17) 
Delors also contributed to the related debate of "gradgrind" 
economics to compete with the Pacific Rim, as advocated by both 
Thatcher and her successor, and the more socially aware views of 
Europe. He saw the way forward as competing, especially in high 
technology indusliy, on a European scale, creating a European "bloc" to 
resist both the US and Pacific Rim economically. He summarized his 
views on the subject: "Should the EC let itself be undercut by 
competitors with sweatshop labour conditions? We should distinguish 
between countries which share the fruits of their trade and those which 
exploit their workers." (18) 
Delors was a complex mixture: an austere personalist who joined the 
socialists rather than the Christian democrats; a pragmatic socialist who 
believed the state had a vital and necessary' role in protecting individuals 
but who recognized a role for the market in reviving Europe's fortunes. 
Perhaps pulling these beliefs together was his overall vision of a united 
Europe. According to Delors: "....for many who are socialists, the 
tran.scendent political aim is building Europe; the means are judged 
pragmatically according to their effectiveness in realising that end." (19) 
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And like his mentor Jean Monnet, Delors could sacrifice dogma and be 
pragmatic in his functional, or "Russian Dolls", method of European 
integration. (20) 
Delors arrived upon the European scene at the Brussels Council in 
January 1985, following his appointment at Fountainbleau the previous 
summer. Thatcher supported him as she did the nomination of 
Cockfield as a Commissioner. She supported him despite the fact that 
he was a socialist and that his nomination came out of the 
"Franco-German breakfast" and was part of, "....the France-German 
deals which heavily influenced or in some cases determined the outcome 
of a Council." (21) 
Thatcher believed Delors was the best she could hope for within the 
unwritten code of alternating Christian and social democrats from small 
and large states. She believed the alternative, the former French 
Foreign Minister Claude Cheyson, was more of a federalist: both were 
French socialists but Delors was the lesser of two evils. It was 
Germany's turn but Kohl did not have a nominee and seemed to favour 
the direction in which Delors would take the Commission. In the 
opinion of Lawson, "Helmut Kohl the Federal German Chancellor 
pathetically announced that Germany could find no candidate of 
sufficient stature for the post and that he had therefore agreed with 
Mitterrand that it should go to France instead." (22) However, Kohl 
had much in common with Delors: he had the Christian democrat view 
of a united Christian Europe, whose tenets were pluralism, personalism, 
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solidarism and subsidiarity. (23) According to Michael Burgess, when 
these principles are taken together they produce a brand of European 
federalism "whose roots lie deep in Catholic social theory." (24) Despite 
being of different political persuasions, both Delors and Kohl had much 
in common in terms of the basic tenets of their belief, philosophy, 
motivation, religion and not least where the ultimate destination of 
Europe would lead. (25)' He was ideal material for an EC Commission 
President. 
In addition. Kohl did not want Claude Cheyson because he was a 
friend of his foreign minister and liberal coalition partner - Hans 
Dietrich Genscher. (26) Through such motives are Commission 
Presidents appointed. Kohl, Delors and Mitterrand formed a close 
partnership to push the EC in the direction they desired, much to the 
consternation of Thatcher. Despite this, she seconded his 
re-appointment when it was obvious he had gained much de-facto 
power and was leading the most active and assertive Commission since 
Walter Hallstein; and in a direction she opposed. (27) Again, 
negotiation and power politics played a part because the alternative was 
a German and the Secretary General of NATO was also German and 
Thatcher's anti-Germanism could have played a part. 
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5. I N T E R N A T I O N A L RELATIONS. 
5.1. B R I T A I N A N D T H E U N I T E D STATES OF A M E R I C A 
Britain is notorious for governments Labour or Conservative, that 
think the Atlantic is narrower than the Channel. (1) 
The British want to become the 5Ist American State. It's pitiful. (2) 
Britain and the US have been linked by the so-called "special 
relationship." Their foreign policies are normally diverse and it was 
only during the Second World War that the special relationship was 
close, due to mutual goals and the closeness of the two leaders. During 
the 1950s, Britain was the junior partner and the Suez crisis illustrated 
not only Britain's retreat from a world role but also that the US 
followed a foreign policy of its own, regardless of the British. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, the relationship existed but it was not until the 
advent of Thatcher in 1979 and Reagan in 1980, that it became closer. 
Thatcher was a traditionalist who acknowledged the US role in 
uniting Europe through the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan and 
she looked for US leadership in the "cold war." She had more faith in 
Britain's common heritage and language with the US than with Europe. 
In her memoirs she conveniently forgets Britain's European 
Anglo-Saxon and Norman heritage. She was pro-American and 
preferred to visit Washington than attend European Councils. She 
seemed happiest at high political summits where she could exclude the 
mundane business and "petty squabbles" of the EC. She did not 
disguise her admiration for the US: "We cherish our relationship with 
the United States, that great citadel of liberty and justice." (3) She 
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sympathised with the US before her ideological ally Reagan became US 
President with, for example, her support for the boycott of the 1980 
Moscow Olympics following the invasion of Afghanistan and her trip to 
Washington to "pledge support for President Carter" in his argument 
with Europe over detente. (4) 
However, when Reagan became President, Thatcher found a friend 
with similar ideological views and the "special relationship" became even 
more special. Ideologically there seemed little difference between the 
two because the following quotes from Reagan could easily have been 
quotes from Thatcher: "We must move boldly, decisively and quickly to 
control the growth of federal spending." "We must balance the budget, 
reduce tax rates and restore our defences." (5) The Atlantic bias 
became more pronounced than with any other Prime Minister. She 
even said that the presence of Howe "cramped her style" when she met 
Reagan. (6) His simple rhetoric, be it economic or as "cold warrior", 
appealed to her and she preferred Reagan's ideas to those of her 
partners in Europe. According to Lawson, "For Margaret the special 
relationship with the United States was all important and she regarded 
the continental Europeans with distrust and in private with undisguised 
distaste." (7) 
The relationship became close; for example, Reagan was given the 
unique opportunity to address both Houses of Parliament during a visit. 
In 1985 Britain, against the wishes of its partners, tamely followed the 
US lead and withdrew from UNESCO. In another example, it was the 
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us option (and capital) which she preferred to the European, during 
the near-fatal Westland fiasco. However, it does seem that despite this 
intimacy Reagan did very little for Britain that he would not have done 
normally. An exception perhaps was the secret logistic support during 
the Falklands war, for which Caspar Weinberger was given an honourey 
knighthood. 
Thatcher and Reagan were united ideologically and shared the same 
world view which saw monolithic communism as the enemy. She 
supported him against what was perceived by many to be activities 
against British interests. There are several examples of this view: She 
made a personal decision to support his bombing of Lybia, without 
Cabinet approval, and she called the EC "weak and feeble" for having 
reservations. (8) She felt it "cemented the Anglo-US alliance." (9) This 
decision dismayed many in the Cabinet who saw not only an increase in 
the threat of terrorism (the number of American tourists to Britain 
declined sharply) but also the constitutional problem of setting aside 
Cabinet government for personal friendship. According to Thatcher: " I 
found it inconceivable to refuse the United States request to use aircraft 
based in the United Kingdom." (10) Howe said that the Lybian 
bombing and the US withdrawal from the Lebanon was undermining 
Europe's and his (but not Thatcher's) faith in US foreign policy. (11) 
Thatcher always suspected the motives of European leaders, yet did 
not question Reagan's motives even when he invaded the sovereign 
territory of Grenada. She attributed the invasion to over-reaction to the 
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Beirut bombing of US troops but insisted that it was too small an 
incident to endanger Britain's special relationship. (12) Duchene 
believed there was. no European (EPC).response to these events, (13) 
and Howe called this the "mid-Atlantic fault line in NATO." (14) He 
supported more of a role for the European Political Cooperation 
concept because, "....would not such thinking enable us to detach 
ourselves a little from some US policies which were not always in our 
own national interests." (15) 
The EPC was strengthened in the 1970s, as a response to the 
collapse of the 1945 Bretton Woods system, by which currencies were 
kept stable by the gold convertibility of the dollar. The influx of 
currencies against the weak dollar caused the US to suspend the 
agreement. The dollar's collapse became an important fulcrum of 
change for the EC and set the pattern for the future. The US response 
with floating exchange rates caused Europe to look to an alternative 
foreign policy (EPC) and to formulate a separate currency system, with 
the European Monetary System (EMS) proposed by Giscard d'Estaing 
and Schmidt. (16) This would evolve into the "snake", ERM and 
ultimately E M U . Thus the EC developed a more independent foreign 
policy, albeit outside the existing Treaties, a fact which helped Britain to 
support its essentially intergovernmentalist nature. 
However, its very existence has produced a divergence in foreign 
policy because EC and US priorities differ. Europe's relationship with 
the US became more distanced before the arrival of the "genial but 
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stupid Reagan" whose reception from Europe was one of "vituperative 
contempt." (17) The "mid-Atlantic fault line" was called by Thatcher the 
imbalance in diplomacy, because EC leaders met on a regular basis but 
other members of NATO, especially Canada and the US, met 
infrequently. In addition, issues could always be discussed on an EPC 
basis, again excluding the US. 
Through all of this concern for the special relationship, there appears 
an almost sycophantically embarrassing attachment on the part of 
Thatcher to Reagan; a pair united ideologically with the same political 
dreams. It is perhaps significant that her relations with George Bush 
(18) were never so close because he was not so ideologically pure and 
tended to "go wobbly" in a crisis. In turn, it is perhaps significant that 
his first visit to Europe was to Germany rather than to Britain. 
Her adherence to US foreign policy showed Thatcher's double 
standards: She objected to Soviet spheres of influence and the Breznev 
doctrine, yet accepted the Monroe doctrine or its updated version - the 
Reagan doctrine. The invasion of Afghanistan was wrong but 
Nicaragua, El Salvidor and Angola were right. As with the cold war, 
minor nationalist civil wars were sucked into a bipolar global scenario. 
However, she was wise enough not to overtly promote Reagan's "new 
cold war" and in the late 1980s acted as a "go-between" for the 
superpowers. 
By contrast, other members of the EC were critical and distrustful of 
Reagan's "new cold war", which was to fight back and defeat 
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communism rather than the previous policy of containment. To 
George, they saw it as using military action to solve political problems. 
(19) The US called this involvement in the sovereign affairs of minor 
states their "hemispheric interest." Many European states classed it as 
interference in the "insignificant domestic affairs of obscure banana 
republics." (20) 
Despite the German "twin track" iniative to modernize NATO and 
maintain detente, there was an overall pattern of divergence between 
the US and Europe after 1979. (21) They had different aims and 
diverse views of detente with, for example, Germany wanfing trade and 
reproachment with the ospolitik and thus at variance with the US. 
Duchene makes the point, "European detente was unlinked to super 
power detente in areas outside Europe." (22) The US and European 
foreign policy goals had become different, with the US world view, 
especially under Reagan, linking trade to trouble spots, whereas the 
European view was essendally regional and therefore more 
accommodafing to the Soviet Union. 
Thatcher's near spiritual attachment to the US and its role in Europe 
brought her into further conflict with Europe when the issue of NATO 
and the European military organizafion, the Western European Union 
(WEU), came onto the agenda. She resisted attempts to replace NATO 
with the WEU. It seems that other internafional organizafions like the 
U N were disliked by her but that NATO was loved. Howe and 
Heseltine had to persuade her in 1984 to support the re-activafion of 
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the WEU (23) (another French attempt to exclude the US, although it 
did have German support) and she later resisted any closer defence 
links with Europe. The debate evolved into whether the WEU would 
become an EC institution or a "bridge" with NATO. (24) She did not 
like exclusion of the US or the WEU as an alternative to NATO - thus 
the W E U was resisted and talk of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) treated with suspicion. That was also the US position. 
Howe calls the issue of Britain's defence based upon a transatlantic or 
European foundation, the "permanent British dilemma." (25) In 1989, 
she resisted French attempts to have a nuclear alliance with Britain and 
a conventional one with Germany because again this would exclude the 
US. The French motives were "to guarantee Europe an independent 
voice in defence." (26) These defence issues persisted after Thatcher 
left office and Delors continued to support the French view of a CFSP 
with an active role for the WEU. 
Despite this scepticism, Thatcher favoured closer foreign policy 
cooperation but not at the price of the special relationship; her efforts 
could not stop a diversion of EC and US policy. With separate areas of 
concern and involvement, it seems natural that the policy would diverge, 
especially under a president like Reagan. (27) During this period, the 
foreign policies of Thatcher and the Europeans were going in opposite 
directions and increased the gulf between the two. 
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5.2. FRANCE A N D T H E U N I T E D STATES OF A M E R I C A . 
Nationalism has deep historical roots in France and is linked with anti 
Anglo-Saxon attitudes that originally was directed against Britain but 
was easily transferred to the United States when it became the standard 
bearer of what to the French is Anglo-Saxon imperialism. (1) 
Delors' view of the US contrasted with that of Thatcher. He appeared 
to have inherited a great deal of the French distrust of the US, much of 
which developed during the Second World War. The antipathy between 
de Gaulle and Franklin Roosevelt over, for example, the destruction of 
the French fleet and the invasion of Syria came to the fore at the 
Casablanca conference in 1943. De Gaulle suspected Roosevelt's 
motives over French possessions, believing he would not act in the best 
interests of France in any peace deal. According to Duroselle, 
Roosevelt did not understand de Gaulle, thought he was a "prima 
donna" and paid no regard to his popularity in France. Roosevelt even 
called de Gaulle unreliable, disloyal and a dangerous threat. However, 
in return, "de Gaulle did not understand Roosevelt either; the roots of 
his notorious anti-Americanism may well be found in this period." (2) 
In addition, there was hostility to the US from the French intellectual 
left, including Mounier, whose personalism was to later influence 
Delors. John Hellman believed, "The personalist group had long been 
hostile to the United States." (3) There were ideological differences, 
"....the United States, symbol of laissez-faire economic system, 
represented an imperialist Fascist challenge to Europe." (4) Following 
World War Two, "both the Marshal Plan and Truman's fair deal were 
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seen by Mounier and the personalists as economic conquests." (5) 
Although France was a vigorous supporter of NATO in 1948-49, the 
many attempts at integrafion sponsored by France, both economic and 
military, since that date, seem to have had the intenfion of both tying 
Germany closer and excluding the US from Europe. There appears to 
have been several areas of distrust between the US and France, many 
inherited by Delors. There was andpathy with US anfi-colonial views in 
1945 and shortly after, when the French saw themselves fighting for the 
west in Indo-China and deserving US support. (6) 
This situafion was reversed with the advent of the cold war, when the 
black-white worid of bipolarity seemed to the French to be the US 
exerting a hegemonic influence over the west. They saw the rationale 
of the ideological divisions as the US using "moral window dressing" for 
a "naked animus dominandi" (7) over other smaller states who were in 
"their camp." The French, with their vision of grandeur, were not 
prepared to have a modest place in the post-war world which they 
believed to be determined on an ideological basis and explained by the 
US in their terms as the "common good." 
To the French, the true division of the worid is by nafion, and 
national interests wi l l outlast the temporary divisions of the ideological 
divided world. Nations should have autonomy and were a safer method 
of internafional relations in a multi-polar worid than the bipolar world 
of the cold war, which threatened the peace and smaller states. Thus 
the view of de Gaulle, that the answer to the German "problem" was not 
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to divide the state ideologically; it was one nafion and would be so 
again, so it was safer united and tied to Europe. 
This view continued, as illustrated by Delors' acfions in 1989. There 
is a strong feeling of French nationalism in both the Gaullist and 
socialist wings of French politics. (8) Perhaps the failure of Monnet, 
and later Delors, was to underesfimate the pull of nationalism. (9) 
French fears and suspicions of the US were increased when, due to 
the increased tension of the Korean war, moves were made to re-arm 
Germany. To the US, German economic recovery and its military 
contribufion to western defence were seen as vital to European and 
world balance during the cold war. (10) To Duchene, this was the US 
dilemma: to safisfy Germany without dissafisfying France. (11) 
According to Reginald Harrision, the US treated France as a nuisance, 
its favoured partners being Germany and Britain. (12) This was seen as 
the Anglo-Saxons treating France as just another state, as a pawn in the 
world of global power polifics and, perhaps more importantly, Britain 
would retain her worid influence. (13) To Stanley Hoffman, the French 
saw the US position in the post-war world as preserving defacto its 
hegemony over its half of Europe and that belief he called "distrust of 
Anglo-Saxon sincerity." (14) 
The distrust was compounded by the belief that the US used Britain 
as an "American Trojan Horse", (15) to maintain influence and promote 
its foreign policy in Europe. To Harrison, part of the blame for the 
"dissipation of Community spirit" rests on the transatlantic relationship: 
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"....the veto on the free trade area in 1959, the failure of the Fouchet 
committee....the veto on British entry by France in 1963 and the later 
veto in 1967." (16) 
French distrust was maintained when the US and Britain cooperated 
over nuclear weapons. After the 1962 Nassau agreement on Polaris, 
(17) de Gaulle was convinced that Britain was a satellite of the US and 
maintained that view even when Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez 
weakened the "special relationship." His independent deterrent (Force 
De Frappe) became a matter of prestige, part of his vision of grandeur 
and another means of equality and equal distance between the 
superpowers. De Gaulle's decision to talk to Moscow rather than to 
maintain the cold war stance was not only a show of national 
independence but also a need to show the prestige of France to the 
world. His rejection of British entry and his criticism of the Vietnam 
war also demonstrate that need. His withdrawal from the integrated 
command of NATO also had those combined motives - US exclusion, 
French independence and a refusal to permit defence to be in another 
state's hands. 
He praised the exclusiveness of the EC when it reduced its 
dependence upon the US. (18) However, during that period de Gaulle 
was also concerned about the supra-national aspects of the EC under 
the first Commission President, the assertive and visionary Hallstein. 
Many of de Gaulle's actions had as their motive the maintaining of his 
vision of a Europe des Patries. For example, the Fouchet Committee 
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was intended to undermine the Commission. (19) However, Duchene 
makes an important point about this search for grandeur. French 
security was underwritten by the US-German alliance and de Gaulle, • 
"unlike the Bismarcks of this world ....proposed policies unrelated to his 
power." (20) France did and still does dislike a Europe dependent upon 
the US. This was the crux of de Gaulle's policy and he used the EC 
(with the minimum of supra-nationality) to achieve it. 
The American-European relationship, to the dismay of the US, has 
now developed from economic cooperation into compefition. (21) 
Ginsberg said that memories of 1945 have faded, (22) a view endorsed 
by Delors: "....there are conflicts of interest between ourselves and other 
powers in general and our major compefitors, the United States....the 
Commission does not look for trouble but it has a duty to defend our 
industries and our jobs...." (23) 
The gulf between France and the US can also be seen in the 
economic field, where Anglo-Saxon free trade liberalism is opposed by 
the more state-orientated regulated and dirigiste viewpoint 
predominating not only in France but throughout most of Europe. De 
Gaulle may have been a conservative in many ways but in contrast to 
Thatcher he did believe in state involvement in the market. As with 
Delors, de Gaulle also had disagreements with the US over GATT. He 
saw the Kennedy Round influencing Europe, just as years later Delors 
objected to US pressure over the Uruguay Round. It was the age-old 
argument: free trade versus protection, an argument which became part 
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of the ideological battle between the neo-liberal Thatcher, and Delors 
with his dirigisme and state orientated model. 
Perhaps a more uniquely French fear is that of cultural penetration 
by the Anglo-Saxon culture. Harrison believed that in 1945 the US was 
the heir to European culture, but by the 1970s many Europeans saw 
American culture as an onslaught upon their own traditions. (24) To 
Charles Powell, "....the French see the main challenge to them coming 
not from Britain but from America: from American films, slang and 
hamburgers as much as from American power, influence, and 
technological supremacy." (25) It is perhaps surprising that France of 
all European states, allowed the shrine of US culture, Disney, to open a 
theme park there, but this also showed evidence of Disney's ignorance 
of European culture. Delors talked of penetration and domination by 
other cultures: "We don't want to be brutally Japanified, Americanized 
or globalized...my dream is that Europe should shine forth, without 
dominating and that it should give the example of a certain fraternity." 
(26) He expanded upon this theme when discussing the decline in 
French national confidence. "The influx of languages, products, customs 
- even attitudes of mind - from elsewhere has caused them distress. 
The obsessive assertion of Frenchness on the extreme Right of our 
political spectrum expresses this new vulnerability." (27) 
Many of the French suspicions and fears of the Americans can be 
seen in Delors. He was aware of their bullying and patronizing motives. 
For example, members of the Reagan administration tended to lecture 
93 
Europeans on the merits of "Reaganomics" and liked to exclude the 
Commission from G7 meetings. American atfitudes range from the 
belief that the EC was just a trade blub, that Delors was anfi-NATO, to 
the idea that E M U was a threat to the dollar. Delors retorted on one 
occasion that Europe should not take lessons from a country that 
financed its development through military build-up and a huge deficit. 
He also criticised the service economies favoured by both Thatcher and 
Reagan: "What kind of supply can correspond to this kind of demand? 
Either a workforce that is poorly paid and without protecfion, on the 
Reaganite model, or (why not if one thinks of the opportunifies created 
by immigration?) a workforce with a status akin to that of slaves." (28) 
He made the claim that the social democrafic alternative had a 
resistance to unemployment because of the depth of their social fabric. 
To Delors this gulf is philosophical: there is the Reagan-Thatcher 
Anglo-Saxon liberal outlook, which downgrades people in relation to the 
market, and there is the more European social democrafic alternative 
with the market in its place. Additionally, Delors was also influenced by 
the French "Colbertian" dirigiste belief in the role of the state. 
This animosity between two systems added to the gulf between 
Delors, with his French European viewpoint, and Reagan and his 
acolyte Thatcher. Delors saw US individualism and a return to 
laissez-faire as alien and not European, and he did not, unlike 
Thatcher, want US leadership. The argument during the protracted 
GATT Uruguay round illustrated the division between the free trade of 
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the British and Delors' belief in European protection. Ross wrote that 
this schism of opinion ran through the Commission itself: "Leon Brittan 
....was a genuine neo-liberal to whom the fully open market was the only 
industrial policy." (29) Delors' defence of the CAP on this issue 
perhaps illustrated not only the usual French distrust of the US but also 
his nationalism in defending essentially a French rather than an EC 
position. Delors believed in equality with the US in their mutual 
relationship: "It must be one of equals, as political thinkers on both 
sides of the Atlantic have affirmed frequently and one which 
corresponds to the vision of Jean Monnet, the intellectual father of the 
new Europe." (30) 
There was a fundamental ideological split between Delors and 
Thatcher in their relations with the US. They both inherited some 
national attitudes, including the so-called British special relationship and 
the traditional French suspicion. Delors had the personalist hostility to 
the US and was from a different political spectrum to de Gaulle, but 
had a Gaullist view of the US. Thatcher, who had similar views to de 
Gaulle about Europe, was at the other extreme regarding the US. 
There is an irony in that de Gaulle used his dislike of the US to achieve 
his way in Europe and that Thatcher, with her love of the US, agreed 
with many of de Gaulle's sentiments about Europe. According to 
Holland: "Thatcher represented the reincarnation of Gaullist tradition; 
just as de Gaulle had stymied any concession that encroached upon 
French sovereignty during the 1960s, Thatcher was committed to 
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opposing any federal attack on British national independence." (31) 
However, these sentiments became mixed with her ideological views 
and, in contrast to de Gaulle, Thatcher was concerned about 
de-regulafion, free trade, liberal market economics and, as she said in 
the Bruges speech "....Britain would fight attempts to introduce 
collectivism and corporatism at the European level...." (32) 
The division of opinion between Thatcher and Delors was 
reminiscent of the near disaster of the 1960s, when Hallstein took the 
supra-nafional view against de Gaulle's Europe des Patries, with French 
leadership and US exclusion. To Monnet, de Gaulle believed "that 
Europe should be built around France and he could not imagine 
delegafing sovereignty." (33) Allen believed that, like Thatcher, de 
Gaulle was concerned about the advance of supra-nationality at the 
expense of national sovereignty. He also believed there was another 
similarity; de Gaulle wanted to keep the CAP and as a consequence 
integrafion developed, just as Thatcher pushed the SEA, with the same 
result. (34) It was perhaps ironic that de Gaulle, by blocking British 
entry, also robbed himself of a potenfial ally in the supra-national / 
nafional sovereignty debate. The opinions which divided Hallstein and 
de Gaulle were also present with Thatcher and Delors but, in addifion, 
there was ideological parfifion. Thatcher constantly equated Delors' 
supra-national federalist viewpoint with socialism. He is a socialist so he 
is a federalist. (35) 
There were many issues wrapped up in those many complex debates 
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and the role of the US perhaps provided an interesting comparison. De 
Gaulle and Thatcher would have agreed on many things but they had 
diametrically opposed views on the US: De Gaulle was hostile and saw 
the US as a threat, especially in high politics, whereas Thatcher was 
infatuated, mainly with their economic system. In another contrast, 
Monnet was enthusiastic, had a cooperative relationship with John 
Kennedy and wanted partnership; but Delors, his admirer and follower, 
was ambiguous, hostile and took a more sceptical "Gaullist" view. 
Between Thatcher and Delors there was an ideological schism: She 
wanted economic liberalism and he opposed Anglo-Saxon economic 
ideology and the role of the US and Britain in supporting it. This 
divide was further illustrated by the positions taken by the two during 
the SEM negotiations and their aftermath. 
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6. I N T E G R A T I O N . 
If you open that Pandora's Box you never know what Trojan 'orses will 
jump out. (1) 
6.1. T H E SINGLE E U R O P E A N A C T A N D N E G A T I V E 
I N T E G R A T I O N 
Integration is like riding a bicycle: the choice is simply going forward 
or falling off. (2) 
The SEA was perhaps the great step which revitalized the EC and 
helped to produce many of the integrationist steps which followed. It 
was an attempt to re-create the original intention of the Treaty of Rome 
to override national interests and remove hidden barriers to internal 
trade, many of which had been erected during the recession and period 
of "Euro-sclerosis" in the 1970s. 
The EC was receptive to the SEA following recessions in the 1970s, 
the pre-eminence of intergovernmentalism and increased American and 
Pacific Rim competition. The general weakness of the left at that time 
meant that market solutions to the problems were examined, in an 
attempt to create what Howe called "Thatcherism on a European scale." 
(3) This period of "stagflation" had seen old declining industries 
subsidized and, according to John Pinder, national markets were slowing 
the dynamism of the EC. (4) External forces were slowing integration 
and, in response, Europe was turning inwards upon itself to create 
wealth from its own resources: A Europe san fronteirs. The Dooge 
Committee was formed to examine the issue and the first item of its 
report said "by creating a genuine internal market by the end of the 
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decade on the basis of a precise timetable." (5) According to Delors: 
"Following the example of Jean Monnet, the idea must be turned into 
an objective, and that in time must be made concrete by setting a date -
hence 1992." (6) 
The divide between Thatcher and Delors over this issue and the 
subsequent proposals for extending the SEM into the monetary and 
social areas can be illustrated by using the integration theory of Kapteyn 
and various views on regulation. The first scenario is Thatcher's vision 
of the stateless market, where there is no regulation and the gap 
between the negative integration of the market and the positive 
integration of state-like structures is very wide. (7) Kapteyn's second 
scenario is near Delors' hopes for the transfer of powers to a European 
government and the gap between negative and positive integration 
closed. (8) His third scenario is a form of middle way between the two 
extremes, represented by Thatcher and Delors. Both Dyson et. al., and 
Woolcock et. al., examine different views on regulation: The British 
wish to regulate only where necessary; and the European view, (which 
includes the German system), (9) of a more consensual and corporatist 
approach and the necessity to regulate to make the market work in the 
public (as well as the private) interest. (10) 
Although Delors is given much of the credit for driving the SEA to 
relaunch the EC, many of its concepts came from a paper circulated by 
Thatcher during the Fountainbleau Council. (11) According to 
Moravcsik, "....her extreme neo-liberalism lent the SEA much of its 
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substance." (12) It was the first overhaul of the Treaty of Rome and 
was the only measure to gain universal support, perhaps because it was 
a compromise following the EP's Draft Treaty on European Union and 
the Genscher-Columbo plan. Delors felt he was only asking the 
member states to adhere to the commitments they had made 35 years 
before. (13) It was a measure which fitted the converging domestic 
agendas of the member states, thus producing integration from 
intergovernmental bargaining, rather than from spillover. (14) 
In addition, there was pressure from business to promote this project. 
European business did not want its markets penetrated by corporations 
controlled by the Japanese. Allen believed, "....the Japanese threat 
inspired many to advocate the advantages of completing the internal 
market in the 1990s." (15) The European Business Round Table 
contributed to the agenda and, according to Sandholtz and Zysman, it 
was the threat of aggressive Japanese expansion which focused business 
on the project: "The final goal of the European dream is to transform 
Europe into an integrated economic continent with its specific role 
weight and responsibility on the international scenario vis-a-vis the USA 
and Japan." (16) "The Commission aided by business was able to 
mobilize a coalition of governmental elite's that favoured the overall 
objective of market unification." (17) 
Thatcher's instincts supported the SEA and Britain became highly 
communautaire. To Moravcsik: "Insofar as Thatcher was pro-European, 
it was largely because she saw the EC almost exclusively as an 
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organization for promoting economic liberalism in the industrial and 
service sectors." (18) Therefore, she did settle the BBQ and promoted 
a project which was an attempt at negative integration by the removal of 
barriers to create a giant 340-million strong free trade area, which 
would involve 40% of the world's trade. It would be free of protection 
and with market forces prevailing. Howe justified the SEA to 
Parliament by the fact that 48% of Britain's exports went to Europe and 
that we wanted "completely free access to these markets." (19) Thatcher 
stated her intentions before the White Paper was published. At the 
Dublin Council in December 1984, she agreed to enlargement, but also 
called for a free trade market with budget discipline and no regulation 
from the Commission. 
In retrospect, that seemed a vain hope considering that the 
re-invigorated Commission and its active and visionary President had 
different views on regulafion and were promofing the SEM. She 
repeated this desire to Parliament following the Luxembourg Council in 
December 1985: "The government is wary of greater integration except 
on matters such as the internal market which are to our advantage." (20) 
In her memoirs she stated: "(The SEA)....must be used to create and 
maintain a single market, rather than to advance other objectives." (21) 
This illustrated her desire for the "stateless market" without elements of 
state building and her desire for no insfitutional regulation in the 
market. 
To Thatcher, the new single market would also include new members 
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which brought to the fore the widening-versus-deepening debate. To 
her, widening would slow down the deepening process, by contrast 
another view is that widening could make deepening necessary in order 
to maintain stability and to stop the centrifugal forces that come with 
enlargement. It is typical of Thatcher that she would not agree to pay 
more for protection upon the entry of Spain and Portugal, because if 
they were joining a free market, they should stand alone and not expect 
high budget contributors like Britain to support them. In the Brifish 
view, many of the new applicants also took a sceptical approach to 
integration, and thus Thatcher, despite being totally opposed to 
Sweden's domestic social consensus, could see an ally in future battles 
with Brussels. 
Cockfield's White Paper, "Compledng the Internal Market" which 
listed 300 measures with no priority but a tight timetable, was published 
by the Commission in June 1985 and its.principles were accepted by the 
Luxembourg Council in December 1985, and signed "on February 1986. 
The preamble to the SEA stated that: "Just as the customs union had to 
precede economic integration, so economic integradon has to precede 
European unity." (22) Also in the preamble is the commitment to 
EMU. (23) Title one contained the phrase, "making concrete progress 
towards European unity;" title two stated the intention to establish the 
internal market by 1992, gave formal status to the EMS, named EMU 
as an objective, and extended the range of qualified majority voting in 
the European Council. (QMV) This produced not only a new 
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dynamism within the EC but al,so meant Britain was committed to the 
EC. This list of proposals was certainly beyond Thatcher's desire and 
contained elements of European state building; the positive integration 
of Kapteyn's second scenario. 
By settling the budget issue (BBQ) and by promoting the SEA, 
Thatcher helped to unleash the forces which she spent her time fighting 
at each European Council after 1985 and those forces led indirectly to 
her demise. She knew the SEA would give more power to the 
Commission in return for the economic benefits. The main question is: 
why did Thatcher sign the SEA? In her first book of memoirs she 
wrote that originally she did not want a Treaty, only arrangements, but 
that she was forced to back down. Her greatest worry at that stage was 
cross border terrorism and she would not have signed without 
safeguards. She signed because she felt the huge market it created 
would "get the community back on course." (24) Perhaps she was 
persuaded by her desire for an enlarged free-trade area, in line with the 
British policy of world wide free trade? In her 1995 memoirs she wrote: 
"International free trade gives collective peace and prosperity. It must 
be a liberal world - politically, economically and culturally." (25) It 
seems Thatcher wanted the economic rewards without paying the 
political price. In the view of Gamble, she did not appreciate the full 
implications of the SEA or majority voting. (26) This conundrum was 
discussed by Hugo Young: "Having herself negotiated and signed the 
European Single Act in 1985 it was as if at some point thereafter she 
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suddenly became aware of what it meant. How this misunderstanding 
came about - how so diligent a reader of the small print came so 
thoroughly to misinform herself remains one of the puzzles of the 
Thatcher era." (27) 
To Cockfield, "her support of the Single Market was largely based on 
a misunderstanding." (28) He also said she "felt she had been conned" 
into signing both the Solemn Declaration on European Union and the 
SEA. (29) However, she does admit being warned at the time that 
giving the Commission new powers would only make it want more and 
she says that she thought the SEA would be an end in itself: "Looking 
back I was wrong to think that. But I still believe it was right to sign the 
SEA because we wanted a Single European Market." (30) With more 
reflection she enlarges upon the SEA: "The Single European Act, 
contrary to my intentions and my understanding of formal undertakings 
given at the time, had provided new scope for the European 
Commission and the European Court to press forward in the direction 
of centralization." (31) This misconception was discussed in Parliament 
by George Robertson in 1985: "The Government's ideology sees a 
free-trade area - a Europe-wide enterprise zone - with deregulation 
triumphant and all social protection dismantled, but for our partners in 
the EC, even those on the right wing it is about much more than that...." 
(32) Several years later. Kohl made a similar point: " I have never 
understood Mrs Thatcher who believes that the future of Europe lies in 
a super free-trade area." (33) These statements illustrate the basic 
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divide: The negative integration of the "stateless market" of Thatcher 
with the removal of controls and regulation and the views of both 
Robertson and Kohl which show a desire for a transfer of sovereignty, 
an erection of Europe-wide controls and positive integration. 
Another area of controversy concerns Thatcher's agreement to an 
extension of majority voting, the QMV. To Cockfield, she "did not 
regard the unanimity as a way for all members to move foreword 
together. She saw it as a right to veto." (34) The QMV was brought in, 
despite stating in Parliament in 1985 that she thought the market could 
be completed keeping the unanimity rule. (35) To quote Smith, "....she 
was persuaded that more majority voting was required if the programme 
was not going to be blocked by one country or another." (36) Majority 
voting did change the nature of the EC as Pinder has written: 
"Unanimous agreement among government representatives is the typical 
procedure for intergovernmental organizations, whereas majority voting 
is used in a. federal system." (37) Howe told Parliament what QMV 
meant: "....qualified majority will replace unanimity for the measures 
which are major components of the construction of the common 
market...." (38) To Thatcher, majority voting was for the articles of the 
SEA and no more. As she wrote later: " ....the new majority voting 
provisions intended solely to implement the single market were used by 
the Commis.sion to extend its regulatory powers." (39) Delors's view 
was that "the law of the lowest common denominator could water down 
our ambitious plans for European Union." (40) Thatcher seems to have 
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been aware of this and was determined to keep unanimity on most 
issues and preserve the Luxembourg compromise, although it was not 
enshrined in the treaties. 
She wanted to keep the unanimity rule for directives "which could be 
vital" to many industries and she also thought there was a gap between 
rhetoric and reality on the issues in many states. (41) For example, 
both Denmark and Greece had similar views to Thatcher's. There also 
appears to have been some self delusion; after agreeing to those 
changes she said that the "Luxembourg compromise was unaffected." 
(42) She told the House of Commons in 1985 that "we agreed there 
should be greater use of majority vodng on a number of treaty articles 
dealing with goods and services ...but unanimity will be retained for all 
decisions on taxadon." (43) She then said specifically: "The 
Luxembourg compromise, whereby a member state can invoke a very 
important national interest to prevent a decision being taken is 
unaffected." (44) She then described how the two systems would work 
together: "....the Luxembourg compromise will still be applied even 
when there is majority vodng provided that a very important national 
interest is involved." (45) Howe endorsed this view when he told 
Parliament that "....the Luxembourg compromise remains in place, 
untouched and unaffected," (46) a view he repeated later in his memoirs 
when he called it "untouched." (47) These statements were made in 
1985, but by 1986 the argument was still going on with Delors calling 
the QMV an important step in achieving the SEM and as a way to "stop 
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the inertia." (48) During the same speech he repeated the implied 
threat of a multi-speed Europe to keep up the dynamism, in order to 
"speak of a community not a free trade area." (49) 
Thatcher did not seem to realize that Delors would attach other 
items to the SEA, making them subject to QMV, to stop her defending 
the national interest against the majority opinion. She had a minimilist 
position; majority voting to gain the SEA, then opt out. Despite the 
fact that Thatcher and Howe, in partnership with Cockfield and Delors, 
had promoted the SEA project, (50) her criticism of fellow neo-liberal 
Cockfield is withering: "Cockfield produced the single market but he 
disregarded the larger question of politics - constitutional sovereignty 
national sentiment and the promptings of liberty. He was the prisoner 
as well as the master of his subject. It was all too easy for him to go 
native and to move from de-regulating the market to re-regulating it 
under the rubric of harmonization." (51) It is this latter point which is 
perhaps the most important to Thatcher because this influences the free 
movement of the market. The statement demonstrates another division 
between Thatcher and Europe. Her view of regulation was minimilist, 
especially in the economic field, (52) and was an extreme version of the 
British reluctance to regulate; in contrast, Cockfield, despite being an 
economic liberal, saw the need for some harmonization and regulation 
to make the SEM work. 
He seemed to be taking more of a European stance and Howe 
confirmed this when he later wrote that Thatcher did not re-nominate 
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Cockfield to the Commission because "he had gone native with his tax 
harmonization plans." (53) Thatcher seems to have reacted to this by 
replacing Cockfield with "one of us", Brittan but, to her dismay, he also 
went native and began to advocate tighter European integration. 
However, despite this accusadon, Brittan fought a condnual bureaucradc 
batde in the Commission in defence of neo-liberalism, most especially 
against Delors. (54) In her memoirs there is no evidence that she knew 
of this internal Commission batde; her famous "no, no, no" reply in 
Parliament included cridcism of Brittan. (55) 
At the London Council of December 1986, Thatcher seemed to have 
realized the full impact of the SEA and the Commission President. She 
agreed to implement the SEA, she sdll restated her ideological aversion 
to the CAP and she realized Delors was a new kind of President, "a 
major player in the game", prepared to use the SEA to advance 
federalism supported by the Franco-German axis. (56) Much to her 
annoyance he used the pre-council dinner to announce that, because of 
the CAP, the EC was nearly bankrupt. She resented Delors "springing 
surprises upon the heads of Government" and seeming to work "from 
his own agenda." (57) Thatcher later wrote that "The European 
Commission, which had always had a yen for centralized power, was 
now led by a tough, talented European federalist, whose philosophy 
justified centralism." (58) That was also a point when she realized that 
the direction of the EC had changed - towards a direcdon she did not 
want and she expressed concern that the veto would be "circumvented." 
I l l 
(59) 
Delors was aware of the differing priorities of the members and what 
they hoped to gain from the SEA and, again, Kapteyn's theory can be 
used to show the divide: Britain and Denmark wanted integration to 
stop with the SEA, followed by the widening of the EC to include the 
northern states (the first scenario); the southern members were looking 
for more regional aid and a ticket to modernity; and the founder 
members led by France and Germany viewed the SEA as a 
stepping-stone towards deepening the relationship (the second 
scenario). (60) Kohl summarized their view: "The internal market is 
only an intermediate point of development, we must have political union 
in Europe too." (61) During his "Monnet" lecture in 1986, Delors listed 
his three alternatives for the future of the EC and these are very similar 
to Kapteyn's thesis: 
A choice must be made between a large market in name only 
where different arrangements and requirements exists in the 
various countries and from which our economies as a whole 
would not benefit, or a free trade area which is not regulated 
and is subjected to divergent economic policies and I might 
add, has no conscience, no soul, no political will or else finally, 
a true economic area....to make our economic policies converge 
and lead us towards European Union. (62) 
Delors was mindful of the British push for a limited 
market-orientated free trade zone and he made a plea to stop that kind 
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of development: " I reject a Europe that would be just a market, a free 
trade zone without a soul, without a conscience, without a political will 
and without a social dimension. That's where we are heading and I am 
issuing a cry of alarm." (63) To Ross, Delors believed that markets 
were a "social construction which gained their vitality from the people 
who contributed to them." (64) On one occasion he told the Directors 
General of the Commission that "the Community is not, and will not be, 
a free-trade zone." (65) In the programme of the Commission for 1986, 
Delors stated that "the creation of a vast economic area....is 
inconceivable . . . . I would say unatainable without some harmonization of 
social legislation." (66) The different emphasis in the.se two quotes can 
be explained by the fact that the first was said inside the Commission 
and the second was for public consumption and needed to be more 
diplomatic. His more dogmatic quote seems nearer to the real Delors. 
To Bressard, he re-emphasized these points by stating that the SEM was 
doomed if it did not include a move towards political union. (67) 
Delors repeated his apocalyptic warnings between 1985 and 1990 
when he talked of "de-regulation at any price," "a barrier free Europe 
cannot operate without ground rules," (68) and of "ideological reasons 
for a utilitarian vision of Europe." (69) In announcing the 
Commission's programme for 1990 he said, "The Single Act is an 
indivisible whole. It extends beyond the single market to solidarity 
through economic and social cohesion, to the enviroment...and 
monetary cooperation....it implies the creation of a single economic and 
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social area without which the Community would be a hollow creation." 
(70) This is a clear exposition of European state building, of resisting 
the Thatcherite concept of the stateless market. It also illustrates his 
belief that regulation was needed to gain the full extent of the SEA. 
This dynamism pointed towards positive integration, towards all the 
harmonization that Thatcher feared. (71) It included extending the area 
of competence of the Commission, although it would still not be as 
powerful as the ECSC High Authority, and thus keep the European 
Council as the decision making body. (72) Moves were proposed 
towards the ERM, EMU, a central bank, the Social Charter and 
ultimately economic and political union. Despite this, the structure and 
source of power within the EC was unaltered. In his speech to the 
Monnet Centenary Symposium, Delors listed his objectives of the SEM; 
the creation of a single market, economic and social cohesion, 
technological cooperation, monetary cooperation, care for the 
environment and the social dimension. He believed those measures 
would stop a kind of economic Darwinism taking place where, for 
example, the economic gap between Germany and southern Italy 
widens. Perhaps his most telling remark was that those ideas were not 
his, they came from the member states. Delors said: "Contrary to what 
some believe, these six objectives are not the brainchild of the 
Commission, still less of red Jacques Delors." (73) 
Negative integration, the removal of barriers, was giving way to 
positive integration and Thatcher believed that Howe and the Foreign 
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Office (FCO) would compromise in an attempt to avoid isolation. (74) 
This should not have come as a surprise because there was nothing 
secret about Delors' intentions or the contents of the SEA. Whichever 
way it is interpreted, the meaning does seem clear enough. It appears 
that Thatcher signed the SEA and then tried to resist the consequences. 
Delors spoke clearly on several occasions of the SEA being a stage 
towards his goal of political union. He called it "concrete progress 
towards European unity." (75) Without this progress, "European 
integration would loose its driving force and one of its objectives, 
namely economic and social progress." (76) 
Bressard wrote that by 1988 Thatcher had realized that the SEA had 
gone beyond what was first envisaged. (77) Despite this she still, even 
by 1990, retained the hope that the SEA would be limited and she 
could not envisage withdrawal, as the following Parliamentary exchange 
illustrated: Question: "Does my RHP agree and confirm that her words 
today mean in effect that she would prefer to withdraw from the Treaty 
of Rome and the Single European Act?" Prime Minister: "No. We 
should like to have the kind of Europe we believe in and the Europe 
that we went in to join." (78) Thatcher's kind of Europe was a minority 
view and her old colleague Cockfield gave the Commission's view and 
that of Delors: "The SEA .... leads the way to the future development 
of the community - a road clearly signposted in the solemn declaration 
and in the Single European Act - namely - European Union. After the 
single market will come the single currency; and after the single 
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currency will come the single economy; and after the single economy 
will come European Union." (79) 
Positive integration was needed to further this goal and it was obvious 
where the resistance would come from: "Britain remained a distinctly 
awkward partner in the enterprise that was launched in 1985 of creating 
a more closely integrated EC." (80) The awkwardness was perhaps 
increased by the ideological antipathy to the spillover from the SEA by 
the British Prime Minister. Perhaps Pinder is near to the reality when 
he said that "positive integration may prove to be beyond the present 
political capacity of Europe." (81) This may be true, but what the 
momentum did was to bring into open conflict the antipathy between 
Thatcher and Delors, who represented the extremes of the European 
debate. 
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6.2. P O S I T I V E I N T E G R A T I O N AND S P I L L O V E R : T H E 
D E L O R S P A C K A G E . 
Together with other members of the Council I signed the declaration 
on European Union. (1) 
Britain signed the SEA in February 1986 and at the ceremony there was 
no mention of further measures from either the President of the 
European Council, Hans Van Den Brock, or the Vice President of the 
Commission Frans Andrriesson. (2) It was Delors and the Commission 
who attempted to capitalize on the integration momentum created by 
the SEA and to push it into other spheres. He talked of "monetary 
cooperation, economic cohesion and the social dimension." (3) 
Following the negative integration of the SEA with its economic market 
building, Delors and the Commission moved via his "Russian Dolls" 
strategy into the process of European state building. He wanted to 
enhance the SEM with such measures as the 1987-88 Delors package, 
(the paquet Delors) a new push towards E M U , the Social Charter and 
ultimately political union. Writing in The Single Act: A New Frontier, 
he said "the choice is between a hazy free trade area embellished with a 
few financial transfers and a truly economic area." (4) His later address 
in 1989 to the European Parliament (EP) repeated these points: "....the 
economic dimension of the single market cannot be seen in isolation. 
Every market needs some rules. Everyone accepts that." (5) 
However, the measures he proposed appeared to lead beyond only 
the economic and into a European project of state building. The 
success of the SEM was that it allowed Delors to set the agenda and 
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take the lead. He seemed to be tiying to use the intergovernmental 
solidarity created by the SEA and the general economic optimism 
(which remained despite the crash in 1987) to create his vision of 
European union. Delors called this harmonization to stop unfair 
competition, social dumping and unequal business contests. (6) To 
Pinder, this move towards positive integration meant "bringing common 
institutions and instruments to make laws and policies to meet objectives 
beyond that of an undistorted single market." (7) 
The SEA had universal intergovernmental support but these further 
moves towards integration did not. Not only Thatcher thought they 
were enforced spillover and many, including the French, had 
reser\'ations. She saw those ideas as distorting the market and she 
would not accept them, because she believed positive integration of that 
kind puts up barriers. She resisted any perceived logic of spillover: She 
was unhappy with the Delors' package, would not accept any timetable 
towards E M U or even its precursor the ERM, wanted no central bank 
dictating monetary policy and most important of all - she would not 
accept, under any circumstances, a social dimension to the single market 
which would distort and destroy the free movement of the labour 
market, increase costs and destroy jobs. Repeatedly, she called it 
backdoor creeping socialism, centralized bureaucratic neo-socialist 
interfering, which would destroy the basics of economic survival - the 
market. (8) 
Those dynamics were there following the success of the SEA and 
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Thatcher was perhaps correct when she talked of a re-awakening of 
federalist instincts. However, talk of a "slippery slope" to a common 
foreign policy and a "federal Europe" (9) seem far from the reality, 
where rhetoric in many cases does not match the actions of the member 
states, and not just in Britain. Despite those reservations, momentum 
towards positive integration built up and Thatcher realized she could 
not stop it. The threat of a "two-tier" Europe, and being side-lined in 
Europe, kept her involved because ultimately she wanted access to the 
European market she had helped to create. She wanted the SEM and 
she realized integration momentum was building up, but she still wanted 
to keep centralization and regulation to a minimum. To John Young, 
she could not turn the tide; instead she tried to direct it towards the 
free market. (10) 
Those integrationary forces were coming to the the fore, pushed by 
the Commission, and Thatcher did to a certain extent acquiesce. By 
accepting majority voting on the SEA, she opened the door for her veto 
of future measures to be overridden. She compromised the 
"Luxembourg compromise." This should not have come as a surprise to 
her because the Gensher-Columbo plan had said that "vital interests 
should be pleaded only in exceptional circumstances." (11) But not 
anticipating that an astute insider like Delors would add other measures 
to the SEA seems naive and out of character. Although she wanted 
nothing extra grafted on to the existing treaties, she participated in an 
Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) established at the Milan Council 
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of 1985, as a result of the 1984 Dooge Committee which was examining 
closer cooperation. (12) The spectre of the Messina scenario may have 
influenced her and she wanted avoid a repeat. (13) She did not want to 
be sidelined in Europe, especially when her objective for the SEM was 
coming to fruition. She also felt that the FCO wanted to stay on board 
and thus would compromise. The Dooge committee, which included 
one of her own ministers Malcolm Riffkind, did not advocate a federal 
Europe or anything like it. It went out of its way to take national 
interests into account and talked of "old alliances" being maintained, 
defence coordination, taking into account NATO, and cultural identities 
preserved. However, it did have one phrase (on page 17) which was 
guaranteed to antagonize Thatcher "....to forge ahead towards monetary 
integration." (14) 
Despite the intentions of the Treaty of Rome, she believed the vision 
of the EC had changed after 1984: "....the European Community subtly 
but surely shifted its direction away from being a community of open 
trade, light regulation and freely cooperating sovereign nation states 
towards statism and centralism." (15) However, the EC has never been 
about total free trade as she wanted it and as the CAP illustrates. 
There may be a measure of self deception on her part, perhaps that was 
how she wanted the EC to be - not how it actually was. She recognized 
this, hence her promotion of the SEM. However, she was convinced 
that new forces were building up against her and she saw a kind of 
chimera in the making: "For the underlying forces of federalism and 
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bureaucracy were gaining in strength as a coalition of socialists and 
Christian Democrat governments in France, Spain, Italy and Germany 
forced the pace of integration and a Commission equipped 
with extra powers began to manipulate them to advance its own 
agenda." (16) 
If those states were added to the smaller states, whom she 
acknowledged in September 1983 had federalist instincts, there were not 
many left with her point of view, perhaps only Denmark and Greece. 
She saw those forces gaining momentum, manipulated by an assertive 
and political commission working to its own federalist and integrationist 
agenda. 
Perhaps she saw the danger of federalism in the wrong place. 
Michael Butler makes the point that if power is moving from the 
Council, the EP and not the Commission will have the greater 
influence. The EP had democratic legitimacy and could challenge 
national parliaments. Possibly that is why she was determined to curtail 
its fund-raising powers and thereby stop it from becoming another 
source of legitimate authority. (17) She preferred a "limited role" for 
the EP and thought "assembly" was a more appropriate name. (18) 
Although in 1985 she sanctioned "a modest increase in its powers," she 
thought the "Council of Ministers, representing governments answerable 
to national Parliaments, must always have the final say." (19) She 
preferred the nominated system of selecting MEP's because it kept 
close contact with national Parliaments; later the elected EP demanded 
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a wider role to justify the salaries of its members; and she concluded 
that an assembly where "people did not speak the same language or 
share the same traditions illustrated the shortcomings of attempts to 
create artificial Europe-wide institutions." (20) 
The impetus for integration came when the leaders of the EC were 
all at the peak of their careers, were established and dominated their 
respective national arenas: Lubbers, Mitterrand, Kohl, Gonzalez, Santer, 
Schulter and Delors all had positive reasons to favour integration. 
Some may have had doubts but only Thatcher saw it as a threat. 
The first measure to follow the SEA and move towards positive 
integration was the Delors Package, the paquet Delors. According to 
Delors: "In Brussels in June 1987, eleven countries gave their approval 
to the main outlines of the Delors plan." (21) It boosted regional funds, 
stopped the smaller states being hurt by the SEA and put them behind 
the E M U project. The paquet Delors gave more structural funds to 
Spain and Portugal and promised reform of the budget and the CAP. 
Not only Thatcher resisted the increase in the budget. The Gaullist 
Prime Minister of France during the "cohabitation" period, Jacques 
Chirac, also wanted something in return for higher contributions. This 
potential deadlock was broken in February 1988 by the partnership of 
Kohl and Delors; Germany promised to finance the change .as part of its 
push towards greater European unity. Delors told Kohl that only 
through the EC could Germany gain a place on the world stage and that 
this measure would promote the "family spirit" of the EC. (22) 
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Delors realised that reform of the the budget was needed but his 
main concern when announcing his programme for J 987 was "fairness 
for all members," (23) He obtained ah enlarged budget, but Thatcher 
also achieved her aim by preserving the budget rebate, having the 
budget better controlled with fixed spending for five years in advance 
and the Germans paying the bill. What this also did was to increase the 
member states commitment to the EC, including Britain's, thus allowing 
the "Russian dolls" strategy to take affect. The paquet Delors 
interfered in the free working of the market and gave events a more 
European dimension. It was evidence that the stateless market as 
envisaged by Thatcher was unacceptable to the other members and that 
some form of state-like measures were needed at European level. In 
Kapteyn's theory, it was a move to narrow the gap between the negative 
integration of the market and the positive integration of the state. Its 
acceptance built up the momentum towards Thatcher's toughest and 
most internally divisive challenge; the ERM and ultimately EMU. 
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6.2. POSITIVE I N T E G R A T I O N A N D SPILLOVER: T H E 
DELORS PACKAGE. 
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"carried a raft" of spillover measures in its wake; Thatcher's belief 
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6.3 T H E E R M A N D E M U . 
Monetaiy union is indispensable to the jjrogramme to free the internal market. (1) 
There is no way one can buck the market. (2) 
To Delors, the E M U project seemed a logical extension to the SEM. 
By contrast Thatcher viewed it as ideological anathema because it would 
affect the free movement of the market and stop market forces from 
prevailing. The precursor to EMU, the ERM or as it was called in 
Europe the EMS, was also subjected to the same criticism. 
Some form of monetary integration had been on the agenda since the 
early 1970s and in 1972 Britain joined the forerunner to the ERM, the 
snake, for six weeks from May to June, before being forced out. It was 
not a great success. Neither was Schmidt's proposals for an EMS to 
counter President Carter's ideas on reflation during the recession of 
that period. The EMS was devised by Germany and France to protect 
Europe and the interests of the EC from the vagaries of a weak dollar, 
thus giving the impression that the system was anti-American. This 
impression may have influenced Thatcher's attitude to the later system 
because both she and her economic guru, Alan Walters, were 
pro-American. (3) E M U returned to the top of the agenda in the wake 
of the SEA, and it was part of Delors' "Russian Dolls" strategy to push 
for greater integration, to give an EC dimension to monetary policy, an 
important step towards his vision of European union. He summarized 
his views and the merits of EMU: "The first phase of the EC's history 
from 1950 to 1982 has been based on Schuman's leitmotif, never again 
war between us. Since 1984 there has been my idea that union is 
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necessary to guarantee survival. Without that union, our countries will 
turn into museums for the Japanese and Americans to visit." (4) 
In addition to political advantages, there seemed to be merit in the 
fiscal discipline the system would bring, by linking currencies to the 
anti-inflationary Deutschmark, by being on the inside of EC financial 
decision making, influencing events and, for Britain, the possibility of 
presei-ving London as a financial centre. (5) 
There was pressure for Britain to become involved and at least join 
the ERM but this met with fierce opposition from the British Prime 
Minister. The actual process of fixing the exchange rate was ideological 
anathema to Thatcher. It stopped the free movement of the market, 
and she said it would "subvert market forces." (6) In addition, a fixed 
rate with an independent central bank would be outside government 
control and thus could adopt a more Keynesian attitude to economics, 
undermine her economic liberalism and destroy the Thatcher orthodoxy 
of monetarism. This view can be traced to that of the guiding light of 
monetarism - Milton Friedman. He emphasized money supply as the 
weapon to fight inflation and control the economy. Dyson considered 
that, to monetarists "the key requirement was a long-term discipline on 
the rate of growth of the money supply." (7) He also said that 
Friedman "was a long standing aposfle of floating exchange rates....so 
that countries could pursue independent macro economic policies." In 
this respect "neither he nor his disciples could be expected to view the 
EMS with any enthusiasm." (8) Thatcher echoed Friedman's view that 
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exchange rates were too important an instrument of "domestic economic 
adjustment to be sacrificed." (9) 
Friedman's theory opposed EMU, as did one of the first monetarists, 
Walters; so it was to be expected that one of their ideological followers, 
Thatcher, would do likewise. She called Walters "a brilliant but little 
known" economist when in 1974 he forecast economic disaster following 
Heath's change of policy. (10) He then became influential with Keith 
Joseph, who circulated his economic papers in 1975. (11) Walters was 
Thatcher's economic advisor from 1981-85 and in 1989 and her 
admiration of him was so great that she bracketed him with Friedman. 
(12) He was influential and, in many cases, determined her policy. 
According to David Smith: "He was a major influence. His Leicester 
bluntness appealed to Thatcher's Grantham common sense and he had 
a ready explanation for the failure of post-war fiscalist policies." (13) 
His views were always heard: "Alan, who knew that he could always 
have access to me whenever he wished." (14) Her praise of him was 
unstinfing as the following examples show: She was "attracted by his 
clear and persuasive analysis;" (15) "his opinions I set in high value;" 
(16) "he also had the merit of being right." (17) His views became more 
important than either Howe or Lawson and were fundamental in her 
resistance to E R M entry. 
The high point of monetarism in the early 1980s illustrated their 
belief that the money supply was all important. (18) With Lawson's 
Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), it became the most 
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important economic weapon to control inflation and sterling was 
allowed to float on the foreign exchange markets. The fixed exchange 
rate would take away that weapon. Helen Thompson summarized the 
whole problem: 
....the new government was committed to a money supply target 
as the fundamental tool of economic management. This was 
incompatible with ERM membership in two ways. First, while 
the government wanted to direct monetary policy at monetary 
targets, E R M membership would have meant directing 
monetary policy at the exchange rate. Second, the central bank 
intervention required to keep a currency stable means that 
money will enter and depart circulation according to the 
requirements of that objective whatever the consequences 
for monetary growth. (19) 
Thatcher was quite clear on the; issue and blamed Britain's 
inflationary problems in the late 1980s on the move by Lawson from 
strict control of the money supply towards the use of exchange rates to 
reduce inflation. Thatcher later wrote that the mistake of the 1980s was 
to put the exchange rate above that of control of inflation. (20) Stable 
exchange rates were pursued at the expense of monetary discipline. (21) 
Her conclusion was that "Governments should commit them.selves to 
price stability....which can only be achieved by reduced monetary 
growth...." (22) She was also explicit in her criticism of the ERM: ". . . . i f 
you fix the exchange rate, then interest rates and domestic monetary 
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conditions go where they will." (23) Howe confirmed where her 
antagonism lay: Firstly, her "ideological hostility to the vety idea of an 
exchange rate policy. And second was her mounting hostility, 
particularly from the date of her Bruges speech (September 1988), to 
any institution or idea which might strengthen the role of the European 
Community." (24) 
By contrast Delors, during his period as the tough minded and 
austere Finance Minister in the French Socialist government, combined 
public spending reductions with a prices and incomes policy. He 
believed Thatcher's policy of monetarism without an incomes policy 
would cause more pain than necessary. He also fought to keep France 
within the EMS because he feared withdrawal would mean a massive 
devaluation of the Franc. (25) 
The issue naturally divided Thatcher from Delors but, more 
importantly for her, it caused a rupture at the heart of the British 
government. The divisions came as a result of the failure of £M3 and 
£M0 to behave to the patterns as prescribed in monetarist doctrine. 
The money supply continued to grow. Dyson considered the problem: 
"The growing internationalization of capital markets raised the question 
of whether it would be possible to achieve domestic money supply 
targets. After 1979, the efforts of the British government to pursue an 
independent monetary policy based on such targets provoked 
disillusionment." (26) The emphasis on money supply became less 
pronounced in Lawson's budgets of 1984-89 compared to the pre-1983 
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budgets of Howe. To Dyson, policy was changed quietly with more 
importance put on the exchange rate than on the money supply. (27) 
This change is still shrouded in mystery and produced one of the 
great controversies of the Thatcher government, with recriminadons 
from both sides of the argument between the pure monetarist Thatcher 
and her Chancellor who changed tack. Lawson qualified his change of 
mind on the issue by stating that with the on-coming elecdon "the 
political pressures for the relaxation of monetary discipline will mount." 
(28) He thought, with some misgivings, that an externally imposed 
exchange rate discipline would be more politically acceptable. To quote 
Lawson: "At the end of the day the argument rests on political 
judgement." (29) 
The debate with Thatcher over this change of policy produced much 
acrimony between the two. Hugo Young believed: "Starting in 
February 1987 he began to operate sterling as i f it were in the ERM 
even though it wasn't." (30) Thatcher accused him (which he denied) 
of making policy behind her back by shadowing the Deutschmark in an 
attempt to control infladon and ease entry into the ERM. She has 
written: "Nigel Lawson's shadowing of the Deutschmark between 
March 1987 and March 1988 undermined my own government's 
anti-infladon policy." (31) What this policy did was to push up interest 
rates to maintain the pound's posidon in reladon to the Deutschmark 
and thus have an adverse effect upon infladon. Whether this was the 
cause of the late 1980s inflationary spiral or Lawson's tax cutdng 
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budgets which unleashed credit, is a matter for debate. Thompson has 
written that it is "implausible to suggest as some have done that 
Thatcher herself was unaware of the policy..." (32) To Thompson "lip 
service" was being paid to monetary targets and "the exchange rate was 
now central to economic policy...." (33) I f that was true, Thatcher was 
less committed than she has since written in her memoirs; she is not the 
model of consistency she pretends to be. 
John Cole believed the division between Thatcher and Lawson was 
"over the whole ideology of fixed or floating exchange rates." (34) 
Lawson's flexibility was illustrated by his reaction in the wake of the 
October stock exchange crash. To Cole, Lawson was "....sufficiently 
concerned to loosen monetary policy." (35) "He had leaned far enough 
out of the ivory tower to discover that in the real world preconceived 
theory should not dominate his handling of events." (36) 
The rancour over this issue came to a head before the Madrid 
Council in June 1989, just as the issue was to be given a new dimension 
by events in Europe. Thatcher called the meedng between herself, 
Howe and Lawson on the eve of the Council an "ambush." (37) Howe 
called it the "nodon of collective responsibility." (38) She resisted 
putting any date on entry into the ERM despite pressure and threats of 
resignation from both Howe and Lawson. Howe blamed Walters: "His 
hostile influence to the ERM persuaded Thatcher to say no." (39) She 
laid down two condidons: the completion of the SEM and reducdon of 
the infladon rate, for which she blamed Lawson. (40) This meeting and 
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the bad blood it created can now be seen as the crucial point when the 
government fell apart and illustrated the gulf of opinion at the vety 
centre. 
The ideologically pure Thatcher resisted her Foreign Secretary and 
then demoted him. She also opposed her Chancellor, who was willing 
to adapt his monetarist beliefs to the circumstances of the time. These 
were not one nation Tories who were "wet" on monetary policy, they 
were true believers, "one of us" who saw sense in joining. Both could 
also differentiate the ERM from E M U . Lawson saw the ERM as an 
agreement between independent sovereign states and the E M U 
proposals as incomplete and flawed. He said: "It is clear that economic 
and monetary union implies nothing less than European government -
albeit - a federal one - and political union: the united states of Europe. 
That is simply not on the agenda now nor will it be for the foreseeable 
future." (41) Whereas he saw the E R M as a tool of policy, "...it would 
reduce exchange rate fluctuations and we would be able to use it to 
assist us in our anti-inflationary policy," (42) she saw it as being "sucked 
into a currency union." (43) Her official answer to the question when it 
was posed in Parliament showed her desire to keep her party united 
and was that "....we shall join the exchange rate mechanism of the 
European monetary system when we believe that the time is 
appropriate." (44) 
Lawson became frustrated with Thatcher when, despite frequent 
urging, she would not take his advice which was to use the ERM as a 
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tool to either reduce infladon or to slow down the momentum towards 
E M U . Howe echoed this view. (45) He saw the non-elected hand of 
the hosdle Walters behind the position of the "dme is right" formulae 
later replaced by the "when inflation comes down excuse." Howe 
believed Walters was both sure of his wisdom and becoming less 
discreet and, like Thatcher, he had a bias towards the US and against 
Europe. (46) Howe assumed that she always listened to Walters and 
overrode for more than five years the collecdve opinion of such staunch 
supporters as Brittan, Tebbit, Lawson and himself. (47) She, almost 
alone, resisted the case for entry and this rejecdon of collective decision 
making in favour of her and-ERM advisor, Walters, produced a gulf in 
the government which weakened it and was the cause of her downfall. 
(48) It directly caused the resignadon of Lawson. (49) Howe is nearest 
to the reason for her intransigence: "Her ideological hosdiity to the 
very idea of an exchange rate policy....even though the government was 
committed." (50) In his resignation speech, Lawson emphasized both 
his and Thatcher's view of Europe - and what divided them: " ....and let 
me make it clear I am speaking as she speaks of a Europe of nadon 
states." He warned that Britain would not lead Europe in a free market 
ethos, "....as long as we remain largely outside the EMS....our condnuing 
non pardcipation in the ERM cannot fail to cast a pracdcal doubt on 
that resolve." (51) 
Thus Thatcher lost her long-serving Chancellor, the most influential 
character in her government and the architect of much of the Thatcher 
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revolution. Her ideological myopia and adherence to strict monetarist 
doctrine, despite the realities of the time, cost her a great deal, and her 
unbending attitude and determination not to waver from her monetarist 
instincts would ultimately cost her everything. 
Perhaps the tragedy of the situation was that only Britain asked the 
hard questions about E M U , but they were ignored because the other 
members thought Britain was trying to destroy the concept. (52) The 
Economist said that, for this reason, all British suggestions were treated 
with suspicion, (53) including Lawson's adaption of Hayek's competing 
currency theory which he presented to the European Council of Finance 
Ministers. In essence, it meant that only the most stable 
anti-inflationary currency would be used in the SEM because market 
forces would decide the answer. It appealed to Thatcher because "the 
markets rather than governments would provide the momentum for 
monetary union." (54) However, she later admitted in her memoirs that 
it was only a manoeuvre to slow down E M U , but said that the other 
members did not like it because it was not "the statist centralist model 
our partners preferred." (55) Dyson called it a "diversionary tactic" that 
did not "receive the attention that was expected." (56) The Bundesbank 
stopped it by asking how competing currencies could lead to E M U 
without state involvement and organization. (57) Jolly Dixon, the 
Commission official responsible for E M U perhaps summed up the EC 
opinion of Thatcher: "She would put her foot down and isolate the 
Brits....we could then ignore them and go about our business...." (58) 
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Thatcher was sceptical yet, when at the Hanover Council of June 
1988 it was proposed by Kohl that Delors head the Committee to 
investigate E M U , she did not object: "Chancellor Kohl suggested that a 
committee of central bank governors with a few outsiders be set up 
under M. Delors chairmanship." "....there was nothing I could do to 
stop the committee being set up." (59) To Delors even at this stage 
(July 1988) they had already made "progress ....towards monetary 
union." (60) Kohl made his posidon clear to the EP following this 
Council: "....extension of cooperadon on monetary policy with a view to 
economic and monetary union, the progressive achievement of which is 
our objective under the SEA." (61) 
The Delors Committee was given authority but in her memoirs 
Thatcher thought it would be slowed down because it contained 
sceptical bankers, including Karl Otto Pohl and Robin Leigh-Pemberton. 
(62) Howe shared this expectation, recalling that Germany had its own 
scepdcs: "Karl Otto Pohl of the Bundesbank and their Finance 
Ministry." (63) Thatcher also admitted that she had few allies at that 
dme. (64) She had managed to alienate everybody. She 
under-estimated the results of the Delors Committee because, despite 
the presence of the realistic bankers, it did produce positive results. It 
agreed that the member states by accepting the SEA had also accepted 
EMU; that there would be central control but with the Chrisdan 
democrat concept of subsidiarity; and that stage three would lock 
exchange rates and produce a central bank. (65) This final point was 
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anathema to Thatcher because the process of locking exchange rates 
was contrary to the monetarist behef in floating exchange rates and, as 
she said many times, would allow inflation to run riot. 
However, the most influential member of the committee, Pohl was 
unconvinced. He saw his constitutional duty as defending German 
national interests and seemed to resent the political visionaries. He 
seemed to have a great deal in common with Thatcher and gave a tough 
realistic view in his criticism of the motivation behind EMU: "Like a lot 
of French bureaucrats Delors does not understand market mechanisms, 
he believes in administration. Like Kohl and Mitterrand he believes in 
a moral drive for European integration derived from World War Two. 
But this view is based on circumstances which are out of date." (66) 
Despite the similarity of their views, the two never formed an axis to 
resist E M U . He apparently disliked her nationalism and perhaps her 
anti-Germanism, i f Ridley's view of E M U in any way reflects hers: "This 
is all a German racket to take over the whole of Europe....with the 
French behaving like poodles." (67) Undeterred by the momentum 
building up, she still did not acknowledge where it could lead, or 
pretended she did not, as her amazing reply in Parliament on 30th June 
illustrated: "Monetary union would be a first step but progress towards 
it would not necessarily involve a single currency or a European central 
bank." (68) 
Despite misgivings, Pohl agreed to go along with E M U and, according 
to Howe: "Pohl had disappointed us all and Leigh-Pemberton had not 
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felt able to dissent on his own." (69) The report on EMU was signed 
by the governor and Thatcher never spoke to him again on European 
matters. (70) Thompson has made the relevant point that, in fairness to 
Leigh-Pemberton, he could not bring much influence to bare because 
Britain was outside the ERM. (71) This seems to confirm Lawson's 
fear that being outside meant Britain could not slow up or move the 
momentum in a more acceptable direction. The Messina scenario was 
again in evidence, as confirmed by both Howe (who ultimately resigned 
over this non-participatory role) and Cockfield who said, "we have a sad 
history of too little too late but not quite." (72) Both saw the danger of 
the founder members pushing ahead with closer union and Britain again 
acting as the reluctant European confined to the periphery. The 
phrases variable geometry and concentric circles were used by the 
Commission and by Kohl and Mitterrand in an effort to keep Thatcher 
involved in the project. She, however, resisted all pressures including 
those from her friends in business but she did not want exclusion from 
other iniatives. Delors attempted to allay her fears when he said that 
E M U was not "a transfer of sovereignty designed to raze Westminster to 
the ground." (73) 
The Madrid Council of 26th June 1989 accepted the Delors report 
and said it "launched the process leading to EMU." (74) Lawson 
believed she was worried that she had signed the SEA with its 
commitment to E M U but her Parliamentary reply ruled out withdrawal 
from either. It was simply - no! (75) There were pressures to move 
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forward which were not all the product of the visionary ideals of the 
EC: Mitterrand believed it would subsume and curtail the 
overwhelming power of the Bundesbank to dictate economic policy and 
Kohl thought it would alleviate the fear of resurgent German power. 
This latter point became important towards the end of 1989 when 
reunification became an issue. 
German reunification came back onto the agenda after the Madrid 
Council. Delors realized that, just as the first phase of the EC's 
development concerned the control of German power, so did EMU. 
(76) The role of Germany in the new push for EMU was crucial. 
Kohl wanted E M U for essentially political reasons, whereas the 
Bundesbank was scepdcal on economic grounds. The role of the 
German currency and the Bundesbank was vital to the whole project. 
Germany supported Delors and the French, despite some reservation 
and their recurring nightmare of German power, supported the push for 
reunification. (77) It seems that where Thatcher opposed both E M U 
and reunification, France and Germany used more diplomafic skill to 
produce a typical European deal; both gained and only Thatcher lost 
because of her anachronistic and decreasing capacity to resist. 
The Rome Council of October 1990 decided on stage two of EMU by 
January 1994. Thatcher's criticism of this Council and the Italian 
presidency was acrimonious and the domesfic tabloid press jumped on 
the nationalist xenophobic bandwagon. A typical example was that it 
was "like a coach trip with the Marx brothers in the driving seat." (78) 
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Her comments on stage two were: "People who get on a train like that 
deserve to be taken for a ride. It was heading towards cloud cuckoo 
land." (79) She was alarmed at talk of a single currency by the year 
2000 and was not prepared to compromise. She was impatient with the 
far-off goals of the EC and saw discussions on E M U as diverting the 
EC from the path of low protection and a single free trade zone. 
Delors became the focus of her attacks and it was he she blamed for the 
change from strictly trading arrangements to centralized state building. 
To Hugo Young, he was "the source of her loathing....and it is not too 
strong a word." (80) 
Fuel was added to the flames by Delors who announced in the 
Commission Programme for 1990 that we need "to make progress 
towards EMU." (81) In her memoirs, she wrote of her dismay and 
frustration that her vision of a open free trade EC based on market 
principles was being neglected for a more aesthetic vision of the future: 
"In three years the European Community had gone from practical 
discussions about restoring order to the Community's finances to 
grandiose schemes of monetary and political union with firm timetables 
but no agreed substance - all without principled public debate on these 
questions either nationally or in the European fora." (82) 
Although Thatcher had equated E M U with high politics and had said 
that Britain's future as a "democratic sovereign state" (83) was at stake, 
this was only the tip of the iceberg. Her real resistance was ideological: 
E M U meant the ERM, which meant fixed exchange rates which 
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produced the inflation which her monetarist's beliefs were determined 
to attack. She was also concerned that any central bank could have 
"Keynesian" tendencies and undermine her monetarist policies which 
had been achieved at a heavy but worthwhile price. As a monetarist she 
wanted to control the money supply, the fabled £M3, and not leave it to 
a central bank; she had even grown impatient with her own central bank 
but having to deal with a "Euro-fed" - a new version of the Bundesbank 
- would have been intolerable. Thatcher remained the most convinced 
laissez - faire neo-liberal free trader in her Cabinet, with the exception 
of Ridley, and both had similar ideological objections to the E M U 
project. More pragmatic true believers could see the sense in trimming 
monetary ideology to fit the circumstances of the time; both her former 
Chancellors saw the need to adapt monetarism to the realities of the 
time and saw the need to use the ERM as a weapon and E M U as a way 
to keep Britain involved. (84) Both were neo-liberals but they were 
pragmafic, whereas Thatcher was a purist and would not bend. 
She criticised her new Chancellor, John Major, for playing "Nigel's 
cracked record to the effect that you should steer by the exchange rate 
rather than the money supply." (85) What really brought her angst was 
the attack by Delors (86) and the Commission on what she saw as the 
free open Europe; any E M U proposal would bring regulation and 
control to the free flowing market and this was the bete noire. As she 
said herself: ...."there can be no right level for sterling apart from what 
the market says it is..." (87) Howe sums up her view and belief in that 
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nothing, least of all a French socialist, should be an obstacle to free 
market economics. He said simply that "ideological obsessions" 
destroyed the relationship between Thatcher, Lawson and himself: (88) 
They certainly destroyed the relationship between the British Prime 
Minister and her allies in Europe. 
It is paradoxical that, despite her resistance, Thatcher had to sanction 
entry into the E R M when the time was wrong, in order to keep her new 
Chancellor. Her reasons for entry summarized her belief: "the money 
supply had turned sharply downwards." (89) 
The E M U debate illustrated the extremes of the argument in relation 
to the opposing views of regulation and Kapteyn's integration theory. 
Thatcher showed an extreme version of the British reluctance to 
regulate; she wanted no regulation and Howe and Lawson wanted only 
what was necessary to achieve limited objectives. By contrast, the 
European view was for institutional regulation to make the market work 
better and to pave the way for greater things. E M U was European 
state building; the process of achieving that goal involved fixed rates and 
a Euro-bank and had the elements of a transfer of powers from a 
national to a European level. European state powers were being 
produced to help control the stateless market. The result of this 
process has, to date, produced the "half way house", much 
intergovernmental bargaining and very slow progress towards the 
transfer of power. 
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6.4. T H E S O C I A L D I M E N S I O N . 
...it will be possible to realize not a mere free trade area exposed to ever>' 
passing wind, but a shared space for the benefit of all. (1) 
The social dimension was an attempt to build upon the success of the 
momentum created by the SEA project. It was to become the Social 
Charter and Social Chapter. (2) Delors wanted to link the SEA to a 
.series of social measures including the protection of workers rights, 
health and safety measures and, perhaps his main concern, the 
prevention of social dumping. He felt that this issue, with different 
members undermining social provision in the name of competition, 
could undermine the concept of the SEM. These areas were first 
discussed publicly in 1987 although the Commission had talked about 
them previously. 
His motivation can be traced back to his personalism and the need to 
balance the role of the individual, as seen in liberalism and that of the 
community, illustrated by the social democratic legacy of Europe. 
Delors saw the social dimension as fitting Europe's model of society 
with market capitalism combined with social provisions and care for the 
community. This went to the very heart of his beliefs and upbringing. 
The social dimension was justified by Delors' beliefs and he also saw 
those sentiments as part of Europe's heritage in that relations between 
individuals, groups and society needed always to be regulated. He 
acknowledged that the Japanese and Americans conducted social affairs 
differently and with a more individualist attitude, but he believed the 
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European method traditionally involved the parficipation and protection 
of all groups in society. In his inauguration speech, Delors called this 
broad concept "a peoples Europe" and he linked the term to the SEA. 
(3) He considered that the majority of the SEA concentrated upon 
helping and creafing a better atmosphere for business, with little 
provision for the social improvement of ordinary working people. He 
therefore wanted a social dimension to the SEA and believed it was 
"central to our work." (4) 
It is perhaps significant that in 1988 he first launched those ideas to 
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) who were his 
natural allies, especially on the issues of social dumping and social 
dialogue. (5) Delors was greatly concerned about social dumping, 
where states competed for jobs and consequently lowered their social 
standards to become competitive, and this provided some of the 
rationale behind the social dimension. To Delors: "The beneficial 
effects of a large market would be dissipated if some member states 
were to seek a competitive advantage by sacrificing social achievements." 
(6) His belief in a social dialogue can be seen from his period as 
finance minister, when all parties were consulted on his economic 
policies and by his determination to involve all groups in the SEA. His 
trip to the TUC was part of that process. 
This gestation of the Social Charter and Social Chapter, and the 
wording of the report on the subject made it clear that Thatcher would 
object: The report said that the Social Dimension needed to be 
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concerned with "information, consultation and participation of workers" 
and that trade unions should be guaranteed "rights and freedoms in the 
public and private sectors, including the conducing of negotiations and 
activifies, including strike action." (7) Delors thought the SEA would 
improve business but, in addition, something should be done for the 
workers, especially his supporters in the trade unions. His speech to the 
EP in January 1989 sums up his view: "Europe will never be built . . . . i f 
the working men and women are not among the first to be involved." 
He said the social dimension would provide "social rights to give 
concrete form and life to the European model of society." (8) Delors' 
roots were in the trade unions, and he saw them losing influence in the 
face of right wing ascendancy in the 1980s, epitomized by the 
Thatcherite vision of the SEA as a total free market. He classed the 
SEA as a bargain: the SEA removed barriers and liberalized the 
market, therefore action was needed for the protection of jobs and the 
harmonizafion of standards. (9) This harmonizadon would stop what he 
called "social dumping" (10) and help "calm union fears" about the 
single market concept. (11) 
Delors linked these measures to the SEA, in accordance with his 
spillover or "Russian Dolls" strategy; in this way he would slowly 
increase the level of competence of the EC and create a more 
communautaire atfitude towards the SEM. In contrast to Thatcher, 
who thought the SEA was an end in itself, Delors said the SEA 
"incorporated the social dimension." (12) He stated in the Commission 
159 
programme for 1989: "....we must work together to implement the 
provisions of the single act....the improvement of working conditions...to 
make the social dimension a practical reality." (13) 
In 1990, he enlarged upon the issue: "....the creation of a vast 
economic area, based on the market and business cooperation is 
inconceivable - I would say unattainable - without some harmonization 
of social legislation." "It is the corollary of the integrated market, a 
precondition for its completion." (14) However, his ultimate destination 
seems clear enough and he repeated it so often that it should not have 
been a surprise to anyone what his intentions were. He wanted 
dialogue between both sides of industry, between all of society and 
thought Europe was capable of advancing together. (15) His ultimate 
aim was a "European social area." (16) This endeavour was not new to 
the EC, not just a Delors' project. Similar views were held by the 
majority of the member states. For example, several member states 
including Belgium, Holland and Denmark have a social partnership, 
where employers, trade unions and the government fix conditions of 
work and wages. 
Kohl spoke to the EP and said: "We will be able to achieve such an 
important aim as the internal market only if we win over to this goal all 
groups in society, namely workers and employers, representatives of 
industry and trade unions.... We need a European economic and social 
continium.... The SEM is a living peoples Europe." (17) These views 
show the German style of consensus, cooperation and institutional 
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regulation and seem to put Kohl in the Delors' camp on the issue. A 
similar view was expressed by Mitterrand: "....the single act deals with 
the social dimension of Europe." (18) 
These speeches appear to show Thatcher's isolation on the issue. 
According to George, the social issue represented the "fundamental 
difference between Britain and the other member states." (19) Even 
Thatcher's erstwhile allies on other integration issues, the Danes, 
supported the social dimension. Delors reinforced the view that the 
social dimension did not just come from him when he talked about the 
1988 Hanover Council's proposal for the "adoption of a charter of 
human rights" (20) and of the 1989 Madrid Council "wanting a social 
dimension to the single market." (21) The report of this latter Council 
placed the question of the social dimension in the context of the 
implementation of all parts of the SEA. It should be given the same 
importance as the economic aspects and there was a "general consensus" • 
in favour. (22) Britain stood outside this consensus. 
Delors believed this reflected the political ideology of Thatcher 
rather than a traditional British scepticism of social provision. When 
asked about support for social provision, his reply was revealing: "Yes in 
Britain's foundations but not in Thatcherism. The English remain 
attached to many grass roots collective organizations. Their tradition is 
the same even if they still dream of being at the heart of three circles -
America, the Commonwealth and Europe." (23) He believed that 
Thatcherism was alien to Britain - it was a change of direction and not 
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part of the heritage. He also said that Thatcherism was closer to the 
rampant individualism of the Americans and it highlighted the division 
of opinion in Britain: The British cannot "in the name of their internal 
difficulties compel others to abandon what is regarded as a vital 
necessity in Europe." (24) Delors' view of Thatcherism seems to 
converge with Thatcher's own opinion: Both saw it as related to 
American individualism, radicalism and the need to re-create the 
so-called flexibility of the American labour market; and they 
acknowledged it as a change from the past; a breaking of the collectivist 
consensual settlement of British politics since 1945. 
Their divisions over the social dimension could not have been wider 
and its philosophy infuriated Thatcher. Where other states encouraged 
dialogue and participation, her government specialized in confrontation, 
the exclusion of organized labour from influence and they had 
introduced several measures to curtail their power. There were 
ideological reasons for those measures and the near-anarchy of the 
"winter of discontent" provided additional motivation for this anti-labour 
stance. (25) 
The social dimension was another step in the increasing antipathy 
between Delors and Thatcher. By 1989, with the moves towards E M U 
and Delors' proposals on the social dimension, their relationship was 
beyond repair. She saw the collection of measures in the social 
dimension, and even the sentiment behind it, as a return to corporatism 
and to the tripartism of the early 1970s; the involvement of workers in 
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their businesses by representation on the boards of industry, equality, 
and statutory minimum wages meant to her the corruption of, and 
interference in, the free flow of the labour market. She thought the 
measures would not only peivert the market but that they were 
"socialism via the backdoor," "Marxist interventionism," " a socialist 
charter," and they would condemn us to "Euro-sclerosis when what we 
need is American style flexibility." (26) 
Her criticism ranged beyond Delors. She thought the Germans 
wanted to put up employment costs in states like Portugal, thus making 
them less competitive than Germany; she also equated the social 
dimension with the German system of worker participation in business 
and industry. She later included Sweden in her criticism: "The Swedish 
style welfare state has failed - even in Sweden. So the Euro-statists 
press ahead with their social chapter." (27) She also doubted the ability 
or desire of some states to implement EC social legislation, compared to 
Britain's good record in enforcing EC law. The argument that the 
protection of employees rights would undermine competitivness and 
cost jobs is still with us today. It is a fundamental division of political 
opinion, the argument being bet\ '^een social protection and "Gradgrind" 
economics in the name of competition. 
Eleven of the member states made the Solemn Declaration on the 
Social Charter in May 1989; only Thatcher resisted. At the Strasbourg 
Council in December 1989, eleven members signed the Social Charter 
and Britain opted out, thus excluding itself from future developments in 
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the field. Although on this issue Thatcher had the overwhelming 
support of her party, her resistance and ideological objections to the 
social dimension of the SEA were a further stage in her isolation in 
Europe. As each of Delors' "Russian Dolls" unfolded, Britain seemed 
to be in a near-permanent minority of one. 
The social dimension illustrated the division of ideology between 
Thatcher and Delors. (28) It also demonstrated an attempt to make the 
SEM more than a stateless market and to stop the "downward spiral." 
(29) It placed social policy on a more communautaire basis. However, 
despite the British view, it has not brought with it European state 
building and a significant "transfer of sovereignty." (30) National 
conditions and procedures are accommodated within its broad 
framework. Rather than Kapteyn's scenario two - the European-wide 
controls and state building model - it appears to be nearer scenario 
three, the "interstate cooperation" model. (31) 
The social dimension also illustrated the contrasting views of 
regulation between Britain and Europe. To Britain, the SEM had to be 
open, with minimum regulation, and this fitted the domestic thrust of 
policy since 1979. There was resistance to move competence to a 
European level, especially in areas which would not ensure the 
liberalization of the market. Woolcock judged that, "The British 
approach to market regulation rests on the interpretation of national 
public interest by Parliament, or, more accurately, by the government of 
the day." (32) The German approach emphasized a clear regulatory 
164 
framework agreed by broad consensus, protected by statute but with the 
day-to-day operation delegated to lower bodies. (33) In the case of the 
social dimension this would be the national authorities, which is what 
happened. Within that framework the market would operate: "Markets 
should be allowed to operate freely but subject to regulation designed to 
satisfy agreed objectives." (34) 
Although Britain ultimately "opted out", the other eleven members 
agreed on the social dimension but allowed for national preferences in 
such areas as labour law. In addition, the unanimity rule still applies to 
many of the provisions which came out of the social dimension, for 
example, social security and redundancy protection. What may have 
started as a "spillover" from the SEA ended as the usual European 
intergovernmental bargain. However, despite this, its very existence and 
the sentiments which produced its broad outline are a clear division of 
political belief between the EC and the British Tory party. Thatcher 
represented this resistance in the extreme just as Delors with his push 
for a Europe-wide set of social laws represented the other extreme. 
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6.5. P O L I T I C A L U N I O N . 
Bonn is not Weimar. (1) 
It should also be remembered that the twelve solemnly affirmed in the 
preamble to the Single Act that they were prepared to create 
a European Union: that means one for twelve and twelve for one. (2) 
The fourth area of spillover, or Russian Doll, which followed in the 
wake of the SEA were the discussions and the momentum towards the 
rather ill-defined term political union. (3) Delors had written in 1985 
that he was in favour of European Union. (4) The document published 
by the Commission on the SEA in 1986 talked of the members needing 
"to transform relations as a whole among their states in a European 
union." (5) His speech to the EP in 1988 was explicit and increased the 
antagonism with Thatcher: "My own feeling is that we are not going to 
manage to take all the decisions needed between now and 1995 unless 
we see the beginnings of European government in one form or 
another." He added that "ten years hence 80% of our economic 
legislation and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation will be of 
community origin." (6) 
However, there were many difficulties in moving into the political 
sphere of integration and he was well aware of them: "When a head of 
government goes back home flexing his muscles like Rambo and says I 
won at the Council last night, we have come to a pretty pass, because 
the fact is that of the twelve, even the strongest will win together or lose 
together. Politics must be given a European dimension." (7) He also 
acknowledged the limits of polifical integration in that member states 
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had separate histories, foreign policy concerns and special relations. 
Speaking in the EP, he said that the "fundamental diversity of our 
countries is a source of enrichment." (8) Despite Thatcher's fears at the 
time, this document was not a blueprint for federalism; it did not hide 
where its preferences lay, but it acknowledged the difficulties, especially 
in high politics. (9) 
Intergovernmental bargaining was added to the spillover pressures 
when France and Germany maintained the momentum because they 
wanted the completion of the SEM, E M U and political union in 
Europe. In January 1989, Delors repeated his linkage of political union 
with the SEA: "....moving steadily towards European Union, the ultimate 
objective may I remind you, of the Single Act." (10) Mitterrand told the 
EP in 1989 that "....the Community's political design was European 
Union." (11) 
Perhaps the most important issue was what the term political union 
meant. Butler echoed Thatcher's criticism when he said that with all 
the plans and reports on union, Tindermans, Genscher-Columbo, and 
Dooge, the EC would talk in broad terms rather than the unpleasant 
realities of the CAP, budget or SEM. (12) He said that the Dooge 
committee was "rather superficial" in its description of "union"; to Butler 
the word "union" had the advantage of "ambiguity." I t could mean 
anything from a federal Europe, the WEU, or the European postal 
union. (13) Thatcher said as much in Parliament back in 1985: "Once 
again it comes down to the phrase European Union, which to this 
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countiy means European federation; but it does not mean that in 
Europe. They are as much against a federal Europe as we are." (14) 
She repeated this in an answer: The term meant less "over there" than 
some people "over here" think they mean. (15) She accused Andreotfi, 
the Italian Prime Minister, of "gaining top marks for calculated 
ambiguity" on the subject. (16) 
The issue was given a spur by events outside the control of Thatcher 
and her arch antagonist Delors. The events of 1989 ciianged the map 
of Europe and brought the possibility of a united powerful Germany to 
the heart of the European debate. Although not part of their 
socio-economic division, the unificafion issue created problems for both 
of them and their different approaches to it increased the mutual 
antagonism which had been building up since the SEA. 
In 1989, Thatcher seemed out of touch with the realities of events in 
Europe. She viewed German reunification purely through a realist 
assessment so that, to her, it was a change in the balance of power 
which had kept Europe at peace since 1945. She visualized a zero sum 
game in which, if Germany became stronger, someone else became 
weaker. In Thatcher's view, she was continuing Britain's traditional 
balance of power policy in Europe; she said that for many years "a 
major yet unstated objective of policy had been the containment of 
German power." (17) 
To her, the answer to the "German quesdon" was not to bind it closer 
to Europe, as Germany France and Delors wanted, but to construct a 
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framework for containment. She said "tying the German Gulliver down 
within a federal European Community was no answer." (18) She 
rejected integration as a way of producing-a more stable Germany, with 
the spectre of nationalism contained from within. She viewed 
integration as having a centralized federal Europe as its end game (]9) 
whereas Kohl saw it from a de-centralized German perspective with 
power spread and balanced, and Mitterrand and Delors saw both 
reunification and integration as ways to secure Germany to France and 
as part of a myriad network of agreements. (20) This linked France 
economically to a resurgent Germany, as well as containing it through a 
European-level decision-making process. 
By contrast, Thatcher wanted a "return to the politics of balance of 
power which would ensure that individual nation states, like Britain and 
France, would be able to act as a counterweight to Germany if it 
pursued pohcies which were against our interests." (21) This rationale 
seemed to be a return to a kind of failed pre-1914 Realpolitik balance 
of power scenario and was totally out of touch with the mood of the 
times. It was an old-fashioned answer to expect modern Europe to 
adopt. 
At this time Thatcher seemed isolated in her balance of power stance; 
Powell believed she tried and failed to "drive a wedge beUveen France 
and Germany." (22) Perhaps her view of the Franco-German 
relationship was nearer to that of Ridley: "The Franco-German 
reproachment has been distorted into a FYanco-German axis, operated 
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to secure the objectives of these two countries." (23) Thatcher wanted 
Germany in NATO but controlled by the US presence. (24) This would 
make them, an integral part of an intergovernmental organization and 
their attachment to the west would not be at the price of further 
integration within the EC. She even said that the US needed to stay in 
Europe (to redress the balance of Power) because they provided 
insurance against the rise of Germany. (25) That view seemed like an 
attempt to continue the cold war with the Americans as the guardians 
and Germany replacing the Soviet Union as part of the object of policy. 
In addition, she wanted a Pax Americana "in the camouflage of United 
Nations resolufions" to preserve the peace in the post-1989 
Balkanization of the East. (26) 
Although many of the European states are Atlanticists, it is not 
surprising that her patronizing attitude was rejected by Europeans who 
perhaps felt the time was right to keep their own peace, without the US. 
Despite her traditional distrust and prejudice against the previous 
generation of Germans, it did seem a strange way to talk about an ally 
and economic partner. 
Those fears came to the surface when Ridley vilified the Germans 
during an interview with the Spectator. Lawson made the point that 
Ridley felt safe making his infamous and-German remarks to Lawson's 
son on 14th July 1990, because he had heard them from Thatcher in 
private. (27) To quote Ridley when discussing Kohl: " I mean he will 
soon be trying to take over everything." And on sovereignty: "You might 
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as well give it to Adolf Hitler." (28) Thatchers comment on this issue 
in Parliament was more controlled but rellected the same underlying 
fear: "If we did not retain our national identities in Europe, the 
dominant people in Europe would be German." (29) It was perhaps 
unfortunate that at this time Thatcher convened a seminar on the 
"German question." The leaked reports of its conclusions show a fear 
of unification, the danger of a German takeover of the EC, and some of 
the words used to describe the German national character are revealing; 
they include, angst, aggressive, assertive, bullying, egotism, and 
inferiority complex. (30) To Howe, the Ridley interv'iew and the leaked 
seminar "served to confirm the scale and passion of Margaret Thatcher's 
anti-Germanism." (31) 
Thatcher's delay in endorsing reunification brought her isolation. 
Allen called her marginalized and anachronistic and claimed that 
Germany was contemptuous of her attitude and the US, Soviet Union 
and EC gave her no support. (32) Allen wrote: "Mrs Thatcher's stock 
response was Canute-like in its determination to preserve the status quo 
and there was precious little sympathy for the German dilemma." (33) 
She had so little sympathy that she wrote in her memoirs: " I had 
unsuccessfully resisted the reunification of Germany." (34) Her attitude 
seemed to be that, because Germany had lost in 1945, it should wait 
until the victors sorted out the peace; a view endorsed by Ridley. He 
claimed that at this period the EC had no influence over Germany. 
Perhaps nearer the truth was that Thatcher, because of her attitude 
174 
about most European issues, had no influence. He made his view plain 
in his auto-biography: "I f the Germans have a mind to do something 
they take little notice of other points of view." (35) Ridley, like 
Thatcher, seemed to have little appreciation of living in a divided 
country which was suddenly faced with the possibility of being united. 
Ridley saw Thatcher as the champion of Eastern Europe against the 
domination of Germany. Both appeared to be influenced by Germany's 
history, did not trust its nadonalist ambidons and saw it gaining power, 
either inside the EC with EMU or outside in some form of territorial 
expansion. Germany was not treated as a European partner, more as a 
dangerous inhabitant of Europe, which could only be controlled by its 
inclusion in NATO and by the US presence. Thatcher did not seem to 
appreciate that Germany's membership of both the EC and NATO 
meant it would not be a rogue state in the centre of Europe. President 
Gorbachev accepted the reunification of Germany and eventuaiUy 
NATO membership, partly for those reasons because he, more than her, 
appreciated the security issues involved. 
At the Strasbourg Council of December 1989, Thatcher appreciated 
that the relationship between France and Germany would need to 
become closer. Old French fears were coming to the fore and the 
Germans, in response wanted to show everyone that they were good 
Europeans. By the dme of the January 1990 Dublin Council, she knew 
that unification would push France, "federalists on grounds of tacdcs 
rather than conviction," and Germany, who wanted to demonstrate that 
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they would not behave like "the old Germany of Bismark and Hitler," 
down the federalist path advocated by Delors. (36) 
Delors saw the inevitability and thus supported Kohl's push for 
German reunification; he also appreciated the prospect of a potential 
super-state in Europe. Despite his French fears of German power, 
Delors saw the answer as closer integration, with Germany a full 
participant in the future of Europe and not just an object of policy. (37) 
Thatcher, with her balance of power realism, did not seem to appreciate 
that approach. Like Monnet, Delors laid the blame for Europe's 
previous wars at the door of rampant nationalism, with people pursuing 
their own destinies irrespective of others. Like his mentor, he was 
strongly influenced by 1939-45 and saw integration as the answer. One 
of the founding fathers, Paul-Henri Spaak, sums up this view: "Those 
who drew up the Rome Treaty....did not think of it as essentially 
economic; they thought of it as a stage on the way to political union." 
(38) To Delors, nationalism could be controlled by integration rather 
than by some pre-1914 balance of power. 
As events have unfolded, her fears have not materialized; on the 
contraiy, Germany has proved a more reliable European than Britain, 
has not looked for an alternative foreign policy and has continued its 
pragmatic business-like approach to the EC. She over-reacted to 
reunification and believed Germany had not learned the lessons of the 
past. However, she was not alone in her fear of Germany, but she was 
alone in her solution to the German Question. The alternative, the 
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integrationist model, was the concept more favoured by other EC 
members and most significantly by France (and Delors), who have much 
more to fear from resurgent nationalism than Britain. This solution, the 
subversion of German power within the EC, gave momentum to Delors' 
plans for European unity. It gave urgency to the concept of building 
political union to bind and curtail German power. Because of her 
isolation, Thatcher's realist balance of power scenario was marginalized 
and she saw herself on the periphery as Europe pushed towards greater 
integration and political union. 
The dynamism of integration resulting from the SEA seemed to have 
come in a carefully thought-out manner, with the paquet Delors, EMU, 
the social dimension and political union, but the events of 1989 pushed 
it into turmoil. In the Commission programme for 1990, Delors talked 
of "world events" making an increase in the pace of integration 
necessary. (39) The Commission's October 1989 report on the issue 
linked economic with political union and gave several reasons for 
urgency: the new world order would mean new applicants and the EC 
would have to democratize and reform its institutions; it talked of 
"pooled sovereignty" and a "federal type organization" (Thatcher's 
nightmare) to avoid Europe degenerating into a "free trade area." 
(Thatcher's dream.) (40) The same document said that "Political union 
and economic, social and monetary union are thus inextricably linked." 
(41) 
Despite the vagueness of the term, there was a push to go forward 
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and Delors saw Germany as the key to Europe's future. However, his 
main ally Kohl saw the problems ahead: "...translating grand designs into 
sustainable structures is never a simple task." (42) Perhaps both 
Thatcher's caution and Kohl's awareness of the difficulties were to be 
proved correct when the EC gave a poor response to the unfolding 
story in the East. There was not a united or firm response, as 
illustrated by Delors' criticism of the lack of a common view after the 
1986 Reykjavick summit, despite the fact that it was Europe's future 
that was at stake - and it had no say in the outcome. (43) In January 
1989, Delors spoke to the EP of the problem: "There is a gap between 
progress on the economic front and the hesitations of political 
cooperation." (44) Delors wanted to make the EC an international 
actor. (45) The "economic giant and political pygmy" jibe still stung and, 
to Delors, there was a need to change the EPC into the more 
communautaire CFSP. (46) 
The revolutions in the East brought the possibility of new applicants 
onto the agenda. Delors saw the danger of this widening at the expense 
of deepening, because it would create Thatcher's desire - a giant free 
trade area. He told the Monnet Centenary Symposium: "We cannot 
cope with another enlargement....internal development first, then 
enlargement." (47) This view brought a rebuke from Ridley; speaking 
to the Bruges group in 1990, he talked of a moral obligation to allow 
new members, especially the Visegrad group, and that the EC should 
not go ahead with E M U if it meant their exclusion. Both his and 
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Thatcher's support of the East may owe something to the fact that new 
members of that kind would need assimilation and thus retard Delors' 
deepening process. Ridley said that Delors and the Franco-German 
axis turned "a bhnd eye" to Eastern Europe, for the sake of their push 
for integration. (48) Delors' push for political union was a race against 
time but he saw dangers in this momentum. It was too fast and the 
issues "went to the heart of state building." (49) The Commission was 
unprepared for the momentum and saw the problems of moving the EC 
"from market to state building." (50) 
Powell acknowledged that the momentum seemed unstoppable and 
that the British government was divided; he accused Howe of going 
along with any ideas so long as Britain was not left behind. (51) 
Thatcher was equally critical of her former colleague: "For Geoffrey 
harboured an almost romantic longing for Britain to become part of 
some grandiose European consensus." (52) 
Paradoxically, it was the cost ($100 billion per year) of reunification 
which stalled the progress of Delors' last "Russian Doll." In addition, a 
European recession put pressure on the ERM, derailed the EMU 
process and made more members sceptical of its feasibility. Joseph 
Joffe believed: "What unhinged Europe this time was the gargantuan 
costs of the benign takeover of the bankrupt GDR by Bonn inc." (53) 
There were two debates involved in these events. The reunification 
issue revealed Thatcher's balance of power realist views, as opposed to 
Delors' more integrationist belief This divergence contributed to their 
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antipathy and added considerably to the tension between the two. The 
question of political union was the next stage in their running battle 
over the future of Europe and this became an extension of their 
arguments over E M U and the social dimension. It showed the difficulty 
of moving from the "stateless market" into the realm of state building. 
(54) 
Not only Thatcher voiced concern, for Delors and Kohl saw the 
difficulty of turning rhetoric into reality. Mitterrand showed his alarm 
when Delors proposed a political executive for a federal Europe: "It's 
mad. What is he interfering for? No one in Europe will ever want that. 
By being extremist he is going to destroy what is feasible." (55) The 
answer seemed to be between the two extremes as proposed by 
Thatcher and Delors: Europe is more than a market but less than a 
state. The antagonists in this ideological division ardculated their views 
in major speeches which encapsulate the whole European debate. 
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7. T H E MAJOR SPEECHES. 
It became clear in the mid 1980s that people were doing creative 
wbrk in the E C and social policy was becoming stronger we had 
the good judgement or good luck to invite Delors. (1) 
Delors spoke to the TUC in Bournmouth on the 7th of September 
1988 and he was a great success. He was treated more like a political 
leader than an internadonal administrator. His four themes were: the 
preservation of a European model of society; that Europe must master 
its own destiny; that there must be cooperation and solidarity because 
"it is impossible to build Europe only by deregulafion;" and he said that 
"the social dimension is a vital element." (2) 
Delors leitmotiv reiterated his beliefs and his arguments with 
Thatcher. He repeated his personal conviction when he said that the 
European model was a balance between society and the individual. (3) 
He illustrated his point further, saying the EC must be concerned with 
"cooperation as well as competition", and he called it "individual iniative 
and solidarity." (4) He said "unemployment is our major challenge" 
and the "social dimension is very important." (5) He included other 
member states in his argument when he said that the Hanover Council 
of June 1988 had agreed that the SEM needed to be for the benefit of 
all and that it would not harm social welfare. He returned to his fear of 
the SEM without regulation; that it would lead to the undermining of 
working conditions. According to Delors, "Europe must not be the road 
to social regression." (6) 
His next theme was European level collective bargaining: "....social 
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dialogue and collective bargaining are essential pillars of our democratic 
society and social progress." (7) Thatcher took exception to that 
statement and it was the excerpt she used in her memoirs. 
The delegates appreciated the point because they had been excluded 
from any role of influence since 1979; many thought they had more in 
common with the social democratic views of Europe than with Tory 
Britain. Peter Shore said they were "reviled at home and welcomed into 
Europe." (8) To John Cole, the unions had been more than reformed, 
they had been "submerged." They were "still a significant factor in the 
economy, except that ministers refused to acknowledge this." (9) This 
exclusion of the TUC from decision making or, as Cole called it, 
"ideological blindness", provided a division of opinion between the Tory 
party and all the other parties of the right in Europe. "Ministers have 
discovered to their horror that Europe still believes in tripartism -
cooperation between the social partners (industry and the unions) and 
the government." (10) Cole said that Thatcher described the German 
system of "mitbestimmung" which included worker-directors as "Marxist 
thinking." (11) These divisions illustrated the different views on 
regulation (and deregulation) between the British, especially Thatcher, 
and the European approach, epitomized by the German desire for 
consensus, statute and parameters within which the market would 
operate. (12) 
The speech did much to remove the unions' hostility to the EC and 
the SEM and was the beginning of their conversion towards a 
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pro-European stance after years of either ignoring the EC, or 
opposition, when they treated it as a capitalist club. To quote Norman 
Willis: 
I saw much evidence in Europe that the social partnership 
is part of the economic success. We realised that we must 
not put up with the European Community but make the 
best of it. And we got a response from the Community 
that was totally lacking from the government. We found 
a home in social Europe, not just on the rebound, but in 
a positive sense. I believe that we have a responsibility 
to show that European democracies can deliver the goods 
economically. (13) 
Following Delors' speech, Ronald Todd the leader of the Transport 
Union, stated the view of many TUC members when he called Europe 
"the only game in town." (14) Delors also attempted to allay fears of a 
federalist European super-state: "You dear friends will remain 
British....we all retain our individual way of life.... and our culture." (15) 
He closed with the argument about the meaning of the SEA: "1992 is 
much more than the creation of an internal market, abolishing barriers 
to the free movement of goods, services and investment. To capture 
the potential gains it is necessary to work together. Dear friends, your 
movement has a role to play. Europe needs you." (16) He was asking 
them if they could afford, from their position of domestic weakness, to 
ignore Europe. Those final comments must have inflamed Thatcher. 
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Thatcher saw the visit as an attempt to gain support for the 
Commission and the Social Charter from left wing groups in Britain and 
to encourage them to lobby Brussels. A l l were contrary to her beliefs 
and went against everything she had been trying to achieve since 1979. 
She resented any other source of power, especially from the TUC, 
whom she blamed for many of Britain's problems and she distrusted 
them as much as she distrusted Delors. She said Delors had "slipped 
his leash as a fonctionnaire and become a fully fledged political 
spokesman for federalism." (17) 
Both he and the TUC were obstacles in the way of her revolution and 
she recognized a common enemy. Delors defended himself: "She 
cannot find a single passage in which I interfered in Britain's domesdc 
politics. My goal was to change the stance of trade unions. I 
succeeded." (18) He also succeeded in enraging Thatcher. Howe has 
written: "The standing ovation which he received from the brethren 
fuelled the flames at No 10." (19) Thatcher's reply was not long in 
coming and on the 22nd September 1988 she delivered the Bruges 
speech. (20) 
It was to be Thatcher's most controversial speech concerning the EC. 
The FCO and Howe attempted to "tone it down" but to no avail. 
Powell informed the FCO: "I've been told to tell you that the first draft 
will be done in Downing Street." (21) James Dickie has written that 
about 40% of the speech was from the FCO but Powell made it more 
and-European and, to Dickie, the "knuckle duster s tuff was pure 
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Thatcher; it was an "arrow at the heart of Jacques Delors." (22) 
Realizing what was to happen, Howe had "given up the struggle and 
gone off to Africa." (23) 
Her criticism of the EC was wide ranging: She objected to Delors, a 
non-elected civil servant, becoming identified with federalism. Although 
she did not name him directly it was obvious whom she was attacking 
under the name of the Brussels bureaucracy. She rejected 
supra-nationalism and any enhancement or spillover from the SEA, to 
giving more power to the Commission or EP, and to the push towards 
E M U or the social dimension. She believed those socialist principles 
were on the agenda instead of the real necessities, which were dealing 
with the practical problems and the making of free markets. 
Although accepting that on some issues Europe needed to speak with 
one voice, she wanted no "identikit European personality" and resisted 
an extension of areas of competence of the Commission: " I am the first 
to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to 
speak with a single voice. But working more closely together does not 
require more powers to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be 
taken by an appointed bureaucracy...." (24) Her language was emotive 
and she linked the EC with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
which spent years shaking off centralization and stagnation. She 
equated supra-nadonalism with the Eastern command economies: "It is 
ironic that just as those countries such as the Soviet Union which have 
tried to run everything from the centre, are learning that success 
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depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, there 
are some in the community who seem to move in the opposite 
direcdon." (25) 
Her most notorious phrases were reserved for what she saw as the 
dangers to her neo-liberal economics: "We have not successfully rolled 
back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at 
a European level, with a European super state exercising a new 
dominance from Brussels." (26) To Lawson this was "a perfectly valid 
sendment" which was changed in tone by Ingham's press briefing, 
addressed to people, few of whom had read the text of the Bruges 
speech. He thought the new tone reflected more her own feelings: 
"intensely chauvinistic, and pardcularly hosdle to the Community." (27) 
She reiterated her views on the SEA: "We must have the European 
single market with the minimum of reguladons - a Europe of 
enterprise." (28) She repeated her non-acceptance of the concept of 
the SEA as a stepping stone for further integradon: "...it is matter of 
plain common sense that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if 
we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement 
of drugs or terrorists and of illegal immigrants." (29) This undermined 
the integrity of her partners because she was accusing them of being 
unable to maintain border controls and showed little faith in a genuine 
single market. 
She believed the other members, despite what they said, would object 
to the loss of power which would result from projects such as EMU. In 
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her memoirs, she enlarged upon her critique of other members: Italy 
had such unstable government that it would favour control from 
Brussels and small states like Belgium would have more power in a 
more integrated Europe. What she did not mention was the 
Franco-German axis and the French belief that only through the EC 
would they maintain world influence and use German economic power 
for the good of Europe. She spoke in such a confrontadonal style and 
with such rhetoric that the important points like the democratic deficit 
were lost in a torrent of nationalism and vilification. The speech 
naturally created resentment in the EC and increased Britain's isoladon. 
The other members were being made scapegoats for not following her 
ideological vision of the EC. She finished with a warning not to replace 
NATO with the W E U and thereby exclude the US. (30) It was a 
summadon of all her views on Europe and it put Britain in a minority 
of orie on most issues. Delors, interviewed by Michael Elliott (1996) 
said she "tried to demonize Europe" and Butler, called it "dangerous 
stuff." (31) 
There was a division of opinion at the heart of government, between 
its senior members and within the Conservative party. (32) The Bruges 
speech's nationalist rhetoric appealed to her right-wing followers who, as 
a result, formed the Bruges group, whose main concern was the 
repatriation of powers back from the EC. To Ridley, she "translated 
her own philosophy for Britain onto a European scale" and this made 
anathema of market interference like the social dimension. (33) By 
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contrast, Lawson called it xenophobic, (34) and Howe considered her 
"negative speech" a mixture of "caricature and misunderstanding" and 
her belief that the Commission would replace the Council of Ministers 
as the decision-making body as "pure fantasy." (35) Howe wrote: " I 
began to see her - I do so more clearly now" (1994) as part of the 
anti-Europe lobby in the Tory party, but she had to continue as Prime 
Minister of a member country. This contradiction he described in his 
memoirs "...like being married to a clergyman who had suddenly 
proclaimed his disbelief in God." (36) He even believed she had been 
anti-EC for years. (37) 
Howe seems to simplify her position; she was not anti-EC when she 
envisaged just a free trade club; it was the evolution of the EC and its 
state building, especially when this affected the market, which caused 
her to turn against the EC so venomously. Howe concluded that the 
party was being split by the defection of its own leader and he later 
wrote that, "it was at this moment at which there began to crystallize the 
conflict of loyalty with which I was to struggle for perhaps too long." 
(38) 
Despite the impression given, the speech did show her commitment 
to the EC but, as with everything, it had to be on her ideologically 
motivated terms. The negative feeling created by the speech made it 
harder for her to get her own way on other aspects of the SEM and it 
increased her isolation. These various opinions were all partially correct 
but perhaps her ideological soulmate and intimate Ridley was nearer the 
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truth when he talked of philosophy. 
She wanted Thatcherism exported to Europe, with the SEA helping 
to create a liberal deregulated market and no more; the questions of 
sovereignty and supra-nationalism were part of this overall critique of 
the EC. In her desire for this, she issued an apocalyptic warning, 
created a false argument and she was ridiculed for xenophobia by Howe 
in his resignation speech. She was perhaps a Don Quixote tilting at 
windmills, seeing danger where there was none. 
The ideological gulf between Thatcher and the rest of the Community 
had become wider, resulting in there being no shared vision. She 
believed she alone could see the dangers ahead and, to her, the other 
members were dupes of the Commission or enemies of the integrity of 
the British state. They were now all classed together, the EC was full of 
demons and "ill intentioned people" and only she could see the logic of 
a liberal orientated SEM. 
It was an exposition of the concept of the stateless market and 
illustrated Kapteyn's point regarding the fear of transferring sovereignty 
in order to transfer former national controls to a European level. Its 
tone, whether real or inteipreted showed the dangers of the pure 
stateless market; the retreat behind nationalist barriers and the danger 
of ending economic liberalization. Kapteyn calls Thatcher's view a 
mixture of free market liberalism, in which negative competition grips 
the market, and incompatible nationalism, which will destroy the SEM. 
(Scenario 1) Kapteyn gave an example of this contradictory position of 
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Thatcher. She attacked the EC for excessive fraud and blamed its 
existence on Brussels. However, she would not countenance a transfer 
of more power to Brussels in order to fight fraud. (39) Bruges summed 
up her view on a transfer of more functions to Brussels: "There was no 
transfer of sovereign rights in her vision of the Community. It offended 
her nationalism and would only frustrate the free market mechanism." 
(40) 
The Bruges speech brought a retort from Delors, also at Bruges on 
17th October 1989. In it, he restated his personalist belief in 
individualism tempered by community, appealed for European 
soHdarity, for a social dimension to the EC, in the belief that it was not 
just a capitalist club. He emphasized its need for strong central 
institutions to help it to compete with the rest of the world. He said he 
wanted an IGC on E M U and one on political union, as well as a 
maximalist CFSP using Q M V and reform of the institutions. He 
defended the Social Charter and linked it to events in the east: "Think 
of the effect in Prague and Warsaw and elsewhere when the EC 
declares solemnly, by means of the Social Charter, that it will not 
subordinate fundamental workers' rights to economic efficiency." (41) 
Then, in answer to Thatcher's attack: "....we have to unite old nations, 
strong in their tradition and personality. So there is no plot against the 
nation, no one is being asked to give up a legitimate patriotism." (42) 
He used the events of 1989 to promote greater unity and, rather than 
calling it the "end of history", he called it the acceleration of history. 
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He emphasized the need more than ever for Franco-German 
cooperation, the need for closer union to deal with new members and to 
provide aid to the East. 
He was defending again the proposals for European state building, 
for avoiding the purely "stateless market" and as with earlier clashes 
with Thatcher, showed the other extreme of the European debate. 
(Kapteyn's second scenario) (43) 
The Bruges speech may have stung Delors into that defence of his 
position, but it was at home and with her own party, that the Bruges 
speech would produce its most damaging and ultimately self-destructive 
. affects on Thatcher. 
196 
7. T H E M A J O R SPEECHES. 
1 Willis, N , quoted in, Sampson, A, The Essential Anatomy of Britain 
(Lx^ndon, 1992), p. 139. 
2 Delors, J, The Report of the 120th Trades Union Congress, 5th-9th 
September, 1988, in Bournmouth. Reported by M . Cherer, Official 
Reporters. (London, 1988), p. 568. See also Lawson, N, The View 
From Number Eleven (London, 1993), p. 907. "The Theme of 
control rather than deregulation could not have been more clearly 
expressed, nor a more explicit rejection of the British government's 
vision of Europe." Woolcock, S, et. al., Britain, Germany and 1992 
(London, 1991), p. 95. The British government stressed the need 
for the market to be open, especially in the period leading up to the 
Rhodes summit in December 1988, when a debate on fortress 
Europe was at its height. 
3 Delors, J, Speech to the TUC, p. 568. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 570. 
8 Shore, P, interviewed in, Elliott, M , The Poisoned Chalice (BBCTV, 
1996). 
9 Cole, J, .4s It Seems To Me (London, 1995), p. 306. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Woolcock, et. al., Britain, Germany, pp. 94-114. 
13 Willis, N , quoted in, Sampson, The Essential Anatomy, p. 139. 
14 Todd, R, (General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers 
Union) speech to the TUC, in Elliott, The Poisoned Chalice. 
See also, George, S, Politics and Policy in the European Comunity 
(Oxford, 1991), p. 216. "British trade unions came to see the 
prospects of improving conditions of their members better at the 
community level than at the national level." Grant, C, Inside The 
House That Jacques Built (London, 1994), p. 89. Thatcher helped 
this conversion: " . . . . i f she hated the EC so much, there had to be 
197 
something good about it." Kapteyn, P, The Stateless Market 
(London, 1996), p. 147. The TUC's influence had been at state 
level and the lack of a European state has meant they had litde 
influence in Europe. "They should organize themselves at European 
level but are caught in the dilemma of the transfer of decision 
making to a European level." Their influence is therefore less than 
business. 
15 Delors, J, Speech to the TUC, p. 570. 
16 fbid. 
17 Thatcher, M The Downing Street Years (London, 1993), p. 742. 
See also Powell, C, quoted in. Grant, Inside The House, p. 89. 
18 Delors, J, quoted in, Grant, Inside The House, p. 89. See also, 
Elliott, The Poisoned Chalice. Delors sanctified the TUC by 
attending and wanted the left to love Europe. 
19 Howe, G, Co/7///cf o f loya/ i^ (London, 1994), p. 537. See also, 
Lawson, The View From, p. 907. The FCO thought the invitation 
might make the unions and the Labour party less hostile to the 
EC. it was scarcely a triumph of diplomacy to have been 
instrumental in greatly widening the already dangerous rift between 
the British Prime Minister and the President of the European 
Commission." Powell, C, interviewed in, Elliott, The Poisoned 
Chalice. Powell called Thatcher's reaction "volcanic." Young, H, 
One of US (London, 1993), p. 549. Thatcher was "roused to fury." 
Powell, C, quoted in. Grant, Inside The House, p. 89. They felt 
Delors had "spoiled " a successful period of the EC when they had 
been able to "focus on enlargement and the single market." Ibid., 
Thatcher was enraged because Delors delivered his speech in 
Britain. Elliott, The Poisoned Chalice. Thatcher's temper was not 
improved when she discovered the FCO had arranged Delors visit. 
Howe "wanted to build bridges between the UK and Europe." 
20 Lawson, The View From, p. 907. "Later that same month it was 
Margaret's turn to put the boot in, with her famous Bruges speech." 
21 Powell, C, quoted in. Young, One of Us, p. 548. See also, Elliott, 
The Poisoned Chalice. Powell said Thatcher returned early from 
her holidays on another matter, then rather than going back on 
holiday she wrote the Bruges speech. 
22 Dickie, J, Inside the Foreign Office (London, 1992), p. 282. 
23 Ibid. See also, Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 537. "..my people had 
given up the tussle." " I had myself departed for a tour of East and 
198 
Central Africa on 10th September." 
24 Thatcher, M, Speech to the College of Europe, Bruges, 20th 
September 1988. Britain and Europe: The Bruges Speech 
(\jondon, 1988). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 744. 
27 Lawson, The View From, p. 907. See also, Ingham, B, interviewed 
in, Elliott, The Poisoned Chalice. He had to brief the press in 
simple terms; it was no good being subtle with the tabloid press. 
The accusations and counter accusations regarding Ingham's briefing 
of the press are explored further in the next chapter. 
28 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 744. 
29 Swann, D, "The Single Market and Beyond - An Overview", pp. 3-25 
in D. Swann (ed), The Single European Market and Beyond 
(London, 1992), p. 18. 
30 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 744. 
31 Delors, J, and Butler, M , interviewed in, Elliott, The Poisoned 
Chalice. 
32 Elliott, The Poisoned Chalice. The Bruges speech has now become 
the symbol of Tory divisions over Europe. 
33 Ridley, N, My Style of Government (London, 1991), p. 146. 
34 Lawson, N, interviewed in, Elliott, The Poisoned Chalice. 
35 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 537. 
36 Ibid., p. 538. 
37 Howe, G, quoted in. Young, One of Us, p. 550. It was the accident 
of office which prevented her opposing entry and that she played 
only a "slight part" in the 1975 referendum campaign. See also, 
Benn, A, The Benn Diaries Qjondon, 1995), p. 310. Benn was told 
that Thatcher stopped the Tory constituency parties working flat out 
for a "yes" vote. This was the price demanded by the 
anti-marketeers for their support of her in the leadership election. 
38 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 538. See also, Cole, As It Seems, p. 
306. A traditional Tory looking at events after Bruges: "This 
government believes its own propaganda about Britain's success. 
199 
We're in danger of finishing up as a rainswept island off the coast 
of Europe." Swann, "The Single Market and Beyond", p. 25. 
Holland, M, European Community Integration (New York, 1993), p. 
55. Thatcher believed the EC should be built around the active 
cooperation of independent sovereign states. Taylor, P, "The New 
Dynamics of EC Integration", pp. 3-25 in J. Lodge (ed). The 
European Community and the Challenge of the Future 
(London, 1989), p. 22. She saw a role for the Commission and the 
speech was concerned with striking a balance between 
supra-nationalism and national sovereignty; to slow the integration 
process and salvage some sovereignty. George, Politics and Policy, 
p. 185. George called her view "a resistance to the logic of 
spillover and that she was reminding many of de Gaulle's stance on 
the issue." Defarges, P, "John Bull's Divided Love", p. 20 in The 
Guardian, 27th September, 1994. Her view was "deregulation, 
intergovernmental cooperation and a strong alliance with the US." 
He also pointed to her fear of the Commission and its 
protectionism. 
39 Kapteyn, The Stateless Market, p. 110. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Delors, J, quoted in, Allen, D, "The European Community and the 
New Europe", pp. in D. Swann (ed). The Single European Market, 
p. 233. 
42 Delors, J, quoted in. Grant, Inside The House, p. 130. 
43 Kapteyn, The Stateless Market, p. 69. 
200 
8. D E P A R T U R E : T H E P R A G M A T I C SURVIVOR. NO NO NO 
A N D T R E A C H E R Y W I T H A SMILE ON ITS FACE. 
The end of Jacques Delors' decade as President of the European 
Commission coincided with the downward cycle of his strategy.-(1) 
After her third general election victory in 1987, she developed an 
arrogant sense that she was politically immortal. (2) 
This assessment has concentrated upon the differences between the 
principle antagonists. However, there were similarities, because both 
had an ideological belief in their actions, the desire, force of character, 
courage and the willpower to turn ideas into reality. Both had the 
ability to use power to achieve their ends and to dominate, especially 
their immediate subordinates. 
The reason for the political survival of Delors and not of Thatcher 
was perhaps his ability to compromise, to listen to argument and to 
steer the course he believed to be successful rather than the "correct" 
one. Despite his ardent personalist and socialist beliefs, he was a 
pragmatist: " I have tended to favour a pragmatic approach of putting 
forward an objective and suggesting a strategy." (3) To Ross he had 
"....a vision and a strategy. The Community had a brief window of 
opportunity to deepen itself before a menacing international market 
system dominated by the Americans and Japanese crashed in on it." (4) 
He always believed his job was to provide ideas, momentum and 
initiative and in that goal he succeeded. 
He could accommodate and with great skill keep most people on 
board for his European vision. Delors gained influential friends from 
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both left and right, the most important being Kohl and Mitterrand. He 
was prepared to start with the single market, to slowly introduce more 
and to move away from the stateless market. He could skilfully use 
European rhetoric, although he used it on occasions to invoke French 
concerns. He intended to achieve his goal, not by Thatcher's method of 
attacking opponents but by smaller steps using coalition building, moral 
pressure and in some cases apocalyptic warnings: "Too often Europe 
had hung about arguing on the station platform while history's trains 
have departed." (5) 
In his first Commission he worked with and became close to 
Cockfield and Natali, both of whom worked closely with him, especially 
during the SEA process. In the second Commission, he would not 
overrule strong commissioners like Andriesson, Bangerman and 
especially Brittan. Ross made the point that this inner core of 
commissioners were all liberals but Delors still managed to achieve 
much, perhaps because they argued among themselves as much as with 
him. (6) However, he would have public rows with Brittan, a 
"diplomatically regulated state of conflict" and Macsharry, especially 
when the subject was close to his heart, like the CAP and EC 
negotiations during the GATT Uruguay round. (7) Ross commented 
that Macsharry became Delors' betes noires "to the point that Delors 
overlooked the agriculture commissioner's considerable merits as a 
negotiator." (8) 
Even when in a minority, he resisted US bullying over GATT when 
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his traditional French distrust of the US came to the fore. He always 
emphasized the rights of workers, especially farmers, whom he believed 
were at the veiy heart of the French community. Although he never 
forgot his roots or his instincts about protection he did on occasions, 
put EC interests ahead of both French national interests and his 
socialist belief. Delors was thus distrusted by the Parti Socialiste, 
which he did not officially join until 1979. He even received the 
ultimate insult from the French press, that he was "a creature of 
Anglo-Saxon liberalism." (9) 
He seemed more of an internationalist than a nationalist. His 
message was that a Europe which remained a collection of competing 
nation states would be weakened in the face of global competition and 
global problems. Like Monnet, he believed that the states of Europe 
had a common history much older than the cold war and that they 
should be able to manage joint policies. Delors wrote: "What is 
essential said Jean Monnet is that there should be no more separate 
national actions, but European actions instead." (10) 
In his article "Europe's Ambitions," he wrote about economic blocks 
taking shape and how Europe was at a disadvantage by not having 
penetrated the Japanese market. He wanted Europe to preserve its 
cultural identity in the face of US influence and believed it should go 
further than the Lome conventions in its relations with the third world. 
(11) To him, the SEM seemed an acknowledgment of the world 
moving into economic blocks and that the EC's dominant economic 
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position gave it responsibilities and a political role which could only be 
reconciled with a federal type structure. (12) 
His "Russian Dolls" strategy, came very close to success but in the 
end he was frustrated by events. Recession, German reunification and 
the later referendums in Denmark and France perhaps did more 
damage than the famous handbag. The referendums illustrated the 
danger of politicians pushing too far ahead of public opinion and they 
made Delors feel uncertain about Europe's future. 
Delors retired with grace at the end of his term. His ambitions and 
visions were unfulfilled, but the qualified success of his presidency laid 
the foundations for future EC development. He also appeared to have 
a future in French politics. 
Cockfield thought "the highpoint of Jacques Delors' ambitions for 
rapid progress to European Union" came at the Rome Council in 
October 1990, when the member states agreed to set up an IGC on 
E M U and one on political union. This Council also provided the 
"trigger" for the events which led to the downfall of Thatcher. (13) 
By contrast with Delors, Thatcher was destroyed by her own party. 
Although a pragmatic realist in high politics, for ideological reasons she 
was aggressive, impatient and intransigent when dealing with the EC. 
Through this attitude she destroyed the support of her longest seizing 
Cabinet colleagues and, according to Howe, she progressively "curtailed 
Cabinet debate." (14) She ultimately dissipated the support of her own 
followers in the party, many of whom were more concerned about their 
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own survival than about her concerns about Europe. 
Her report on the Rome Council and her performance at the 
despatch box frohi 3.30pm on 30th October 1990 was perhaps the time 
when she really lost control. Her attack upon the EC was so venomous, 
emotional and full of vilification that it could have been an attack upon 
Argentina, Arthur Scargill or others she considered to be enemies of 
the state. According to Cole, Douglas Hurd and others had worked 
carefully on the text, in order to "keep a divided Conservative party 
appearing as united as possible." (15) This proved a fruitless task. On 
the subject of EMU, Thatcher said: "And again I emphasized that we 
would not be prepared to have a single currency imposed upon us, nor 
to surrender the use of the pound sterling as our currency." (16) Later 
in the same speech she repeated her criticism of the EC which, in her 
opinion, would not discuss what she wanted to talk about: "The 
Community finds it more difficult to take the urgent detailed decisions 
than to discuss longer term concepts." (17) Neil Kinnock's reply 
touched upon the pertinent question of why she signed the SEA: "In 
1985 she whipped and guillotined the SEA through the House. In June 
1989 at Madrid she formally agreed with other heads of government to 
be determined to achieve the progressive realization of economic and 
monetary union...." (18) 
This criticism of her apparently contradictory position, and 
subsequent questions from the House, provoked the famous reply and 
attack upon her former colleague Brittan, Delors, the Commission and 
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all its works. To Cole, the question and answer session was when 
Thatchers "stream of consciousness tended to take over from Whitehall 
caution." (19) "As a friend of Hurd's said later, she was bowled a soft 
ball and could not help hitting it out of sight." (20) This reply cost 
Thatcher Howe's support and her premiership: 
Leon Brittan is a loyal member of the Commission. Yes the 
Commission wants to increase its powers. Yes it is a 
non-elected body and I do not want the Commission to 
increase its powers at the expense of this House, so of course 
we differ. The president of the Commission .M. Delors said 
at a press conference the other day that he wanted the 
European Parliament to be the democratic body of the 
Community the Commission to be the executive and the 
Council of Ministers to be the senate. No No No! (21) 
During those exchanges she repeated all her old antagonisms: the 
Commission was striving to extinguish democracy, to put power in the 
hands of non-elected officials and EMU was the backdoor to federalism. 
(22) 
The results of this exchange brought applause from fellow 
Eurosceptic's but others, including Howe, were dismayed. The party 
that had started Thatcher's reign as the party of Europe had become 
hopelessly and deeply divided. Cole observed that, "the faces of 
Geoffrey Howe, Douglas Hurd and John Major behind her on the front 
bench were studies in inscrutability." (23) This was too much for Howe 
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and he resigned. Despite the public comments of Ministers to the 
contrary, there was unrest in the party after the resignation of Howe. 
To Lawson, Howe's resignation "was chiefly dictated by Margaret's 
notorious no no no assault on Jacques Delors and the European 
Commission." (24) Cole presumed it was Howe's resignation which 
"undermined her" because he had been her deputy (in title rather than 
reality) for fifteen months and her ally in countless battles for many 
years. (25) Howe was greatly perturbed by her tone and said so in his 
memoirs. He saw the danger of her fighting the next election on that 
nationalist platform; (26) a position which also removed her from the 
"centre of gravity of her own Cabinet." (27) 
The nationalist platform was echoed in the tabloid press, which 
Ingham "could most readily influence." (28) The chauvinist and 
xenophobic flavour of the "Up yours, Delors" article illustrated the 
danger of that type of popular nationalism taking hold and devaluing 
political debate. (29) That attitude was perhaps the simplistic 
down-market result of the infamous "Diet of Brussels" European 
election campaign, which brought such disastrous results and put both 
the Labour party and Michael Heseltine's supporters in the opposing 
camp concerning Europe. (30) 
Howe saw Thatcher's views as a decisive break with the past, away 
from the thirty-year vision of Macmillan's concept, and perhaps more 
important, "she was breaking with Europe....the logic of Bruges taken to 
extremes.... and I had to break with her." (31) He came to the 
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"regretful conclusion" that it was time for him to leave. (32) His letter 
of resignation again highlighted the Messina scenario, when he had said 
the mood she struck made it more difficult for Britain to influence 
events in Europe. (33) Her reply still talked of the "party of Europe." 
(34) 
Howe, who had supported Thatcher for many years, split with her 
over their conflicting approaches to Europe. Both supported the 
concept of the stateless market and the free trade and open market 
which that entailed but he wanted Britain to be involved in the 
momentum which followed it. He was more pragmatic than Thatcher 
and saw greater British influence in Europe by being on the inside, 
contributing to the debate over, for example, EMU rather than 
obstructing it. Although with a different political belief, Howe like 
Delors was prepared to be pragmatic on European issues and would 
compromise and reach a consensus. In contrast to them both, 
Thatcher resorted to overtly nationalist rhetoric to support her 
socio-economic objections to change in the EC and found it increasingly 
difficult to differentiate between the two. 
Following talk that he did not disagree with government policy, Howe 
made his resignation speech on 13th November 1990 and it led to 
Thatchers demise. With great skill and quiet venom, he opened the 
door to a challenge to her leadership and illustrated her paranoia and 
personal animosity against Delors and what she perceived as the threat 
of the EC. 
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We must at all cost avoid presenting ourselves yet again 
with an over simplified choice, a false antithesis, a bogus 
dilemma between one alternative, starkly labelled cooperation 
bet-ween independent sovereign states and a second crudely 
labelled alternative centralized federal super-state, as if 
there were no middle way between....the nightmare image 
sometimes conjured up by my RHF, who seems sometimes 
to look upon the continent that is positively teeming with ill 
intentioned people scheming in her words to extinguish 
democracy to dissolve our national identit)' and to lead us 
through the back door to a federal Europe. (35) 
The speech persuaded Heseltine to make a challenge for the leadership, 
for which he had been waiting since resigning from the Cabinet in 1986. 
He took sufficient votes to successfully wound her and to cause her to 
resign, following the high drama of the ballot result and her 
consultation with the Cabinet. (36) Alan Clark provided a cynical view 
of the events: "There are no true friends in politics. We are all sharks 
circling, and waiting, for traces of blood to appear in the water." (37) 
"The poisoned chalice had claimed its most eminent victim." (Europe) 
(38) 
There were several reasons for her defeat. Many in the party did not 
see Europe as a danger, as she did. They had grown tired of the 
hectoring and wanted a change of policy over Europe, which many felt 
she was handling badly. Many agreed with Howe, who felt her position 
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was leading to isolation. Perhaps most importantly, there was a danger 
of splitting the party. There always existed an ideological rift in the 
Conservative party between the dry neo-liberal right-wing faction which 
was sceptical about Europe and the one-nation tories who were more 
accommodating. The split meant that, when it came to the crux of the 
matter, she lost the support of her Cabinet, with whom she had become 
less dominant after the sacking of her "wet" opponents in 1981. (39) 
By 1990, she was isolated in Cabinet and the forced resignation of 
her staunch ally Ridley was crucial: "He was her last truly loyal friend, 
the last of the Thatcherites, who were in government with a consistent 
ideological purpose." (40) He was bitter about her demise and said her 
critics were motivated by personal animosity towards her and a "desire 
to be loved in Europe." He put the reasons for her removal down to 
ideology, her free market approach and the EC's instinctive desire for 
protection. (41) Lawson gave an additional motive when he said the 
consei-vatives felt they could win the election under another leader. His 
criticism of her was damming: "She had become reckless over Europe, 
reckless over the poll tax, reckless over what she said in public and 
reckless over her colleagues." (42) Government unpopularity, the poll 
tax and the obvious divisions at the heart of government contributed to 
her fall but, to John Young, European policy was one of the most 
important. (43) Europe was the anvil which broke her and her 
ideological myopia on the issue meant that she did not realize she had 
lost the support of her party. Howe made the point that she equated 
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herself with Britain and that criticism was unpatriotic; her own 
sovereignty was linked to the nation's sovereignty. (44) When he was 
interviewed recently by Hugo Young, Delors said " I may have been a 
pawn in an internal British debate." (45) 
Delors did not rejoice that his tormenter had gone and later, by way 
of a compliment, he compared her to her successor: " I never wasted my 
time when I talked with her. She was always well informed on 
economic and monetary matters." (46) Delors knew that she was the 
greatest unifying force for the other members and that, without her, 
divisions would soon appear. Lawson judged: "By 1989 she had 
become the Community's great unifying force - and the unity she had 
forged was a unity against the UK." (47) The pragmatist Delors, his 
dream denied, lived to fight another day and departed with honour. 
Thatcher's reward for never losing an election was "treachery with a 
smile on its face." (48) 
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9. CONCLUSION. 
Jacques Delors and Margaret Thatcher had more in common than 
either would care to admit. They stood out as rare ideologues in 
an age of grey and managerial politicians. (1) 
There were several contributing factors to the antipathy between 
Thatcher and Delors. These included: concerns over national interest 
and identity; the influence of domestic party and internal party politics; 
the role of economic interest groups; and the views of elite groups. 
However, this assessment has illustrated that their antipathy was 
intensified by a distinct socio-economic ideological divide. They had 
conflicting visions about the future of the EC and no meeting of minds 
over the fundamental issue of the role of the market in society, the role 
of the state and the relationship between the two. 
Thatcher supported the neo-liberal criticism of the Keynesian 
consensus state and this she transferred to the EC. This added to her 
traditional British hostility and suspicion of Europe. She was a political 
realist, which contrasted with and came into conflict with the more 
integrationist views of the EC. She could negotiate successfully in high 
politics but when economics became involved she resisted like a zealot. 
Thus the arguments over the BBQ and CAP which had existed 
previously, were escalated and the rhetoric sharpened. 
Her antagonism developed with Delors, whom she saw as the 
epitome of the EC and its culture. Her neo-liberal concepts came into 
conflict with the equally determined Delors, whose personalist, socialist 
and dirigiste doctrine provided his motivation and grande mission. 
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Personalism is a belief which is highly critical of liberalism. 
Their attitude to the US also illustrated a division between the two. 
The role of the US and the special relationship with Britain have been a 
hindrance to Britain's involvement with the EC for many years. 
However, she wanted a very special relationship, especially during the 
Reagan years, and he had the French personalist and Gaullist suspicion 
of US economic and cultural motives. 
The chasm between them over the future of Europe was illustrated 
in the post-1985 era of the EC, when the SEA and its ramifications 
became major issues. They worked in partnership to produce the SEA 
but both had different visions of it. Thatcher saw it as purely negative 
integration with the removal of all barriers to trade creating a Europe 
san fronteirs - a giant stateless market of an expanding community of 
nation states where the state, especially the potential European 
super-state, played a small role. There would be a total free flow of the 
market, which is described in Kapteyn's first scenario. Despite 
misgivings and a degree of self delusion, she agreed to the Q M V and 
signed the SEA in the belief that it would create her vision. She 
seemed to be unaware of the possibility of the negative integration of 
the SEA becoming positive. 
By contrast, Delors' interpretation was that the SEA was a stage on 
the road to greater integration. He did not want the stateless market, 
he wanted state-like .structures to complement the market and this clash 
can be seen in the long running debates over the paquet Delors, EMU, 
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social dimension and political union. This is Kapteyn's second scenario. 
She believed the paquet Delors was a move away from the free 
market towards protectionism, whereas he saw it as helping poorer 
members, increasing EC funds and a Europeanization of problem 
solving. 
E M U was anathema to her because the fixed exchange rate conflicted 
with her monetarist belief in the control of the money supply to reduce 
inflation; she saw E M U as regulation, control and Keynesianism and 
that was her bete noire. By contrast, Delors saw the E M U as a political 
objective required to make the SEA work. He saw it all as one; the 
single market required a single currency and this natural progression 
from the SEA would be an integral part of EC state building. 
To Thatcher, the social dimension would pervert and destroy the free 
flow of the labour market. It was European-style regulation where none 
was needed. She saw it as a return to corporatism, which stops 
enterprise and competition. Delors saw it as vital to provide social 
dialogue, to include eveiyone and not just the business community, to 
harmonize the social provision in the SEM and to prevent social 
dumping. 
Political union was spurred by the reunification of Germany. To 
Thatcher, reunification meant a change in the balance of power and, 
through her old-fashioned realist stance, she tried to resist the 
inevitable. Political union was the sort of visionary language she hated 
when she believed there were greater priorities. To Delors, 
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reunification meant a speeding up of the process of political union, in 
order to tie the new larger and stronger Germany more closely to 
Europe. She resisted these attempts at European state building with 
strong rhetoric which in many cases did not match the reality. She 
stayed at the negotiating table, she did not invoke the Luxembourg 
compromise, but she became isolated. 
The divide between Thatcher and Delors can also be seen in their 
contrasting views on regulation. Her extreme version of the traditional 
British reluctance to regulate compared to his more European view that 
regulation was a vital part of the system, which needed to be enshrined 
in statute and was required to make the market work. 
Thatcher resented Delors promoting his views at the TUC and, in 
response, articulated her vision of Europe at Bruges. The clash was 
becoming more personal and Howe's attempts to bring them together 
failed. The Bruges speech, combined with the emotive venom and 
negative essence of Thatcher's no no no assault upon Delors, provoked 
Howe into following Lawson into resignation. Her comments showed a 
personal animosity towards Delors and their battle seemed to have 
become her raison d' etre. The architects of Thatcherism had gone and 
she soon followed. 
Thatcher's and Delors' views represented the extremes of the 
European debate, neither of which has come to fruition. Her vision of 
Europe failed because the negative integration of the stateless market 
has been regulated by the social dimension, E M U is a possibility and 
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political union is still on the horizon. However, Delors' vision of 
positive integration and European state building is still far from reality, 
with a great reluctance by member states to cede more-power from each 
national forum. The realities of the EC are perhaps Kapteyn's Third 
Scenario, with limited progress towards integration and with 
intergovernmental bargaining diluting attempts at state building. The 
EC is more than the stateless market of Thatcher but less than the 
European state of Delors. 
The divisions between the two were many, both political and 
personal, and overriding them all was an ideological chasm with no 
mutual comprehension of each others point of view, which produced an 
argument between political zealots both of whom believed they were 
right. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
1 Grant, C, Inside The House That Jacques Built (Ijondon, 1994), p. 
87. 
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